New York Law Review

Tag: Uniform Interstate Family Support Act

  • H.M. v. E.T., 14 N.Y.3d 521 (2010): Family Court Jurisdiction Over Same-Sex Partner Support Petitions

    H.M. v. E.T., 14 N.Y.3d 521 (2010)

    Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a support petition brought by a biological parent against a former same-sex partner under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) where the petitioner alleges the respondent is a parent chargeable with the child’s support.

    Summary

    H.M. filed a support petition against E.T., her former same-sex partner, alleging they planned to conceive and raise a child together, with E.T. performing the artificial insemination. After the child’s birth, E.T. ended the relationship. H.M. sought child support in Canada, which was transferred to Family Court in New York under UIFSA. E.T. moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which was initially granted, then reversed by the Family Court, and later reinstated by the Appellate Division. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Family Court has jurisdiction to determine if E.T. is a parent chargeable with the child’s support under Article 4 of the Family Court Act.

    Facts

    H.M. and E.T. were in a romantic relationship from 1989 to 1995, cohabitating for much of that time.
    In 1990, they planned to conceive and raise a child together, discussing conception methods and child-rearing.
    In 1993, H.M. became pregnant via artificial insemination performed by E.T.
    H.M. gave birth in September 1994; E.T. was present and cut the umbilical cord, and they shared expenses.
    E.T. ended the relationship four months after the child’s birth, and H.M. moved to Canada with the child.
    An attempted reconciliation failed in 1997, though E.T. occasionally provided gifts and monetary contributions for the child.

    Procedural History

    2006: H.M. filed a parentage and support application in Ontario, Canada.
    Under UIFSA, the application was transferred to Family Court, Rockland County.
    Family Court Support Magistrate dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
    Family Court reversed the dismissal and ordered a hearing on equitable estoppel.
    The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    H.M. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a support petition brought under UIFSA by a biological parent seeking child support from her former same-sex partner.

    Holding

    Yes, because Article 4 of the Family Court Act establishes the public policy of obligating individuals, regardless of gender, to provide support for their children, and Family Court has jurisdiction to determine whether an individual is responsible for the support of a child.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, but it has the power granted to it by the State Constitution or by statute. The Constitution grants Family Court jurisdiction over proceedings to determine “the support of dependents.” Family Court Act § 413(1)(a) states that “the parents of a child under the age of twenty-one years are chargeable with the support of such child.”

    The court emphasized that statutory jurisdiction carries with it ancillary jurisdiction necessary to fulfill its core function. Since Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to ascertain the support obligations of a female parent, it also has the inherent authority to ascertain in certain cases whether a female respondent is, in fact, a child’s parent.

    The court noted that Family Court and Supreme Court have coextensive authority in child support matters. The relevant statutes, Family Court Act § 413 and Domestic Relations Law § 240, establish statewide child support guidelines applicable to all child support proceedings.

    The court concluded that because H.M. asserts that E.T. is the child’s parent and is therefore chargeable with the child’s support, this case falls within Family Court’s Article 4 jurisdiction.

  • H.M. v. E.T., 14 N.Y.3d 521 (2010): Family Court Jurisdiction in Same-Sex Parent Support Cases

    14 N.Y.3d 521 (2010)

    Family Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) to adjudicate a support petition brought by a biological parent seeking child support from their former same-sex partner, based on an assertion of parentage.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the Family Court has jurisdiction to hear a child support petition filed by a biological mother against her former same-sex partner. The mother, H.M., alleged that she and E.T. planned to conceive and raise a child together. E.T. performed the artificial insemination procedure. After the child’s birth, E.T. ended the relationship. H.M. then sought a declaration of parentage and child support in Canada, which was transferred to Family Court in New York under UIFSA. The Court of Appeals held that Family Court does have subject matter jurisdiction because it has the power to determine support obligations of parents, which includes the authority to determine if the respondent is in fact a parent.

    Facts

    H.M. and E.T. were in a romantic relationship from 1989 to 1995, cohabitating for much of that time. They planned to conceive and raise a child together. In 1993, H.M. became pregnant through artificial insemination, performed by E.T. H.M. gave birth in September 1994, with E.T. present and cutting the umbilical cord. Both parties initially participated in the child’s care. Four months after the birth, E.T. ended the relationship, and H.M. moved to Canada with the child. E.T. provided occasional gifts and monetary contributions after the separation.

