New York Law Review

Tag: Undue Suggestiveness

  • People v. Delamota, 18 N.Y.3d 107 (2011): Limits on the Ledwon Rule and Unduly Suggestive Identification Procedures

    People v. Delamota, 18 N.Y.3d 107 (2011)

    The rule in People v. Ledwon, which holds that a conviction cannot stand when based solely on inherently contradictory testimony from a single witness, does not apply when inconsistencies arise from multiple witnesses or when a witness provides a credible explanation for discrepancies; furthermore, using a translator with a pre-existing relationship with the defendant during a photo array can render the identification unduly suggestive, warranting suppression.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery. The victim, Hernandez, identified him in a photo array and lineup. At trial, discrepancies emerged between Hernandez’s description of the robber and the description given to the police shortly after the crime. Also, Hernandez’s son, Juan Jr., served as translator during the photo array, and it was later revealed that Juan Jr. knew the defendant, a fact not disclosed initially. The New York Court of Appeals held that the discrepancies in testimony did not warrant reversal under People v. Ledwon because the inconsistencies did not arise from a single witness and the victim provided a reason for the differences in description. However, the Court found the identification procedure unduly suggestive due to Juan Jr.’s involvement and ordered a new trial preceded by an independent source hearing.

    Facts

    Juan Hernandez was robbed at knifepoint in his apartment building. His son, Juan Jr., called 911 and provided a description of the robber. Detective Koch interviewed Hernandez, with Juan Jr. translating. Hernandez described the robber, but the description did not match the defendant, Delamota, who was later identified as the perpetrator. Juan Jr. later told the detective that he had heard neighborhood gossip that “Sebastian” was the robber. Detective Koch then showed Hernandez a photo array containing Delamota’s picture, and Hernandez identified him, with Juan Jr. translating. Delamota had a functionally impaired left arm. At trial, Juan Jr. admitted to knowing Delamota for a long time prior to the robbery.

    Procedural History

    Delamota was indicted for robbery and weapon possession. He moved to suppress the identifications, arguing undue suggestiveness. The trial court denied the motion. At trial, defense counsel moved to reopen the suppression hearing after Juan Jr.’s revelation. The motion was denied. Delamota was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding the identification procedure unduly suggestive and ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People’s proof was legally insufficient under People v. Ledwon due to conflicting testimony regarding the perpetrator’s appearance.

    2. Whether the victim’s identification should have been suppressed because his son participated in the photo array, having known the defendant prior to the identification procedure.

    Holding

    1. No, because the conflicting testimony came from multiple witnesses, not a single witness, and the victim provided a rational explanation for the discrepancies.

    2. Yes, because Juan Jr.’s participation as a translator, combined with his prior knowledge of Delamota, created an unduly suggestive identification procedure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court clarified the narrow scope of the Ledwon rule. The Court stated, “Ledwon applies in rare cases where the charged crime is established by only one witness who provides inherently contradictory testimony at trial.” Because discrepancies arose from multiple witnesses (the victim and the detective), Ledwon did not apply. The Court emphasized that it is the jury’s role to weigh conflicting evidence. The victim’s trial testimony was not internally inconsistent, and he offered an explanation for the differing description he allegedly gave to the detective. The court noted it is up to the Appellate Division to review the weight of the evidence.

    Regarding the identification procedure, the Court found that the trial court erred in denying Delamota’s motion to reopen the Wade hearing. Juan Jr.’s role as translator, coupled with his undisclosed prior relationship with Delamota, created an unduly suggestive situation. “In our view, the suggestiveness cannot be attributed to the victim’s son, but to the detective’s decision to utilize him as the interpreter notwithstanding the possible risks that were involved in this practice.” The Court reasoned that the detective should have used a neutral Spanish interpreter and therefore ordered a new trial preceded by an independent source hearing to determine if the victim’s in-court identification had an independent basis.

  • People v. Gee, 99 N.Y.2d 158 (2002): CPL 710.30 Notice Not Required for Witness Viewing Video of Crime

    People v. Gee, 99 N.Y.2d 158 (2002)

    A witness’s viewing of a surveillance videotape depicting the actual crime, as opposed to a lineup, showup, or photo array, does not constitute a “previous identification” requiring notice under CPL 710.30(1) because it doesn’t present the risk of undue suggestiveness that the statute aims to prevent.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a convenience store clerk’s viewing of a surveillance video of the robbery shortly after it occurred did not trigger the notice requirements of CPL 710.30. The court reasoned that showing the clerk the video of the robbery she witnessed was not an identification procedure because the clerk was simply ratifying the events as revealed in the videotape, and no issue or inquiry as to the defendant’s identity was made. The purpose of CPL 710.30 is to protect against suggestive pretrial identification procedures that could lead to misidentification; because the video depicted the actual crime, there was no risk of such suggestiveness. This ruling clarifies the scope of CPL 710.30 and its application to situations where a witness views a recording of the crime itself.

