38 N.Y.2d 618 (1976)
Under the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State in Criminal Cases (CPL 640.10), a trial court’s decision to compel the attendance of an out-of-state witness is discretionary and requires the requesting party to demonstrate the materiality and necessity of the witness’s testimony.
Summary
McCartney pleaded guilty to robbery after his confession was deemed admissible. He appealed, arguing that he was denied his right to compulsory process when the trial court refused to compel a Maryland State trooper’s attendance at his suppression hearing. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the decision to compel an out-of-state witness under the Uniform Act is discretionary and requires a showing of materiality, which McCartney failed to demonstrate. The Court emphasized the need to balance the defendant’s right to witnesses with the potential burden on the out-of-state witness.
Facts
McCartney was interrogated by New York State Police in a Maryland jail. He later sought to suppress statements he made during the interrogation, claiming they were involuntary. He requested the court to compel the attendance of a Maryland State trooper, Officer Miles, who was allegedly present during the interrogation. The prosecution presented testimony from Investigator Anderson of the New York State Police who conducted the interrogation. Another New York State Police officer who was also present during defendant’s interrogation, Senior Investigator Capozzi, although available to the defendant, was not called upon to testify.
Procedural History
The trial court denied McCartney’s request to compel the Maryland trooper’s attendance. McCartney pleaded guilty to robbery in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to issue a certificate under CPL 640.10(3) to compel the attendance of an out-of-state witness at a pretrial suppression hearing.
Holding
No, because the decision to compel the attendance of an out-of-state witness is discretionary, and the defendant failed to demonstrate that the witness’s testimony was material and necessary to his case.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Sixth Amendment guarantees compulsory process, it does not constitutionally require a state to compel the attendance of witnesses beyond its jurisdiction. The Uniform Act, while valid, is not constitutionally mandated. The Court emphasized that the Act should be applied uniformly across states that have adopted it, and that a key requirement for compelling an out-of-state witness is a showing of materiality. The burden of demonstrating materiality rests on the party seeking to compel attendance. The Court stated that unsupported statements of materiality are insufficient. The court stated, “Unsupported statements that the witness is material or necessary are not sufficient to require the Trial Judge to grant an application under CPL 640.10 (subd 3).”
The court found that McCartney failed to meet this burden. He argued that discrepancies existed between the testimony of Investigator Anderson and Senior Investigator Capozzi (who testified at his brother’s hearing), but he did not point out any specific discrepancies or call Investigator Capozzi to testify at his own hearing. Moreover, the trial court found that Officer Miles was only “in and out” of the room and did not observe any significant portion of the questioning. The Court highlighted that the process of securing an out-of-state witness is “drastic” and represents an incursion on the witness’s liberty. Therefore, a trial court’s decision to deny a request under CPL 640.10(3) is discretionary and should not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. The Court concluded no abuse of discretion occurred in this case.