New York Law Review

Tag: Unlawful Seizure

  • People v. Voliton, 83 N.Y.2d 192 (1994): Resisting Arrest After Unlawful Police Seizure

    83 N.Y.2d 192 (1994)

    A defendant can be convicted of resisting arrest even if the initial attempt to detain them was unlawful, provided there was a subsequent, authorized basis for the arrest.

    Summary

    Voliton was convicted of assault and resisting arrest after an encounter with police. The Appellate Division overturned the felony assault convictions, finding the initial police seizure unlawful under People v. May. However, they upheld the convictions for reckless assault and resisting arrest. Voliton appealed, arguing a due process violation and that the resisting arrest conviction was invalid because the initial detention was unlawful. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the due process claim unpreserved and finding that the reckless assault provided a basis for a subsequent, authorized arrest, thus supporting the resisting arrest conviction, focusing on his actions after being apprehended on foot.

    Facts

    Two police officers observed Voliton in a car parked near a suspected drug location. They blocked his car and approached with weapons drawn, suspecting criminal activity. Voliton attempted to drive away, injuring the officers. Shots were fired, and Voliton was eventually apprehended after a chase and physical struggle where he punched and kicked the officers.

    Procedural History

    Voliton was convicted in the trial court of assault in the second degree (two counts), assault in the third degree, and resisting arrest. The Appellate Division overturned the second-degree assault convictions, citing an unlawful seizure, but affirmed the remaining convictions. Voliton appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether substantive due process bars convicting a defendant for actions in direct response to a police seizure later deemed illegal.
    2. Whether a resisting arrest conviction can stand when the initial attempt to detain the defendant was unlawful.

    Holding

    1. No, because the constitutional objection was raised for the first time on appeal and is therefore unpreserved.
    2. Yes, because the defendant’s commission of an assault, third degree, against one officer during the initial encounter furnished the predicate for his subsequent authorized arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held the due process argument was unpreserved because it was raised for the first time on appeal, and it did not fall under an exception to the preservation rule. The Court distinguished this case from situations impacting the court’s fundamental jurisdiction. Regarding the resisting arrest charge, the Court reasoned that although the initial attempt to detain Voliton may have been unlawful, his subsequent reckless assault of an officer provided probable cause for a lawful arrest. Because the jury found that Voliton punched and kicked the officers while they were attempting to handcuff him after the foot chase, the resisting arrest conviction was valid. The Court also cited Penal Law § 35.27, noting that a person may not use physical force to resist an arrest, authorized or unauthorized, when it reasonably appears the person is a police officer. The court highlighted the lack of a requested jury instruction regarding self-defense against excessive force. Judge Smith dissented, arguing that the trial was fundamentally flawed because the jury wasn’t instructed on justification, and they should have been informed the initial police conduct was illegal when considering the assault charge. He also argued no basis existed for the resisting arrest conviction because the initial police conduct was unlawful: “It is inconsistent for this Court, as it was for the Appellate Division, to sustain a charge of resisting arrest in the face of the conclusion that the police officers violated the law.”

  • People v. Boodle, 47 N.Y.2d 398 (1979): Attenuation Doctrine and Independent Acts in Seizure Cases

    47 N.Y.2d 398 (1979)

    An individual’s independent act, calculated to remove incriminating evidence, even after an unlawful seizure, can attenuate the taint of the illegality, making the evidence admissible.

    Summary

    The defendant was seized without probable cause. While unlawfully detained in a police car, he threw a loaded revolver out the window. Police retrieved the gun, leading to a search that revealed heroin. The Court of Appeals held that although the initial seizure was illegal, the defendant’s act of discarding the weapon was an independent action, sufficiently attenuating the taint of the unlawful seizure. Therefore, the gun and the heroin were admissible as evidence. The court emphasized the lack of purposeful police misconduct aimed at discovering evidence.

    Facts

    Detectives investigating a homicide received information that a man called “Heavy” might have relevant information. They found a man believed to be “Heavy” (the defendant), who aroused no suspicion. The detectives asked the defendant to step over to their car, then asked him to enter the vehicle. Without identifying themselves as police officers, they began driving away. One detective asked the defendant if he was “clean” and told him to keep his hands visible. The detective then saw the defendant throw a black object out the window, which was identified as a loaded .32 caliber automatic revolver. A subsequent search at the police station revealed packets of heroin on the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and a controlled substance. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the pistol and heroin were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. Special Term denied the motion to suppress. The defendant pleaded guilty to the drug charge, and a jury convicted him of the weapon offense. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s act of throwing the revolver from the car was a direct and immediate response to the illegal detention, thereby tainting the discovery of the weapon and making it inadmissible as evidence.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s act of throwing the revolver was not in direct and immediate response to the illegal detention but an independent act, the revolver, disclosed as a result of defendant’s independent act, was not tainted by the prior illegality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the initial seizure of the defendant was unlawful because the police lacked probable cause. However, the court distinguished this case from those where the defendant’s actions were a direct consequence of unlawful police action, citing People v. Baldwin, People v. Loria, and People v. Cantor. In those cases, the evidence was revealed as a spontaneous reaction to illegal police conduct. The court reasoned that the defendant’s act in this case was an independent act involving a calculated risk, rather than a spontaneous reaction. The court noted, “While the time for reflection is not measured in minutes or seconds it is measured by facts. The time must be long enough to make a choice, as the result of thought and reflection, and to act upon the choice thus made.” Furthermore, the court emphasized that the police illegality lacked the “quality of purposefulness” to uncover incriminating evidence, meaning it was not designed to discover the weapon. The court determined that suppressing the evidence would not serve the exclusionary rule’s purpose of deterring lawless police activity in this particular instance because the police conduct did not provoke the defendant’s action, nor was it intended to find evidence. Citing Wong Sun v. United States, the court reasoned that the connection between the unlawful police conduct and the discovery of the challenged evidence was “‘so attenuated as to dissipate the taint’”.

