New York Law Review

Tag: Urban Renewal

  • Westchester Creek Corp. v. New York City School Constr. Auth., 795 N.E.2d 300 (N.Y. 2003): Eminent Domain & Prior Public Use Doctrine

    Westchester Creek Corp. v. New York City School Constr. Auth., 1 N.Y.3d 1, 795 N.E.2d 300 (N.Y. 2003)

    When the legislature has authorized condemnation of city-owned property for a public purpose (here, a school), the prior public use doctrine does not automatically bar condemnation even if the property is already dedicated to another public use (here, urban renewal), provided the condemning authority complies with statutory procedures for notifying the city.

    Summary

    Westchester Creek Corporation (WCC) challenged the School Construction Authority’s (SCA) condemnation of its leasehold interest in city-owned property for the construction of a new school. WCC argued that the SCA lacked statutory authority, that urban renewal (WCC’s existing use) was a superior public use, and that it had a constitutional right to develop the property. The New York Court of Appeals held that the SCA had complied with the statutory requirements for condemning city-owned land and that the prior public use doctrine did not bar the condemnation because the legislature expressly permitted condemnation of city-owned property for school construction, provided certain procedures were followed.

    Facts

    In 1976, the City of New York leased several parcels of land, including Lot 70, to WCC for 90 years under a master lease for urban renewal. In 1987, Lot 70 was severed from the master lease with a similar lease term. WCC developed some of the parcels but only performed minimal work on Lot 70. The SCA sought to condemn Lot 70 to build an elementary/intermediate school to alleviate overcrowding in nearby schools.

    Procedural History

    SCA provided written notice to the Mayor and City Council of its intent to use Lot 70, and the City Council approved the site plan. After a public hearing, the SCA president determined that condemnation was necessary. The Supreme Court entered an order condemning WCC’s leasehold. WCC appealed to the Appellate Division, which confirmed the SCA’s determination. WCC then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the School Construction Authority (SCA) has the statutory authority to condemn city-owned property already dedicated to urban renewal.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Public Authorities Law expressly permits the condemnation of city-owned property, even if it is already dedicated to another public use such as urban renewal, provided the condemning authority follows the statutory procedures for obtaining the city’s consent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while Public Authorities Law § 1728(6) grants the SCA broad condemnation powers, it also requires compliance with § 1729(2) when condemning city property or property in which the city has an interest. This section mandates a written request to the Mayor, who has 30 days to object. The Court found that SCA’s written notice to the Mayor satisfied this requirement. The Court addressed the prior public use doctrine, noting that the Public Authorities Law allows the condemnation of city-owned property if the city, through the Mayor, has the right to object. While the Legislature has called urban redevelopment “a superior public use,” it also stated that “'[t]here can be no higher priority than creating a physical environment in the schools that fosters rather than impedes, the education of our children’” (quoting the New York City School Construction Authority Act). The Court emphasized § 1728(6), which explicitly allows condemnation of city-owned property. As SCA followed the statutory procedures, it was authorized to condemn the property. The court explicitly found that Article XVIII, § 1 of the NY State Constitution gives the legislature the power to establish urban renewal projects, but it does not confer any protection on redevelopers against condemnation. The court emphasized that SCA has unquestioned authority to act to relieve severe school overcrowding.

  • Jo & Wo Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 962 (1989): Public Authority’s Power to Sell Property Without Competitive Bidding

    Jo & Wo Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 962 (1989)

    A public authority, having acquired property at its own expense, may sell that property without adhering to the competitive bidding requirements typically imposed on the City, even if the City retains a contingent reversionary interest.

    Summary

    This case concerns the sale of the New York Coliseum by the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (TBTA) to Boston Properties without competitive bidding. The plaintiff, Jo & Wo Realty Corp., challenged the sale, arguing that it violated the New York City Charter’s competitive bidding requirements. The Court of Appeals held that because the TBTA acquired the property at its own expense, it was authorized to sell it without competitive bidding, even though the City had a contingent reversionary interest. This decision clarifies the scope of a public authority’s power to dispose of property it owns and developed.

    Facts

    In 1953, the TBTA purchased property from the City of New York as part of an urban renewal project, paying $2.1 million. The TBTA developed the property into the New York Coliseum. Years later, after the Javits Convention Center was built, the TBTA found the Coliseum economically unsustainable and decided to sell it to Boston Properties without competitive bidding. The Public Authorities Law authorized the City to convey land to the TBTA for as long as the TBTA’s corporate existence continued.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff, Jo & Wo Realty Corp., challenged the sale, alleging that it violated the New York City Charter’s competitive bidding requirements. The lower courts ruled in favor of the City and TBTA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City of New York and the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (TBTA) may sell real property to a private developer without complying with the competitive bidding requirements of section 384 of the New York City Charter, where the TBTA acquired the property at its own expense.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Public Authorities Law authorizes the TBTA to sell property acquired at its own expense without competitive bidding, and the City’s contingent reversionary interest does not alter this authority.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on interpreting the relevant statutes within the Public Authorities Law. The court emphasized that the TBTA acquired the property at its own expense, distinguishing it from property conveyed to the TBTA by the City without consideration. The court cited Public Authorities Law § 553 (4-a) (b), which allows the TBTA to sell or convey property “acquired by the city at the expense of the authority.” According to the court, this provision authorized the sale without competitive bidding. The court also addressed the plaintiff’s argument that the City retained ownership with a reversion to the City. The court stated that the TBTA could convey both its interest and the City’s contingent reversionary interest “in behalf of [the] city” (Public Authorities Law § 553 [4-a] [b]). The court cited Matter of New York Post Corp. v Moses, 10 NY2d 199, 205. The court declined to address the plaintiff’s argument concerning the Urban Renewal Law, deeming it unnecessary in light of its statutory interpretation. The court’s reasoning underscores the principle that specific statutory provisions governing public authorities can override general municipal requirements regarding competitive bidding when the authority has independently funded the acquisition and development of the property.

