Anonymous, 17 Abb. Pr. 398 (N.Y. Ct. of Appeals 1864)

In divorce cases based on adultery, evidence of adultery with unnamed persons is admissible if the complaint alleges the adultery occurred with persons whose names are unknown to the plaintiff, without requiring a specific statement of time and place when such specifics are genuinely unknown.

Summary

This case addresses the specificity required in pleading adultery as grounds for divorce when the adulterous partner is unknown. The Court of Appeals reversed a General Term decision that had required proof of adultery with named individuals before evidence of adultery with unnamed persons could be admitted. The court held that if the plaintiff alleges adultery with persons unknown, evidence supporting this claim is admissible, even without specifying the time and place, as long as this lack of specificity is due to genuine lack of knowledge. This ruling clarifies that strict specificity is not always required, especially when the nature of the offense makes it difficult or impossible to identify the adulterous partner.

Facts

The plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce alleging adultery with named individuals and with other persons whose names were unknown. The General Term reversed the Special Term’s judgment, asserting that evidence of adultery with unnamed individuals was inadmissible without prior proof of adultery with named individuals. The plaintiff appealed this decision.

Procedural History

The Special Term initially entered a judgment in accordance with its decision. The General Term reversed this judgment, leading to an appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether evidence of adultery with a person not named in a divorce complaint is admissible, absent a statement of time and place, when the complaint alleges adultery with persons whose names are unknown to the plaintiff.

Holding

Yes, because the statute does not require the plaintiff to allege that the offense was committed with any designated person, or at any specified time, or at any particular place, where such details are genuinely unknown. The inability to name the adulterous party should not nullify the statute.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the nature of adultery often makes it impossible to identify the adulterous partner. Requiring absolute specificity in all cases would nullify the statute in many instances. The court reviewed prior cases, distinguishing them based on the specificity of the allegations and whether the plaintiff had genuinely pleaded ignorance of the details. It emphasized that while specifics are required when possible, a general allegation of adultery with persons unknown is sufficient when the plaintiff lacks more detailed information. The court noted that public policy and the protection of marital rights do not necessitate such a strict construction of pleading requirements, especially when doing so would prevent a meritorious claim from being heard. The court referenced Tilton v. Beecher, 59 N.Y. 176, suggesting a bill of particulars could address uncertainty, preventing surprise at trial. The court stated, “The courts have required those particulars to be stated where it can be done; but where the offence is alleged to have occurred with a person whose name is unknown to the plaintiff, and that fact is alleged, it has been uniformly held that the allegation is sufficiently specific…”