  • People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559 (1978): Limits on Vehicle Stops Based on Suspicion

    People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559 (1978)

    A vehicle stop is unlawful unless based on a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that the occupants have been, are, or are about to be engaged in criminal activity.

    Summary

    Sobotker was convicted of felony weapon possession after a gun was found in his car following a traffic stop. Police stopped the car because the occupants glanced at two bars while driving slowly. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the stop was an unlawful seizure. The court emphasized that a vehicle stop requires more than a mere hunch; it requires reasonable suspicion rooted in specific, articulable facts suggesting criminal activity. The act of glancing at a bar, even in a high-crime area, is insufficient to justify a stop.

    Facts

    Two plainclothes police officers were stationed in an unmarked car in a well-lit shopping and entertainment area in Wantagh, Long Island, due to recent burglaries. They observed a Buick driving slowly (approximately five miles per hour) towards an intersection. The car paused briefly opposite a bar (“J.T.’s”), during which the three occupants turned their heads towards the bar. The car stopped at a stop sign at the next intersection, where the occupants “glanced” towards a second bar. The police then activated their siren and lights, forcing the car to stop.

    Procedural History

    Sobotker was convicted of possession of a weapon as a felony in the trial court. His motion to suppress the weapon was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. He then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the investigative stop of the vehicle Sobotker was driving violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures under the New York State and United States Constitutions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the police lacked reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, to believe that the occupants of the vehicle had been, were, or were about to be engaged in criminal activity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on People v. Ingle, which established that vehicle stops require either a non-arbitrary traffic procedure or reasonable suspicion of a law violation. The court distinguished this case from a common-law right to inquire, stating that such a right does not include the right to unlawful seizure. The court emphasized that absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, stopping a car is an impermissible seizure. Reasonable suspicion requires “the quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to believe that criminal activity is at hand.” This standard requires more than a subjective “hunch” or “gut reaction”; it must have demonstrable roots in objective evidence.
    In this case, the court found no objective evidence of criminal activity at the time of the stop. The occupants’ act of glancing at a bar, even in a “high crime neighborhood,” did not reasonably indicate criminal conduct. The court noted that the officers’ hunch might have been correct, but a search cannot be justified solely by its results. Allowing hindsight to justify searches would erode constitutional safeguards. The court noted, “almost any series of indiscriminate seizures is bound to produce some instances of criminality that might otherwise have gone undetected or unprevented. But were hindsight alone to furnish the governing criteria, a vital constitutional safeguard of our personal security would soon be gone.” The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, the judgment vacated, and the indictment dismissed.

  • People v. Cantor, 369 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1975): Limits on Police Power to Stop and Inquire

    People v. Cantor, 369 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1975)

    The common-law right of a police officer to inquire does not include the right to unlawfully seize an individual; a seizure requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

    Summary

    Cantor was convicted of attempted possession of a weapon. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the police unlawfully seized Cantor when they encircled him with their car and persons, lacking reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court reasoned that this seizure violated Cantor’s Fourth Amendment rights, rendering the subsequent discovery of the weapon inadmissible. This case clarifies that police investigative powers are limited by constitutional protections against unreasonable seizure, requiring at least a founded suspicion of criminal activity before a person can be detained.

    Facts

    Plainclothes officers observed Cantor and a companion smoking what they believed to be marijuana in Brooklyn. The officers followed Cantor to his home in Queens. After Cantor parked, the officers blocked his car with their unmarked vehicle and approached him from multiple directions. Before the officers identified themselves, Cantor allegedly removed a pistol from his back pocket and pointed it at the officers. The officers then identified themselves, ordered Cantor to freeze, and seized the pistol, subsequently arresting him after he admitted to not having a permit. A search revealed barbiturates and marijuana on Cantor’s person and marijuana residue in his car.

    Procedural History

    Cantor was charged with possession of weapons as a felony and reckless endangerment. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing his constitutional rights were violated. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Cantor voluntarily produced the weapon. Cantor then pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a weapon. He appealed, arguing the stop and search were unlawful. The appellate division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the appellate division and dismissed the accusatory instruments.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police action of encircling Cantor’s car and approaching him in a non-identified manner constituted an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment, requiring suppression of the evidence subsequently obtained.

    Holding

    Yes, because Cantor was effectively seized when the police surrounded him and his vehicle, significantly interrupting his freedom of movement, and this seizure was not justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a seizure occurs when an individual’s liberty of movement is significantly interrupted by police action. In this case, Cantor was seized when he was surrounded by officers and his car was blocked, preventing him from leaving. The court emphasized that constitutional protections apply regardless of whether the individual knows they are being accosted by police officers. The court stated, “Whenever a street encounter amounts to a seizure it must pass constitutional muster.”

    The court distinguished between the stop-and-frisk law (CPL 140.50) and the common-law power to inquire, noting that both are limited by constitutional protections. A lawful detention requires a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The court found that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Cantor, as their observations were remote and unreliable, and they had no independent knowledge of criminal activity. “The minimum requirement for a lawful detention stop is a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”

    Because the initial seizure was unlawful, the subsequent discovery of the pistol was deemed a fruit of the poisonous tree and thus inadmissible. The court concluded that the police action exceeded permissible bounds because there was no justification for surrounding Cantor in a manner constituting a seizure.