New York Law Review

Tag: Unequivocal Request

  • In the Matter of Kathleen K., 17 N.Y.3d 380 (2011): Requirements for Self-Representation in Parental Rights Termination

    17 N.Y.3d 380 (2011)

    A parent’s request to represent themselves in a parental rights termination proceeding must be unequivocal and timely to trigger a “searching inquiry” by the court; otherwise, the court does not err in denying the request.

    Summary

    This case concerns a father, Steven K., appealing the termination of his parental rights. The Suffolk County Department of Social Services (DSS) initiated proceedings due to the father’s neglect and failure to comply with court-ordered conditions. The father made requests to represent himself, which were denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the father’s requests were not unequivocal and timely, and therefore did not trigger the need for a “searching inquiry” into whether he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The court also suggested, but did not definitively rule, that the right to self-representation may be different in parental termination cases versus criminal cases because of the child’s best interests.

    Facts

    Child neglect proceedings were initiated against Steven K. due to allegations of mental and physical abuse of his children and spouse. A temporary order of protection was issued, limiting his contact with the children to supervised visitation. Following a trial, Steven K. was found to have neglected his children, and the order of protection was made permanent. The children were placed in DSS foster care, and Steven K. was ordered to undergo a mental health evaluation, attend parenting classes, and find suitable housing. After failing to comply with these conditions, DSS was directed to file a petition to terminate Steven K.’s parental rights. The mother voluntarily surrendered her rights.

    Procedural History

    Family Court found Steven K. had neglected his children and ordered conditions for him to regain custody. After he failed to comply, the court directed DSS to file a petition for termination of parental rights. Family Court denied Steven K.’s requests to represent himself and terminated his parental rights. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that his requests were not unequivocal and timely. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Steven K.’s requests to represent himself in a parental rights termination proceeding were unequivocal and timely, thus requiring the Family Court to conduct a “searching inquiry” to ensure a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel.

    Holding

    No, because Steven K.’s requests were not unequivocal and timely, the Family Court was not required to conduct a “searching inquiry.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the right to self-representation as established in Faretta v. California for criminal defendants. However, it emphasized that such a request must be unequivocal and timely. The court found that Steven K.’s first request, made through his attorney, was not unequivocal, as it appeared to be motivated by dissatisfaction with counsel rather than a clear desire to represent himself. The court noted that Steven K.’s own statements to the court were non-responsive and did not clarify his desire to proceed pro se. The second request, made after the trial had commenced, was deemed untimely. Citing People v. McIntyre, the Court stated that a request for self-representation must be made before trial commences; after that point, the right is severely constricted, and the trial court has discretion to grant the request only under compelling circumstances. The court distinguished the case from situations where a defendant clearly and affirmatively expresses a desire to represent themselves. Because neither request met the requirements for timeliness and clarity, the Family Court was not obligated to conduct a “searching inquiry” into Steven K.’s understanding of the consequences of self-representation. Judge Smith concurred in the result, but argued that the majority incorrectly found the request equivocal. Judge Smith would have ruled that there is no Faretta right in parental termination proceedings due to the best interests of the child.

  • People v. Porter, 9 N.Y.3d 966 (2007): Unequivocal Invocation of Right to Counsel

    People v. Porter, 9 N.Y.3d 966, 878 N.E.2d 998, 848 N.Y.S.2d 583 (2007)

    When a suspect makes an unequivocal request for counsel during a custodial interrogation, further questioning by the police is prohibited.

    Summary

    Anthony Porter appealed his conviction, arguing that his confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained after he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that Porter’s statement, “I think I need an attorney,” coupled with the interviewing officer’s notation that Porter was “asking for an attorney,” constituted an unequivocal request for counsel, thus requiring the police to cease questioning. The Court suppressed the confession but upheld the finding that police had consent to search the premises.

    Facts

    Anthony Porter was being interviewed by police officers. During the interview, Porter stated, “I think I need an attorney.” The interviewing officer made a notation that Porter was “asking for an attorney.” Despite this, the police continued to question Porter, and he subsequently made a confession. Porter moved to suppress the confession, arguing that it was obtained in violation of his right to counsel.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Porter’s motion to suppress. Porter was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding that Porter’s request for counsel was equivocal and that the police had consent to search the premises. Porter appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Porter’s statement, “I think I need an attorney,” coupled with the interviewing officer’s notation, constituted an unequivocal request for counsel, thus requiring the police to cease questioning.