    Facts

    Defendant Gee and an accomplice robbed a convenience store. The robbery was recorded by the store’s surveillance camera. The clerk, shortly after the robbery, viewed the surveillance videotape and confirmed its authenticity to Officer Buduson. The People provided notice under CPL 710.30 regarding a lineup and photographic identification, but not the videotape viewing.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was indicted for robbery. At trial, the defense learned of the clerk’s videotape viewing and moved to preclude the clerk’s identification testimony due to lack of CPL 710.30 notice. The trial court denied the motion, allowing cross-examination on the viewing. The jury convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the convenience store clerk’s viewing of the surveillance videotape, depicting the robbery she witnessed, constituted a “previous identification” of the defendant as contemplated by CPL 710.30(1), thus requiring the prosecution to provide notice to the defense.

    Holding

    No, because the clerk’s viewing of the videotape depicting the actual robbery did not constitute a “previous identification” within the meaning of CPL 710.30(1), as it did not present the risk of undue suggestiveness that the statute is designed to prevent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 710.30 aims to protect against suggestive pretrial identification procedures that could lead to misidentification. The statute requires notice when a witness will testify about observing the defendant “either at the time or place of the commission of the offense or upon some other occasion relevant to the case, to be given by a witness who has previously identified him as such” (CPL 710.30 [1]). The court emphasized that in viewing the videotape, the clerk did not “previously identify the defendant as such,” meaning as the defendant in the case. Because the videotape depicted the actual robbery and the only people shown were the clerk and the robbers, there was no selection process or risk of suggestiveness. The clerk was simply ratifying the events on the tape. The court distinguished this from lineups, showups, and photo arrays, where the defendant’s identity is at issue and suggestiveness is a concern. As the Court stated, “In cases in which the defendant’s identity is not in issue, * * * ‘suggestiveness’ is not a concern and, hence, [CPL 710.30] does not come into play” (citing People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543, 552 (1979)). The Court also noted that a Wade hearing would have been “all but purposeless” because the only way to argue suggestibility would be to call the clerk as a witness, which a defendant does not have an absolute right to do. The Court also cited Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), contrasting that viewing a clear image of the robber on video shortly after the robbery does not constitute an “undue” or improper suggestion of what he looked like.

  • People v. Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d 533 (1997): Burden of Proof for Admitting Showup Identification Testimony

    90 N.Y.2d 533 (1997)

    The prosecution bears the initial burden of producing evidence demonstrating that a showup identification procedure was not unduly suggestive, even when conducted in close proximity to the crime.

    Summary

    Enrique Ortiz was convicted of attempted murder and weapons possession after being identified by two police officers he shot at. The officers identified Ortiz in a showup conducted after they received hospital treatment. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving the showup was not unduly suggestive because they presented no evidence about the circumstances of the identification procedure itself. The Court emphasized that while proximity to the crime makes a showup reasonable, the prosecution must still offer evidence of the showup’s fairness.

    Facts

    Two police officers, Colon and Sullivan, responded to a call and encountered Ortiz outside an apartment building. Ortiz shot at the officers, and they returned fire. Ortiz fled into the building. Colon and Sullivan were taken to the hospital for treatment. Another officer, Reardon, arrived and, after investigation, found Ortiz hiding in an apartment within the building. Ortiz was taken to the lobby. Colon and Sullivan were brought back to the scene and identified Ortiz as the shooter. Officer Reardon, the only witness who testified at the suppression hearing, did not witness the showup itself.

    Procedural History

    Ortiz was convicted in the trial court. He moved to suppress the identification testimony, arguing the People had not shown the showup was proper. The trial court denied the motion, finding the showup permissible due to its proximity to the crime. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People met their burden of demonstrating that the showup identification procedure was not unduly suggestive, thus warranting admission of the identification testimony at trial.

    Holding

    No, because the People failed to present any evidence concerning the circumstances of the showup itself to demonstrate the procedure was not unduly suggestive.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that showup identifications are inherently suggestive and disfavored. While showups conducted in close geographic and temporal proximity to the crime are not “presumptively infirm,” they still require careful scrutiny for unacceptable suggestiveness. The Court stated that while the defendant bears the ultimate burden of proving the showup was unduly suggestive, the People first have the burden to produce evidence validating the admission of such evidence. This includes demonstrating the showup was reasonable under the circumstances (proximity to the crime) and producing some evidence relating to the showup itself to demonstrate it was not unduly suggestive.

    The Court noted the absence of any witness who could testify to the circumstances under which Ortiz was identified, stating: “Indeed, from this record, it cannot even be ascertained whether the identification procedure utilized here was a true showup or an impromptu lineup.”

    The Court emphasized the People’s procedural burden is minimal, requiring merely some proof of the circumstances of the on-site identification procedure. The court cited People v. Chipp, stating that “the People have the initial burden of going forward to establish the reasonableness of the police conduct and the lack of any undue suggestiveness in a pretrial identification procedure.” Without such proof, the defendant is unduly prejudiced in their efforts to establish whether an identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive.