New York Law Review

Tag: unlawful arrest

  • In re Victor M., 86 N.Y.2d 86 (2006): Limits on Juvenile Arrests for Violations

    In re Victor M., 97 N.Y.2d 86 (2006)

    A police officer cannot arrest a juvenile without a warrant for conduct constituting a mere violation, as opposed to a crime, and a search incident to such an unlawful arrest is also unlawful.

    Summary

    This case addresses the legality of a search conducted after a juvenile was taken into custody for a non-criminal offense. Victor M., a 15-year-old, was observed gambling in a public place and, lacking identification, was handcuffed and brought to the police station. A subsequent search revealed narcotics. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that the arrest was unlawful because it was based on a violation (loitering), not a crime, and therefore the search was also unlawful. The court emphasized that detaining a juvenile requires reasonable suspicion and that taking the juvenile to the station without attempting less intrusive means was unreasonable.

    Facts

    Officer Recio saw Victor M. and others gambling with dice in a Bronx apartment building. Victor had no identification and was unable to provide it at the scene. Officer Recio handcuffed Victor and transported him to the police station. At the station, Victor was searched, and narcotics were discovered on his person.

    Procedural History

    In a juvenile delinquency proceeding, Victor moved to suppress the narcotics, arguing the search was unlawful. The Family Court denied the motion and adjudicated Victor a delinquent. The Appellate Division affirmed. Victor appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the officer’s detention and subsequent search of Victor M. were lawful, given that the initial basis for detaining him was a non-criminal offense (a violation)?

    Holding

    No, because the warrantless arrest of a juvenile is authorized only where an adult could be arrested for a crime, and the offense committed by Victor M. was a violation, not a crime; thus, the subsequent search was unlawful.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected three arguments supporting the search. First, the Family Court’s reliance on gambling-related misdemeanors was misplaced, as those statutes did not apply to a mere player in a dice game. Second, the Appellate Division’s invocation of trespass and loitering was also insufficient, as these are violations, not crimes, and Family Court Act § 305.2(2) only authorizes warrantless juvenile arrests for conduct that would constitute a crime for an adult. The court stated that neither simple trespass nor loitering is a “crime” as the term is defined in the Penal Law (§ 10.00 [6]); each is a violation, not a misdemeanor or a felony. A warrantless arrest of a juvenile is authorized only in cases where an adult could be arrested “for a crime” (Family Ct Act § 305.2 [2]). Finally, the presentment agency’s argument that the detention was a temporary stop based on reasonable suspicion also failed. Officer Recio himself described the event as an arrest, not a temporary detention. Temporary detentions are only authorized for felonies and misdemeanors, not violations. Even if it were a valid temporary detention, transporting Victor to the station house in handcuffs was unreasonable, particularly when a less intrusive alternative (going to his apartment for identification) was available. The Court emphasized the importance of reasonableness in such situations: “Here, nothing in the record shows that it was reasonable for Officer Recio to take Victor to the station house, instead of going with him to his apartment to get his identification.” The Court thus prioritized the protection of individual liberties, especially those of juveniles, against unreasonable police actions. The Court’s decision reinforces the principle that the scope of a search is tied to the justification for the initial detention and highlights the specific protections afforded to juveniles under New York law.

  • People v. Rossi, 79 N.Y.2d 952 (1992): Admissibility of Evidence After an Unlawful Arrest

    People v. Rossi, 79 N.Y.2d 952 (1992)

    Evidence obtained as a direct result of an unlawful arrest, even if tangentially related to the execution of a valid search warrant, is inadmissible if it provides the necessary link to incriminating evidence.

    Summary

    Rossi was unlawfully arrested outside a room suspected of illegal gambling. A subsequent search of the room pursuant to a valid warrant yielded a jacket. At trial, an officer testified that Rossi, after being brought back to the room post-arrest, put on the jacket. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the jacket itself was admissible due to the valid warrant, the officer’s testimony connecting Rossi to the jacket should have been suppressed because it was a direct result of the unlawful arrest. Since the jacket was the only direct link between Rossi and the gambling activities, the indictment was dismissed.

    Facts

    Defendant Rossi was arrested in the hallway outside room 406, which was suspected of being used for illegal gambling activities.
    The arrest occurred before the execution of a search warrant for the room.
    It was undisputed that the arrest was unlawful.
    After the unlawful arrest, police officers brought Rossi back into room 406.
    An officer testified that Rossi was instructed to sit down, sat in a chair with a jacket hanging on the back, and then put on the jacket.
    A jacket was recovered from the room during the execution of a valid search warrant.

    Procedural History

    Rossi moved to suppress evidence, including statements and evidence “flowing from” the unlawful arrest, requesting a Dunaway hearing.
    The Supreme Court denied the motion without a hearing, citing the valid search warrant.
    At trial, the jacket and the officer’s testimony about Rossi putting on the jacket were admitted into evidence.
    Rossi was convicted of gambling-related offenses.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the testimony about the jacket resulted solely from the execution of the warrant.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether testimony regarding the defendant’s post-arrest conduct, specifically putting on a jacket found during the execution of a valid search warrant, should be suppressed as a product of an unlawful arrest.

    Holding

    Yes, because the testimony connecting the defendant to the jacket, which was the only direct link to the gambling activities, resulted directly from the unlawful arrest and asportation, not from the lawful execution of the search warrant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the jacket itself was admissible as evidence seized during the execution of a valid search warrant, citing People v. Arnau, 58 N.Y.2d 27 (1982).
    However, the jacket had no incriminating value without evidence connecting it to Rossi.
    The crucial connecting evidence was the arresting officer’s testimony about Rossi’s actions after his unlawful arrest: being brought back to the room and putting on the jacket. This testimony should have been suppressed.
    The court relied on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), stating that evidence derived from an illegal arrest is inadmissible.
    The court emphasized that the officer’s testimony was a direct consequence of the illegal arrest, not an independent discovery during the warrant execution.
    Because the suppressed testimony was the only evidence linking Rossi to the jacket, and the jacket was the only direct link to the gambling activities, the Court concluded that the indictment should be dismissed.
    The court stated: “This should have been suppressed as it resulted, not from the lawful execution of a valid search warrant, but from defendant’s wrongful arrest (see, Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 485-486).”
    The court reasoned that allowing the testimony would effectively nullify the protection against unlawful arrests.

  • People v. Rogers, 52 N.Y.2d 527 (1981): Admissibility of Police Testimony After Suppression of Evidence

    People v. Rogers, 52 N.Y.2d 527 (1981)

    Even after the suppression of physical evidence and identification testimony due to an unlawful arrest, police officers may still testify about their observations leading up to the arrest if the testimony’s probative value outweighs its potential to undermine the exclusionary rule’s purpose.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether police officers could testify about the events surrounding an unlawful arrest after the suppression of physical evidence and a showup identification resulting from that arrest. The court held that such testimony is admissible, balancing the societal cost of excluding reliable evidence against the deterrent effect on unlawful police conduct. The court reasoned that suppressing the officers’ testimony about their observations leading up to the arrest would not significantly enhance the exclusionary rule’s deterrent effect and that the jury could logically assume the defendant was arrested, regardless of the officers’ testimony. The court affirmed the conviction, finding no error in admitting the officers’ testimony.

    Facts

    Thomas Pimentel was robbed at his cousin’s grocery store by a man who first bought chewing gum and then returned with a knife to steal cash and food stamps.

    Officers Scanlon and Calise, patrolling nearby, observed Rogers acting suspiciously near the store, including entering and exiting a subway station and running to catch a bus.

    The officers received a radio alarm about the grocery store robbery near their location.

    Rogers exited the bus after two blocks, walked several blocks, and entered a construction site.

    The officers approached Rogers at the construction site, identified themselves, and told him to stop. When Rogers reached into his pocket, the officers restrained and arrested him.

    A search incident to the arrest revealed a knife, cash, and food stamps, which were seized.

    Rogers was taken back to the grocery store, where Pimentel identified him as the robber.

    Procedural History

    The trial court suppressed the knife, money, and food stamps, and Pimentel’s showup identification because the arrest lacked probable cause.

    The court allowed testimony about the arrest itself and permitted Pimentel to make an in-court identification based on an independent source (his observations during the robbery).

    Rogers was convicted of robbery and criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a criminal proceeding, police officers may testify to the facts and circumstances surrounding a defendant’s unlawful arrest, notwithstanding the suppression of physical evidence seized during the arrest and testimony regarding an unlawful showup conducted immediately after the arrest.

    Holding

    Yes, because the exclusionary rule should not be applied to preclude admission of the officers’ testimony regarding the events leading up to the arrest, as the societal cost of excluding this reliable evidence outweighs the limited deterrent benefit to the Fourth Amendment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged differing views among its members regarding whether the officers’ testimony fell within the Fourth Amendment’s proscription.

    Some justices believed the testimony concerned observations made *prior* to the illegal arrest and thus did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.

    Other justices believed the testimony *did* fall within the Fourth Amendment’s scope but that the exclusionary rule should not apply. The court emphasized that the exclusionary rule aims to deter unlawful police conduct, not to redress personal privacy injuries. The court stated, “In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generated through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved” (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348).

    The court noted that the exclusionary rule is not absolute and must be balanced against the societal costs of suppressing reliable evidence, adding that “the application of the exclusionary rule is dependent ‘upon a balancing of its probable deterrent effect against its detrimental impact upon the truth-finding process’” (quoting People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12, 21).

    In this case, suppressing the physical evidence and showup identification already weakened the prosecution’s case, sufficiently penalizing the unlawful arrest. Further suppression of the officers’ testimony would have limited deterrent value, as the jury would logically assume an arrest occurred regardless. The court noted, “An illegal arrest, without more, has never been envisioned as a bar to prosecution or as a defense to a valid conviction” (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474).

    The court reasoned that any potential inferences the jury might draw from the officers’ testimony (e.g., that a search produced the knife and money) were speculative and could be addressed with countermanding instructions. The court stated, “Had defendant been concerned as to possible inferences which the jury might draw from the officers’ testimony his remedy was to request appropriate countermanding instructions.”

    Ultimately, the court held that the officers’ testimony was admissible, finding that its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice to the defendant or undermining of the exclusionary rule.

  • People v. LaBorde, 56 N.Y.2d 973 (1982): Admissibility of Identification Evidence After Unlawful Arrest

    People v. LaBorde, 56 N.Y.2d 973 (1982)

    An in-court identification of a defendant is admissible if it stems from an independent recollection, and a pretrial lineup identification is admissible if sufficiently distinguishable from an unlawful arrest to purge any primary taint, particularly when the defendant is held under a valid arrest warrant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a pretrial lineup identification and an in-court identification should be suppressed as fruits of an unlawful arrest. The defendant was unlawfully arrested in Suffolk County, which led to the suppression of weapons charges. Subsequently, Bronx County police, using information derived independently from Suffolk County authorities, connected the defendant to a robbery and obtained an arrest warrant. The court held that the in-court identification was admissible because it stemmed from an independent recollection. Further, the pretrial lineup identification was admissible because it was sufficiently attenuated from the initial unlawful arrest due to the intervening lawful arrest warrant.

    Facts

    Police in Bronx County connected the defendant, LaBorde, to a robbery based on information from Suffolk County authorities. LaBorde’s photograph was obtained from the Bureau of Criminal Identification, and he was identified in a photographic array by the robbery victims. LaBorde was arrested in Suffolk County on weapons charges, pursuant to a Bronx County arrest warrant for the robbery. He was then identified by one of the robbery victims in a pretrial lineup.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division reversed LaBorde’s conviction on the Suffolk County weapons charges, suppressing the seized weapons because of an unlawful arrest. Subsequently, LaBorde was convicted in Bronx County for the robbery. He appealed, arguing that the unlawful Suffolk County arrest tainted both the pretrial lineup identification and the in-court identification in the Bronx robbery case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, upholding the robbery conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an in-court identification of a defendant is inadmissible if preceded by an unlawful arrest?
    2. Whether a pretrial lineup identification is inadmissible if the defendant’s initial contact with law enforcement stemmed from an unlawful arrest?

    Holding

    1. No, because an in-court identification is admissible so long as it proceeds from an independent recollection.
    2. No, because the means used to obtain the pretrial lineup identification were sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint of the unlawful arrest, especially because the defendant was being held under a lawful arrest warrant at the time of the lineup.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that an in-court identification is admissible if based on an independent recollection, citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980). The court found no basis to suppress the in-court identification as it wasn’t tainted by the unlawful seizure by the Suffolk County police.

    Regarding the pretrial lineup identification, the court applied the attenuation doctrine from Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), asking if the evidence was obtained by exploitation of the initial illegality or by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. The court emphasized that the Bronx County police, who had not participated in the unlawful Suffolk County arrest, undertook the effort to connect LaBorde to the robbery. The court highlighted that LaBorde was held at the time of the lineup under a lawful criminal court process (the arrest warrant), not the unlawful seizure. Citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), the court stated that the fact of the arrest on a warrant was enough to dissipate any taint from the unlawful arrest.

    The court declined to address whether an illegality that reveals a defendant’s existence as a suspect can ever require suppression of evidence. The court explicitly stated, “We need not decide whether an illegality that reveals a defendant’s existence as the suspected perpetrator of another crime can ever require suppression of evidence resulting from that information. It is sufficient to note that under the circumstances here, the challenged evidence simply was not tainted by the unlawful arrest.”