  • Binghamton Urban Renewal Agency v. Manculich, 69 N.Y.2d 424 (1987): Statute of Limitations in Eminent Domain Proceedings

    Binghamton Urban Renewal Agency v. Manculich, 69 N.Y.2d 424 (1987)

    Under New York’s Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL), the statute of limitations for commencing condemnation proceedings runs from the completion of the procedure that forms the basis of exemption from the requirement of making new findings, even if the project is later amended.

    Summary

    The Binghamton Urban Renewal Agency (BURA) sought to condemn the remaining parcels of land for its Clinton Street Redevelopment Project. Landowners challenged the condemnation based on the statute of limitations. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations began to run from the initial approval of the project in 1980, not from a later amendment in 1983, because the initial approval was the basis for BURA’s exemption from conducting additional hearings and findings. Since the condemnation proceedings were commenced more than three years after the initial approval, they were time-barred.

    Facts

    In March 1980, BURA adopted the Clinton Street Redevelopment Project. The City Planning Commission and City Council approved the project in April 1980, making a finding of blight. The landowners’ land was within the project area. BURA amended the project plan twice in 1980, and again in April 1983, addressing commercial development. BURA acquired most parcels through negotiation between 1980 and 1985 but could not reach agreement with the landowners. In November and December 1985, BURA commenced proceedings to condemn the landowners’ land.

    Procedural History

    Special Term denied the landowners’ motion to dismiss the condemnation proceedings, ruling that the statute of limitations had not expired and entered judgment for BURA. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the statute of limitations for commencing condemnation proceedings under the Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL) began to run from the initial approval of the urban renewal project or from a subsequent amendment to the project plan.

    Holding

    No, because the procedure that formed the basis of BURA’s exemption from further compliance with EDPL 204 was completed when the plan was initially adopted and approved in April 1980. The 1983 amendment did not involve a new consideration of the factors enumerated in EDPL 204.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court focused on when the procedure that formed the basis of BURA’s exemption under EDPL 206 was completed. BURA claimed exemptions under EDPL 206(A) and (C), arguing it had already considered factors similar to those required under EDPL 204. The court assumed that BURA met the exemption requirements. EDPL 401(A)(2) provides a three-year limitations period from “the date of the order or completion of the procedure that constitutes the basis of exemption under section two hundred six”. The court stated, “The procedure that formed the basis of the exemption claimed by BURA was completed by April 1980 when the ordinance was adopted and approved.” The court rejected BURA’s argument that the limitations period ran from the 1983 amendment, stating that no new consideration of the factors enumerated in EDPL 204 occurred then. The court also rejected the argument that EDPL 401(C), which provides a ten-year limitations period for projects carried out in stages, applied because proceedings for the first stage were not commenced within the initial three-year period. The court noted that BURA was not without recourse, as EDPL 401(B) allows the limitations period to be revived if the condemnor again complies with the provisions of article two.

  • Benson Realty Corp. v. Walsh, 41 N.Y.2d 777 (1977): Municipality’s Power to Amend Urban Renewal Plans

    Benson Realty Corp. v. Walsh, 41 N.Y.2d 777 (1977)

    A municipality may amend an urban renewal plan if the alteration is not major and does not alter the essential nature of the project, and procedural requirements for amending resolutions are satisfied.

    Summary

    Benson Realty Corp. challenged an amendment to an urban renewal plan by the New York City Board of Estimate, arguing that the redesignation of 100 family housing units to housing for the elderly in the Seward Park Extension area constituted a major change requiring a three-fourths majority vote for approval. The Court of Appeals held that the amendment was not a major alteration, and a simple majority vote was sufficient to approve the amendment, as long as the final, amended plan received the required three-fourths majority vote when passed at the same meeting. The court also found that there was adequate public comment on the housing type.

    Facts

    The New York City Board of Estimate approved an urban renewal plan for the Seward Park Extension area. Subsequently, the Board amended the proposal to redesignate 100 out of 1,341 units from family housing to housing for the elderly. The amendment and the proposed plan were introduced at the same Board meeting. The amendment was approved by a simple majority, while the entire plan, as amended, was approved by a vote of 9 to 2.