    2. Whether the Appellate Division’s finding that the police had consent to search the premises where defendant was located has support in the record and is thus beyond review.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Porter’s statement, along with the officer’s notation, demonstrated an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel, prohibiting further inquiry by the police.

    2. Yes, because the Appellate Division’s finding that the police had consent to search the premises has support in the record and is thus beyond the Court of Appeals’ review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that whether a request for counsel is equivocal is a mixed question of law and fact. While the Court normally defers to the Appellate Division’s determination of such mixed questions if there is support in the record, in this case, there was no support for the finding that Porter’s request was equivocal. The Court emphasized that the only evidence was Porter’s statement and the officer’s notation, both indicating a clear request for counsel. The Court clarified, “This is not to say that utterance of the words defendant used would unequivocally invoke the right to counsel in every instance. But on this record, where there were no additional facts upon which a contrary inference could be drawn, further inquiry by the police was not permitted.” The Court found that because the police continued to question Porter after he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel, his subsequent confession should have been suppressed. The Court upheld the Appellate Division’s finding regarding consent to search, stating that it was supported by the record and therefore beyond their review. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granted defendant’s motion to suppress statements and ordered a new trial.

  • People v. Glover, 87 N.Y.2d 838 (1995): Unequivocal Invocation of Right to Counsel

    People v. Glover, 87 N.Y.2d 838 (1995)

    A suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel must be unequivocal to trigger the protections of the New York Constitution, and a statement that simultaneously requests and negates the need for counsel is not considered unequivocal.

    Summary

    Glover was taken to the police station for questioning about a murder. After initially speaking freely, he mentioned wanting to call a friend to get a lawyer upon being confronted with incriminating evidence. However, almost immediately thereafter, he retracted this statement, saying he did not want a lawyer and would talk to the police. The New York Court of Appeals held that Glover’s initial request for counsel was not unequivocal because he immediately negated it. Therefore, his subsequent statements were admissible, and his constitutional rights were not violated.

    Facts

    Police brought Glover to the station for questioning regarding a murder investigation. He initially spoke freely with the police. When officers confronted him with a bloodstained T-shirt found outside his apartment, Glover stated he wanted to call a friend to get a lawyer. He then suggested calling his mother instead. Before the officer dialed, Glover stated, “Hang up the telephone. I do not want a lawyer. I’ll talk to you.” Between 30 and 60 seconds elapsed between Glover’s initial request and retraction. Glover then made incriminating statements, some spontaneously and others in response to questioning.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts found Glover’s statements admissible. Glover appealed, arguing his statements were obtained in violation of his right to counsel under the New York Constitution because he had invoked his right to counsel before making the incriminating statements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, upholding the admissibility of Glover’s statements.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements made by a suspect after an initial request for counsel, which is immediately retracted, are admissible in court, or whether that initial request, even if retracted, triggers the constitutional right to counsel, thus barring subsequent questioning without an attorney present.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s request for counsel was not unequivocal. Glover’s statement expressing a desire for counsel was immediately negated, therefore his subsequent statements were admissible in court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established New York precedent holding that when a defendant unequivocally requests counsel, any subsequent waiver of that right without counsel is ineffective, citing People v. Esposito, 68 NY2d 961 and People v. Cunningham, 49 NY2d 203. However, the court emphasized that this protection only applies when the request for counsel is clear and unambiguous, citing People v. Hicks, 69 NY2d 969, 970 and People v. Rowell, 59 NY2d 727, 730. The court determined that whether a request is unequivocal depends on the circumstances, including the defendant’s demeanor, manner of expression, and specific words used, citing People v. Johnson, 79 AD2d 201, 204. The court found that Glover’s statement wanting to call a friend for a lawyer was immediately negated, therefore the lower court’s finding that the request was not unequivocal was supported by evidence and not reviewable. As such, Glover’s constitutional rights were not violated, and his statements were deemed admissible. The court highlighted the importance of clear communication from the defendant regarding their desire for counsel. A simultaneous request and retraction creates ambiguity, preventing the right to counsel from attaching.

  • People v. Hicks, 69 N.Y.2d 969 (1987): Invocation of Right to Counsel Must Be Unequivocal

    People v. Hicks, 69 N.Y.2d 969 (1987)

    An individual’s inquiry about whether they should speak to a lawyer is not an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel, and therefore does not require police to cease questioning.