    The court also addressed the photographic array identifications, noting that while inadmissible under state law (People v. Lindsay, 42 N.Y.2d 9; People v. Caserta, 19 N.Y.2d 18) as the People did not argue for their admissibility, they were obtained independently and proceeded from the witnesses’ independent recollections and thus, did not taint the lineup identification. The court cited Bynum v. United States, 274 F.2d 767, for the principle of independent source.

  • People v. Green, 46 N.Y.2d 974 (1979): Right to Explore Probable Cause for Arrest During Suppression Hearing

    People v. Green, 46 N.Y.2d 974 (1979)

    A defendant has the right to fully explore the issue of probable cause for their arrest during a suppression hearing to challenge the admissibility of statements obtained as a result of that arrest.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s motion to suppress confessions should not have been denied because the trial court improperly restricted the defendant’s ability to cross-examine police officers regarding the probable cause for his arrest. The Court found that statements obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest or detention are inadmissible. The defendant was entitled to a new suppression hearing where he could fully explore the legality of his arrest, and his guilty plea was vacated.

    Facts

    Two police officers responded to a report of child molestation and went to the alleged victim’s home. After speaking with the victim and her mother, they proceeded to the defendant’s home, where they informed him that his stepdaughter had accused him of rape. The defendant made no response and was then advised of his rights, frisked, handcuffed, and taken to police headquarters. At headquarters, he was again informed of his rights and made inculpatory admissions, both orally and in a signed statement, after waiving his right to an attorney on three separate occasions.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress his admissions, arguing they were the result of an unlawful arrest. The trial court limited the scope of questioning to the voluntariness of the statements, finding that the defendant had waived his rights and confessed voluntarily, and denied the motion. The defendant then pleaded guilty to attempted rape in the first degree and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. The Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in restricting the defendant’s ability to cross-examine police officers regarding the probable cause for his arrest during the suppression hearing, thus improperly denying his motion to suppress his confessions.

    Holding

    Yes, because statements obtained by exploitation of unlawful police conduct or detention must be suppressed, and the defendant was not given adequate opportunity to challenge the legality of his arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Fourth Amendment requires the suppression of statements obtained through the exploitation of unlawful police conduct or detention. The Court emphasized that a suppression court must allow inquiry into the propriety of the police conduct. The People have the burden of establishing probable cause for the arrest or detention, and the defendant must be given an opportunity to fully investigate the circumstances of the arrest. The court found that the trial court’s restriction on cross-examination prevented the defendant from adequately challenging the prosecution’s assertion of probable cause. Because the defendant was not afforded a full opportunity to litigate the issue of probable cause, the denial of the suppression motion was improper. The Court remanded the case for a new hearing on the issue of probable cause, vacated the defendant’s guilty plea, and restored the suppression motion to pending status. The court cited People v. Wise, 46 NY2d 321, 329 stating it is “incumbent upon the suppression court to permit an inquiry into the propriety of the police conduct”. The court also noted, “Unless the People establish that the police had probable cause to arrest or detain a suspect, and unless the defendant is accorded an opportunity to delve fully into the circumstances attendant upon his arrest or detention, his motion to suppress should be granted”.

  • People v. Floyd, 26 N.Y.2d 558 (1970): Exclusionary Rule and Unlawful Entry for Arrest

    People v. Floyd, 26 N.Y.2d 558 (1970)

    Evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest, specifically one where police fail to announce their presence and purpose before entering a private residence without exigent circumstances, is inadmissible under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

    Summary

    Floyd was convicted of felony and misdemeanor narcotics possession. The conviction stemmed from evidence seized after police, acting on an anonymous tip and verifying a federal forgery warrant, entered his hotel room at 7:00 AM without knocking or announcing themselves. Observing drug paraphernalia in plain view, they arrested and searched Floyd, discovering heroin. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence was illegally obtained because the police violated the state’s “knock and announce” rule without justification, and the evidence was therefore inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.

    Facts

    An anonymous tip alerted New York City police that Floyd was wanted on a federal forgery warrant.

    Police verified the warrant and proceeded to Floyd’s hotel.

    At 7:00 AM, three officers obtained a passkey from the hotel clerk and entered Floyd’s room without knocking or announcing their presence or purpose.

    Upon entering, the police observed narcotics paraphernalia in plain view.

    Floyd was arrested and handcuffed, and a subsequent search revealed heroin hidden in a pillowcase.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Floyd’s motion to suppress the seized evidence.

    Floyd was convicted of felony and misdemeanor drug possession.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence seized following a “no-knock” entry by police to execute an arrest warrant is admissible when there are no exigent circumstances justifying the failure to announce their presence and purpose.

