29 N.Y.2d 270 (1971)

When parties agree to abide by a labor union’s constitution and bylaws that mandate arbitration of disputes, that agreement constitutes a written agreement to arbitrate under CPLR 7501, even if the specific contract giving rise to the dispute lacks an arbitration clause.

Summary

This case addresses whether an arbitration clause within a labor union’s constitution and bylaws constitutes a “written agreement” to arbitrate under New York law (CPLR 7501) between a union member and a licensed booking agent. The Court of Appeals held that it does. Glasser, an orchestra leader and union member, refused to pay commissions to Alexander, a licensed booking agent. Alexander sought arbitration per the union’s rules. The Court found that by becoming a union member and the booking agent agreeing to be licensed by the union, both parties consented to the union’s constitution and bylaws, including the arbitration clause. Therefore, a valid written agreement to arbitrate existed, making the arbitration award enforceable. The decision underscores that membership in an organization implies consent to its rules, including arbitration provisions.

Facts

Alexander, a booking agent licensed by the American Federation of Musicians (AFM), arranged two engagements for Glasser, an orchestra leader and AFM member, at Roseland Dance City. Alexander’s commission was to be 10% of Glasser’s total earnings. After Glasser performed the first engagement, Alexander billed him $3,000 for the commission on both bookings. Glasser refused to pay.

Procedural History

Alexander requested the AFM’s international executive board to arbitrate the claim. Glasser did not participate in the arbitration. The board awarded Alexander the full amount. Special Term of the Supreme Court confirmed the award. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Glasser appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the obligation of parties to abide by the provisions of a labor union’s constitution and bylaws, requiring the submission of disputes to arbitration, constitutes a “written agreement” between them, within the sense of CPLR 7501, to arbitrate their differences.

Holding

Yes, because the mutual obligation of the parties to observe the union’s arbitration provisions constitutes a “written agreement” to arbitrate under CPLR 7501.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that Glasser, by becoming a member of the AFM, agreed to abide by its constitution and bylaws, which included a mandatory arbitration clause for disputes between members and booking agents. The court stated, “when a person becomes a member of a labor organization…he thereby agrees, as a matter of law, to abide by the duly enacted provisions of its constitution and by-laws.” Similarly, Alexander, by becoming a licensed booking agent, also agreed to abide by the union’s rules. The court cited Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Griesenbech, where membership in the New York Commodity Exchange, with its arbitration rules, was deemed a valid agreement to arbitrate. The court distinguished the present case by noting that both parties were obligated to observe the union’s arbitration rules, creating a mutual agreement to arbitrate. The court rejected Glasser’s argument that Section 101(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act was violated, clarifying that the act protects a union member’s right to sue the union, which was not limited by the arbitration rules in question. The court found no reason to set aside the arbitration award.