    Procedural History

    H.M. filed an application in Ontario, Canada, seeking a declaration of parentage and child support, which was transferred to Family Court, Rockland County, New York, under UIFSA. The Family Court Support Magistrate dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Family Court reversed, ordering a hearing on equitable estoppel. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the dismissal. H.M. appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a support petition brought pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) by a biological parent seeking child support from her former same-sex partner.

    Holding

    Yes, because Family Court has jurisdiction to determine the support obligations of parents, which inherently includes the authority to ascertain in certain cases whether a respondent is, in fact, a child’s parent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Family Court, as the designated UIFSA tribunal in New York, must apply the procedural and substantive law generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in the state. The Court emphasized that Family Court has constitutional and statutory jurisdiction over proceedings to determine the support of dependents (except those incidental to marital actions in Supreme Court). Family Court Act § 413(1)(a) states that “the parents of a child…are chargeable with the support of such child.” The court stated, “Family Court indisputably has jurisdiction to determine whether an individual parent—regardless of gender—is responsible for the support of a child.” Furthermore, statutory jurisdiction carries with it ancillary jurisdiction necessary to fulfill the court’s core function. Because H.M. asserted that E.T. is the child’s parent and therefore chargeable with support, the case falls within Family Court’s Article 4 jurisdiction. The court did not address whether the case also falls under Article 5. The Court rejected the dissent’s argument that Family Court lacks the authority to grant equitable relief necessary to declare E.T. a parent. The court emphasized that Family Court and Supreme Court have coextensive authority over child support matters. The relevant statutes, Family Court Act § 413 and Domestic Relations Law § 240, can be enforced in a manner that does not disadvantage litigants in Family Court.

  • Spencer v. Spencer, 8 N.Y.3d 64 (2006): UIFSA and Continuing Jurisdiction Over Child Support Orders

    8 N.Y.3d 64 (2006)

    Under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) and the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA), the state that issued the original child support order retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, preventing other states from modifying the order, even if the child reaches the age of majority in the issuing state but not in the modifying state.

    Summary

    Following a Connecticut divorce decree ordering child support until the children reached the age of 18, the mother sought a new child support order in New York for the eldest son until age 21, the age of majority in New York. The father, still residing in Connecticut, argued New York lacked jurisdiction. The New York Court of Appeals held that the New York order was an impermissible modification of the Connecticut order under UIFSA and FFCCSOA, as Connecticut retained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction because the father still resided there. The court rejected the “expired order” concept, emphasizing the importance of a single-order system for interstate child support enforcement.

    Facts

    Susan and James Spencer divorced in Connecticut in 1994. The Connecticut court ordered James to pay child support for their three children until they reached the age of 18, the age of majority in Connecticut. Susan and the children moved to New York. In 2004, the oldest son turned 18. In 2005, Susan filed a petition in New York seeking child support for the oldest son until age 21, the age of majority in New York, and contribution for college expenses. James continued to reside in Connecticut.

    Procedural History

    The Albany County Family Court denied the father’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and ordered him to pay child support. The Family Court denied the father’s objections, holding that the Support Magistrate properly retained subject matter jurisdiction because the second order was not a modification of Connecticut’s original decree. The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that because the Connecticut child support order expired as to the eldest son, there was no existing order to modify. The New York Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a New York child support order for a child until age 21 is a modification of a prior Connecticut order that terminated when the child reached age 18, triggering the jurisdictional restrictions of UIFSA and FFCCSOA.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because under the plain language of the federal statute, a second order for child support is a “modification” of Connecticut’s order.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the New York order constituted a modification of the Connecticut order, as it changed the amount, scope, and duration of the support obligation. The court relied heavily on the FFCCSOA and UIFSA, emphasizing that these statutes aim to establish a national single-order system for child support. Because the father continued to reside in Connecticut, Connecticut retained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the child support order. The court rejected the “expired order” concept, explaining that it undermines the policy of comity and the one-order system intended by UIFSA and FFCCSOA. Citing the FFCCSOA, the court stated that a modification is “a change in a child support order that affects the amount, scope, or duration of the order and modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to the child support order” (28 USC § 1738B [b]). Although New York has a strong policy interest in supporting children until age 21, it lacked jurisdiction to compel the father to pay support. The Court noted that under New York’s version of UIFSA, “[a] tribunal of this state may not modify any aspect of a child support order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state” (Family Ct Act § 580-611 [c]). In Connecticut, a court may issue an order of support for a child who is under the age of 18 (Conn Gen Stat Ann § 46b-215 [a] [l]).