New York Law Review

Tag: union representation

  • Matter of Case v. Monroe Community College, 89 N.Y.2d 438 (1997): Service on Union as Service on Member for Arbitration Appeals

    Matter of Case v. Monroe Community College, 89 N.Y.2d 438 (1997)

    When a union represents a member in arbitration, service of the arbitration award on the union constitutes service on the individual member for purposes of calculating the time to appeal the award, regardless of whether the union pursues an appeal.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether serving an arbitration award on a union representing an aggrieved member counts as service on the member for appeal timeliness. The Court of Appeals held that it does. Case, a college employee, was subject to a grievance initiated by his union. After an unfavorable arbitration ruling was served on the union, Case, dissatisfied, attempted to appeal individually after the statutory period. The Court found that because Case elected union representation, service to the union acted as service to him. Therefore, his individual appeal was untimely. This decision clarifies that union representation in arbitration carries with it the responsibility of the union to act as the agent for service, impacting the individual’s appeal timeline.

    Facts

    Petitioner Case was a non-tenured employee at Monroe Community College, serving as Director of Athletics.
    A student accused Case of sexual harassment, leading the College to not renew his employment contract.
    The faculty union, of which Case was a member, initiated a grievance on his behalf, alleging procedural violations in the non-renewal process.
    An arbitrator denied the grievance, finding no violation of the collective bargaining agreement and concluding Case was properly terminated for insubordination.
    The arbitrator mailed the award to both the union and the College on September 8, 1993; both acknowledged receipt around September 14, 1993.
    Case informed the union of his dissatisfaction with the award on September 22, 1993, requesting an appeal.
    The union declined to appeal the decision.
    Case then filed an individual petition to vacate or modify the award on March 14, 1994.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied Case’s petition and the College’s cross-motion to dismiss.
    The Appellate Division modified the award, striking the portion stating Case was “properly terminated,” and affirmed the decision as modified.
    The College appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether service of an arbitration award upon the union representing an aggrieved member constitutes service upon that individual member, for purposes of measuring the timeliness of an appeal from the award under CPLR 7511(a).

    Holding

    Yes, because when an individual elects to be represented by their union in a grievance proceeding, the union acts as their agent for service of relevant documents, including the arbitration award.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, emphasizing that procedural rules dictate that once counsel (or a designated agent, like a union) appears, statutory time requirements begin when that representative is served.
    The court drew upon the precedent set in Matter of Bianca v. Frank, 43 N.Y.2d 168 (1977) which underscored the importance of serving counsel, extends to union representatives.
    Citing Matter of Beckman v. Greentree Sec., 87 N.Y.2d 566 (1996), the court reiterated that due process requires adequate notice and opportunity to object, not necessarily actual receipt by the individual.
    The court stated, “When an individual elects to be represented by his or her union, regardless of whether the union assigns an attorney or a layperson as the representative, that individual has designated the union as his or her agent for service during the pendency of the entire grievance proceeding. Hence, the grievant would be bound by all limitations periods applicable to the union.”
    The court noted that the individual still retains the right to pursue further proceedings individually if the union declines, as established in Matter of Diaz v. Pilgrim State Psychiatric Ctr., 62 N.Y.2d 693 (1984), but the timeliness is measured from service on the union.
    Because the union received the award on September 14, 1993, Case’s March 14, 1994, petition was untimely.

  • Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc. v. Newman, 53 N.Y.2d 35 (1981): Enforceability of Collective Bargaining Agreement Settlements Without Employee Signature

    Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc. v. Newman, 53 N.Y.2d 35 (1981)

    A disciplinary grievance settlement negotiated between a union and an employer is binding on an employee, even without the employee’s signature, if the collective bargaining agreement’s procedural requirements are met and the employee had knowledge of and verbally agreed to the settlement.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a disciplinary settlement, reached between the Department of Correctional Services and the union representing a correction officer, is binding on the officer when he verbally agreed to the terms but did not sign a written agreement. The court held that the settlement was binding. The key was that the collective bargaining agreement’s (CBA) procedural requirements were met: the settlement terms were written down, the employee had an opportunity to consult with his union representative, and the union received a copy of the settlement. The court found that the CBA did not require the employee’s signature for the settlement to be effective, especially given the established practice between the Department and the union.