    Procedural History

    The case originated from a challenge to the Board of Estimate’s amendment of the urban renewal plan. The Appellate Division’s order was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the redesignation of 100 family housing units to housing for the elderly in an urban renewal plan constitutes a major alteration requiring a three-fourths majority vote for approval under the New York City Charter.

    2. Whether the legislative procedure followed by the Board of Estimate in approving the amendment and the amended plan complied with the requirements of the New York City Charter.

    3. Whether there was adequate opportunity for public comment on the question of whether housing for families or the elderly should be built.

    Holding

    1. No, because the alteration was not a major one and did not alter the essential nature of the project.

    2. Yes, because a simple majority was sufficient to approve the amendment, and the amended resolution was passed by a three-fourths vote at the same meeting, satisfying the requirements of the New York City Charter.

    3. Yes, because there was an adequate opportunity for public comment on the question of whether housing for families or the elderly should be built.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the redesignation of 100 units out of a much larger number (1,341) did not constitute a major alteration to the urban renewal plan. Referencing Margulis v. Lindsay and Fisher v. Becker, the court emphasized that the amendment was within the Board’s power because it did not alter the essential nature of the project.

    Regarding the voting procedure, the court interpreted Section 62 of the New York City Charter, which requires a three-fourths vote for a resolution or amendment passed at the same meeting it was originally presented. The court held that this provision was designed to prevent hasty action. Allowing a simple majority to approve the amendment, while requiring a three-fourths vote for the final amended resolution passed at the same meeting, satisfied the policy of the section. The court emphasized that a simple majority could approve an amendment, but the amended resolution needed the three-fourths vote if passed at the same meeting.

    The Court also found that adequate opportunity for public comment had been provided on the question of housing preference (families or elderly).

    The court’s decision emphasizes the broad discretion afforded to municipalities in modifying urban renewal plans, provided the changes are not drastic and procedural safeguards are followed. The decision also clarifies the interplay between simple and supermajority voting requirements in municipal legislative processes.

  • Yonkers Community Development Agency v. Morris, 37 N.Y.2d 478 (1975): Eminent Domain and Public Use for Urban Renewal

    Yonkers Community Development Agency v. Morris, 37 N.Y.2d 478 (1975)

    Land condemned for urban renewal constitutes a public purpose when it addresses substandard conditions, even if a private entity ultimately benefits from the redevelopment, provided the primary purpose is to eliminate blight.

    Summary

    This case examines the permissible scope of eminent domain for urban renewal, specifically whether condemning land for a private company’s expansion constitutes a valid “public purpose.” The Court of Appeals affirmed the condemnation, holding that if the land is genuinely “substandard,” its taking serves a public purpose, even if a private entity like Otis Elevator Company ultimately benefits. The court emphasized that urban renewal aims to eliminate blight, and private involvement doesn’t invalidate the taking if the primary goal is achieved. However, the court cautioned that agencies must provide sufficient evidence to support their claims of substandard conditions; a mere conclusory statement is insufficient.

    Facts

    The City of Yonkers, through its Community Development Agency, sought to condemn land for redevelopment. The defendants, landowners and tenants in the designated area, challenged the condemnation. The Agency argued the land was “substandard” and part of an urban renewal plan. The defendants countered that the land was being taken to benefit the Otis Elevator Company, a major employer in Yonkers, for its plant expansion.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court found no factual issues requiring a trial and ruled in favor of the Agency, relying on *Kaskel v. Impellitteri*. The Appellate Division upheld this decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to determine whether the taking served a dominantly public purpose.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City of Yonkers’ condemnation of land, ostensibly for urban renewal but potentially benefiting a private company, Otis Elevator Company, constitutes a valid “public purpose” under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the New York Constitution.

    Holding

    Yes, because when land is deemed substandard according to urban renewal standards, taking it via eminent domain is permissible even if it primarily benefits a private entity like Otis Elevator Company, as long as the fundamental aim is eliminating blighted areas and the city provides sufficient evidence to support the substandard designation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that urban renewal, historically aimed at eliminating slums, had evolved to include addressing economic underdevelopment and stagnation. Taking substandard land for renewal serves a public purpose, akin to taking land for a park or school. The fact that a private entity redevelops the land doesn’t negate the public purpose, provided the land is indeed substandard. The court emphasized that the agency’s determination of substandard conditions is not self-executing and requires judicial review. Courts must have a basis to determine the existence of substandard conditions. However, in this specific case, the landowners failed to properly raise the issue of the quality of the taken land, focusing instead on the alleged improper benefit to Otis. The Court stated, “Carefully analyzed, it is clear that in such situations, courts are required to be more than rubber stamps in the determination of the existence of substandard conditions in urban renewal condemnation cases. The findings of the agency are not self-executing. A determination of public purpose must be made by the courts themselves and they must have a basis on which to do so.” Because the landowners failed to make this a key point in their defense, they were denied relief. The Court thus affirmed the lower court’s ruling, stating the subordination of a valid issue under an untenable contention means the defendant owners are no longer entitled to relief.