Douglaston Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. Klein, 51 N.Y.2d 963 (1980)

Uniqueness, as a requirement for zoning variances, does not necessitate that only a single parcel be affected by the hardship condition, but rather that the condition is not so widespread within the district that granting variances to all similarly situated properties would substantially alter the zoning of the district.

Summary

Douglaston Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. Klein addresses the “uniqueness” requirement for obtaining a zoning variance. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of a variance, holding that the swampy condition of the land, while not entirely unique within the residential district, was not so generally applicable as to preclude a finding of uniqueness. The court emphasized that the key consideration is whether granting variances to all similarly situated properties would materially change the zoning of the district. Because the land could not yield a reasonable return as zoned, the court upheld the variance for enclosed tennis courts for a limited period.

Facts

The landowner sought a variance to use their property, which was zoned for residential use, as enclosed tennis courts for 15 years. The zoning board found that the land could not yield a reasonable return as zoned because the cost of constructing residences was significantly higher than the potential sales price due to the swampy nature of the property. The board also determined that granting the variance would not negatively impact the character of the adjacent properties or substantially affect traffic or pollution.

Procedural History

The zoning board granted the variance. The Appellate Division affirmed the zoning board’s decision. The Douglaston Civic Association appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the “uniqueness” requirement for a zoning variance necessitates that only the subject parcel be affected by the condition causing the hardship, or whether a variance can be granted when other properties in the district share similar conditions.

Holding

No, because uniqueness does not require that only the subject parcel is affected by the condition causing the hardship. What is required is that the hardship condition be not so generally applicable throughout the district as to require the conclusion that if all parcels similarly situated are granted variances the zoning of the district would be materially changed.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that a strict interpretation of “uniqueness” would be impractical and unreasonable. The court cited precedent and scholarly commentary to support its view that uniqueness is a relative concept. The court stated, “Uniqueness does not require that only the parcel of land in question and none other be affected by the condition which creates the hardship.” The crucial factor is whether the hardship condition is so prevalent that granting variances to all similarly situated properties would effectively rezone the district, which in this case, the court determined was not the situation. The court acknowledged the confiscatory nature of the present zoning in relation to the subject parcel and the time limit imposed by the board on the variance it granted.