    Facts

    A correction officer received a notice of discipline proposing dismissal for misconduct. The officer filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the State and his union. A settlement was proposed: the officer would serve a 12-month disciplinary evaluation period, and in return, the charges would be dropped. The officer verbally agreed to the settlement after his union representative explained the terms. The Department sent a letter confirming the settlement to the union’s executive director, but the officer did not receive a copy or sign any written agreement. Later, the officer was dismissed for unsatisfactory work performance. He then initiated an article 78 proceeding, claiming the settlement was not binding because he never signed it.

    Procedural History

    The correction officer commenced an article 78 proceeding seeking reinstatement. The lower court likely ruled in favor of the officer (details not provided in this excerpt). This decision was appealed, eventually reaching the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a disciplinary grievance settlement is binding on an employee when (1) the employee verbally agreed to the settlement, but (2) did not sign a written agreement, despite a provision in the collective bargaining agreement requiring settlements to be reduced to writing and the employee to have an opportunity to consult with a union representative before executing it.

    Holding

    No, because the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) only requires that the settlement terms be reduced to writing, that the employee be offered the opportunity to consult with a union representative, and that the union receive a copy of the agreement. The CBA does not explicitly require the employee’s signature, and the established practice between the Department and the union did not require employee signatures for such settlements to be binding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found substantial evidence that the correction officer knew about and verbally agreed to the settlement, thus negating any procedural due process claim. Regarding the CBA’s requirement for written consent, the court deferred to the interpretation of the CBA by both the Department and the union. The court noted that the CBA required the settlement terms to be in writing, which was satisfied by the Department’s letter to the union. The CBA also stipulated that the employee be offered the opportunity to consult with a union representative, a requirement met when the union representative explained the terms to the officer. The court emphasized that the CBA did not mandate the employee’s signature for the settlement to be binding, aligning with the established practice between the Department and the union. The court stated, “Whatever the term ‘to execute’ the settlement agreement means in another context, the record in this case clearly shows that under the collective bargaining agreement, the Department and the union had long taken the view and followed the practice of not requiring that settlements negotiated by the Department and the employee’s union representative be delivered in writing to the employee for his signature.” Since the CBA, as interpreted and implemented by both parties, was complied with, the officer’s dismissal was deemed lawful. This case highlights the importance of established practices in interpreting collective bargaining agreements and the binding nature of agreements negotiated by unions on behalf of their members, even without individual employee signatures, provided procedural safeguards are in place.

  • O’Brien v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 394 (1980): Waiver of Contractual Benefits Through Collective Bargaining

    O’Brien v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 394 (1980)

    An individual employee is bound by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by their union representative, including provisions that waive certain benefits, provided such waiver is not against public policy.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, a former Assistant Director in the NYC Department of Social Services, claimed she was entitled to greater pension benefits under the “Career and Salary Plan” rather than the “Managerial Pay Plan” to which her position was later assigned. The Court of Appeals held that the collective bargaining agreement, in which her union agreed not to object to the transfer of certain titles to the Managerial Pay Plan, effectively waived her right to claim benefits under the Career and Salary Plan. The court reasoned that an employee is bound by the agreements made by their union representative, absent a violation of public policy, and cannot selectively accept or reject portions of the collective bargaining agreement.

    Facts

    Plaintiff was employed as an Assistant Director in the NYC Department of Social Services. Prior to January 1, 1971, her retirement benefits were governed by the “Career and Salary Plan.” On July 1, 1971, retroactively effective to January 1, 1971, her title was transferred to the “Managerial Pay Plan.” Plaintiff argued that the Career and Salary Plan would have provided greater pension benefits.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued the City of New York to recover the additional pension benefits she claimed were due under the Career and Salary Plan. The lower courts ruled in favor of the City of New York, finding that her union had waived her right to those benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an employee can claim entitlement to benefits under a prior employment plan when their collective bargaining representative agreed to transfer the employee’s position to a different plan with potentially lower benefits.