    Summary

    Hicks voluntarily went to the police station with his brother. He was gratuitously given Miranda warnings. He then asked police, “Should I speak to a lawyer?” The police asked if he thought he was in trouble; Hicks said no and gave a statement. Hicks was told he wasn’t under arrest and could leave. Hicks moved to suppress the statement, arguing his question invoked his right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the inquiry was not an unequivocal request for counsel, and therefore, the police were not required to stop questioning him.

    Facts

    Defendant Hicks and his brother voluntarily went to the police station.

    The police gave Hicks Miranda warnings, even though he was not in custody.

    Hicks asked the police, “Should I speak to a lawyer?”

    The police responded by asking Hicks if he thought he was in trouble.

    Hicks replied, “No,” and then gave a statement to the police.

    Hicks was advised that he was not under arrest and was free to leave.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Hicks’s motion to suppress the statement he made to the police.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a suspect’s question to police, “Should I speak to a lawyer?” constitutes an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel, thereby requiring the police to cease questioning.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s inquiry did not unequivocally inform the police of his intention to retain counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a suspect must unequivocally inform the police of their intention to retain counsel to trigger the right to counsel. A simple inquiry, such as asking whether one should speak to a lawyer, does not meet this standard. The court relied on prior case law, including People v. Rowell and People v. Johnson, which established the requirement of an unequivocal request for counsel. The court distinguished the case from People v. Esposito, where the invocation of the right to counsel was deemed unequivocal. The suppression court found that Hicks was not in custody and a reasonable person would not have believed their freedom was impaired. Because the defendant’s inquiry was not an unequivocal request for counsel, his right to counsel did not attach. The court found the remaining arguments to be either unpreserved, unreviewable, or without merit.

  • People v. Johnson, 55 N.Y.2d 931 (1982): Invoking Right to Counsel Requires Unequivocal Assertion

    People v. Johnson, 55 N.Y.2d 931 (1982)

    A suspect’s statement to police that they might consult with an attorney is insufficient to invoke the right to counsel; the suspect must unequivocally inform the police of their intention to retain counsel.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the trial court’s judgment convicting the defendant of sexual abuse. The court held that the defendant’s statement to police that he was going to see an attorney was insufficient to invoke his right to counsel. Because the defendant was not in custody, nor had he unequivocally informed the police of his intention to retain counsel, his subsequent statements were admissible in evidence.

    Facts

    The defendant, a 19-year-old school bus driver, was accused of sexually abusing a 10-year-old handicapped girl on his bus on September 27, 1977. The police learned of the incident the next day and contacted the defendant through his employer, who was also his uncle, asking him to come to the police station. The defendant initially denied the allegations. Later, inconsistencies arose, and the police contacted the defendant’s uncle again on October 4 to request further questioning. The defendant then admitted inaccuracies but still denied touching the victim and agreed to take a polygraph examination. On October 10, a detective notified the defendant that the polygraph was scheduled for October 13. The defendant stated that he was going to Manhattan to see his mother and then an attorney, but did not provide details about meeting the attorney.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree at trial. He moved to suppress his statements, arguing Fifth Amendment violations. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the defendant’s right to counsel had been violated, citing People v. Woodard and People v. Skinner. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s statement that he was going to meet with an attorney was sufficient to invoke his right to counsel, thereby rendering his subsequent statements inadmissible.

    Holding

    No, because under the circumstances, it was not enough to invoke his right to counsel under the circumstances that he suggested to the police that he might consult a lawyer. His statements were admissible unless he had retained counsel on the matter under investigation to the knowledge of the police or had unequivocally informed the police of his intention to do so.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from People v. Woodard, where the defendant made a clear and categorical request for counsel during custodial interrogation, and People v. Skinner, where the police were aware that the defendant had retained counsel. The court emphasized that the defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation, nor had his right to counsel attached at the time he made the statement about seeing an attorney. The Court of Appeals stated the rule that after a suspect in custody requests counsel, any evidence obtained without counsel and without counsel’s consent is inadmissible at trial. Similarly, once formal charges are filed, the right to counsel attaches regardless of whether the defendant requests it. However, in this case, the defendant was free for two weeks, had access to competent adults, and had not unequivocally indicated his intention to retain counsel. The court stated, “It was not enough to invoke his right to counsel under the circumstances that he suggested to the police that he might consult a lawyer.” Therefore, the court concluded that his statements were admissible because he had not retained counsel to the knowledge of the police or unequivocally informed them of his intent to do so. The court reasoned that to trigger the right to counsel, a suspect must clearly and unambiguously assert their desire to have an attorney present during questioning. A mere mention of a possible consultation is insufficient to create this constitutional protection.