    Holding

    Yes, because the police failed to comply with the “knock and announce” rule without any exigent circumstances excusing their non-compliance, rendering the subsequent search and seizure unlawful, and the evidence inadmissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on New York statutes and common law requiring police to announce their presence and purpose before forcibly entering a residence to make an arrest. The Court acknowledged exceptions to this rule in exigent circumstances, such as the imminent destruction of evidence, escape, or increased risk to the police or others. It cited Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) regarding the potential destruction of evidence. However, the Court found no such circumstances present in Floyd’s case. There was no reason to believe Floyd was likely to escape or present a danger to the officers. The court noted, “True, in this case there was matter that was both contraband and evidence, but before entry the police did not have the slightest reason to believe that the matter was present in the premises.” The Court stated the police’s belief that he had previously evaded an officer was irrelevant. Furthermore, the court found that the officers drawing their weapons before entering the room, did not demonstrate that there were exigent circumstances, but that this was extrahazardous given that they were entering by stealth without notice. The Court determined that the arrest was unlawful, citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958) and Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968). Because the arrest was unlawful, the evidence seized during the subsequent search was inadmissible under the exclusionary rule, which applies to state arrests through the Fourteenth Amendment, as established in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). The court explicitly declined to determine if the search had been permissible under Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), given that there was already a violation based on the entry of the room.

  • People v. Gates, 24 N.Y.2d 666 (1969): Admissibility of Fingerprint Evidence After Arrest

    24 N.Y.2d 666 (1969)

    Fingerprint evidence obtained after an arrest is admissible at trial even if the legality of the arrest is questionable, provided the defendant fails to make a timely objection to the evidence’s admissibility based on the claim of unlawful arrest.

    Summary

    Patricia Gates was murdered in her apartment. Her estranged husband, the defendant, was convicted of first-degree murder based largely on fingerprint evidence found at the crime scene. The prosecution argued that Gates entered his wife’s apartment through a window and attacked her. On appeal, Gates argued that the fingerprint evidence should have been excluded because it was obtained following an unlawful arrest. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that because Gates failed to object to the admissibility of the fingerprint evidence on the grounds of an unlawful arrest at trial, the issue was not preserved for appellate review. The court emphasized the importance of raising timely objections to allow the prosecution an opportunity to demonstrate the legality of the arrest.

    Facts

    Patricia Gates obtained a separation from her husband in June 1966, which included custody of their children. Gates made several threats against his wife, including a statement that she would not live to enjoy the children. Three days before her death, after a divorce decree was entered giving the mother permanent custody, Gates threatened her again. On September 7, 1966, Patricia Gates was found stabbed to death in her apartment. She told police at the scene she did not know who attacked her, but the attacker wore glasses. About 30 minutes after the stabbing, Gates appeared at a neighbor’s house. He was later arrested for failing to dim his headlights. Police found fingerprints on the bathroom window screen of Patricia’s apartment that matched Gates’ fingerprints.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in the trial court. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the conviction. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether fingerprint evidence obtained after an arrest is admissible at trial when the defendant claims the arrest was unlawful, but failed to object to the evidence’s admissibility on that specific ground during the trial.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to challenge the admissibility of the fingerprint evidence based on the grounds of unlawful arrest by a pre-trial motion to suppress or by objecting to the receipt of the evidence during trial. Therefore, the issue was not preserved for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the Supreme Court’s ruling in Davis v. Mississippi, which held that fingerprint evidence is subject to Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protections and must be excluded if it results from an illegal arrest. However, the court emphasized the importance of adhering to procedural rules, specifically that a defendant must make a timely objection to the admissibility of evidence. The court reasoned that because Gates did not object to the fingerprint evidence based on an unlawful arrest, the prosecution was deprived of the opportunity to present evidence justifying the arrest. The court stated: “Although the defendant now asserts that his arrest was unlawful, his failure to object to the use of the evidence on that ground, or even to intimate that such an issue was in the case, deprived the People of any opportunity to show the information in the possession of the police at the time of Gates’ arrest.” The court noted that the police may have had reasonable grounds for believing Gates had committed the crime at the time of the arrest, based on his prior threats. The court found the fingerprint evidence to be almost conclusive proof of guilt because the location of the prints on the window screen indicated that they could only have been made by a person seeking to enter the apartment from the outside. This evidence pointed strongly to the defendant’s guilt and excluded other reasonable hypotheses. By failing to properly raise the issue at trial, Gates forfeited his right to have the appellate court review the legality of the arrest in relation to the admissibility of the fingerprint evidence.