    Holding

    Yes, because the employee is bound by the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by their union representative, which effectively waived any claim to the benefits under the prior plan. This is permissible because the waiver was not against public policy, and the employee cannot selectively accept the benefits of union representation while rejecting its burdens.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that a union acts as the agent for its members in collective bargaining, and employees are generally bound by the agreements made by their union. The Senior Social Service Administrators Association, plaintiff’s union, had entered into a collective bargaining agreement stating it would not object to the City’s efforts to classify certain titles as managerial and remove them from collective bargaining. The court cited Matter of New York Times Co. [Newspaper Guild of N. Y.], 2 AD2d 31, 33, stating that plaintiff “may not reject certain acts of her bargaining representative and accept others.” Since the waiver of potentially greater retirement benefits was not against public policy, the court found no reason to invalidate the union’s agreement. The court also noted that the plaintiff accepted the benefits of the Managerial Pay Plan, specifically a higher salary. As such, she was bound by the entirety of the Plan, as negotiated by her union. The court referenced Rosen v New York City Teachers’ Retirement Bd., 282 App Div 216, affd 306 NY 625 in support of its decision, implying that some rights can be waived by collective bargaining agreements if the agreement does not violate public policy. The key principle is that the union’s power to act on behalf of its members extends to waiving contractual benefits, preventing employees from selectively benefiting from union representation.

  • Long Island College Hospital v. Catherwood, 23 N.Y.2d 20 (1968): Resolving Representation Disputes Under the Labor Law

    Long Island College Hospital v. Catherwood, 23 N.Y.2d 20 (1968)

    Under New York Labor Law, disputes regarding union representation status for non-profit hospitals are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Labor Relations Board, not subject to compulsory arbitration under Section 716.

    Summary

    Long Island College Hospital challenged the Industrial Commissioner’s authority to appoint a fact-finding commission and order compulsory arbitration regarding a union’s representation status. The New York Court of Appeals held that representation disputes fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Labor Relations Board (SLRB), as outlined in Labor Law Sections 705 and 707, and are not subject to the mediation, fact-finding, and compulsory arbitration procedures of Section 716, which are intended for economic disputes. The Court emphasized the importance of the SLRB’s expertise in determining appropriate bargaining units and preventing the disruption caused by unresolved representation issues.

    Facts

    Local 144 was certified by the Labor Board as the bargaining representative for the maintenance employees of Long Island College Hospital. The hospital refused to bargain with the union, claiming it did not accurately represent the employees. Instead of filing an unfair labor practice charge, the union sought resolution under Section 716 of the Labor Law, leading the Industrial Commissioner to appoint a fact-finding commission and subsequently order compulsory arbitration.

    Procedural History

    The hospital initiated actions to enjoin the fact-finding commission and stay the compulsory arbitration. The Appellate Division ruled in favor of the Industrial Commissioner’s authority. The hospital appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a dispute concerning union representation status in a non-profit hospital constitutes a “dispute” under Section 716(1) of the New York Labor Law, thus empowering the Industrial Commissioner to appoint a fact-finding commission and order compulsory arbitration.

    Holding

    No, because the legislative history, the language of the amendments to the Labor Law, and underlying policy considerations indicate that representation issues are not included in the definition of “dispute” under Section 716(1). The Labor Board has exclusive jurisdiction over representation issues.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the 1963 amendments to the Labor Law created distinct paths for resolving different types of disputes. Representation issues were assigned to the Labor Board under Sections 705 and 707, while economic issues were addressed through mediation, fact-finding, and compulsory arbitration under Section 716. The Court emphasized the Labor Board’s expertise in determining appropriate bargaining units, stating, “The Federal courts have uniformly recognized that because of the complexity and difficulty of the problem of designating the appropriate unit, the power to make the decision has been delegated exclusively to the expert judgment of the board which has wide discretion in making the determination.” Allowing Section 716 to cover representation issues would create duplicative proceedings and undermine the Labor Board’s authority. Furthermore, the Court noted that Section 702(9) specifically states that “neither the industrial commissioner nor any board or other agency of the department of labor shall in any way direct, review, modify or reverse any decision or finding of the board.” The Court also cautioned against allowing minority unions to invoke Section 716, as it could lead to instability and undermine the exclusive bargaining rights of majority unions. The Court suggested that the Legislature should expedite certification and refusal to bargain proceedings to avoid delays in resolving representation issues, and noted that “judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.” The Court concluded that the union should have followed the traditional method of filing an unfair labor practice charge under Section 706 to challenge the board’s certification and obtain judicial review.