New York Law Review

Tag: Underlying Felony

  • People v. Brensic, 89 N.Y.2d 579 (1997): Corroboration of Underlying Felony in Hindering Prosecution

    People v. Brensic, 89 N.Y.2d 579 (1997)

    In a prosecution for hindering prosecution, CPL 60.50 requires independent corroborative evidence that the underlying felony occurred, but the threshold for such corroboration is low and can be satisfied by evidence such as the victim’s death, the suspect being a fugitive, and the suspect’s consciousness of guilt.

    Summary

    Brensic was convicted of hindering prosecution for assisting her common-law husband, Rivera, who she knew had committed a class A felony (murder). The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while CPL 60.50 requires corroboration of the underlying felony in hindering prosecution cases, the prosecution met this requirement. The court emphasized that the corroboration requirement exists to prevent convictions based solely on confessions when no crime has actually occurred. Here, testimony from investigating officers about the victim’s murder, Rivera’s status as a suspect and fugitive, and his violent flight from police provided sufficient corroboration.

    Facts

    Brensic provided a detailed statement to police that her common-law husband, Marcus Rivera, and others planned and carried out the murder of Roberto Corperone. She admitted to twice thwarting police efforts to apprehend Rivera by warning him in advance of their arrival. Detectives eventually apprehended Rivera in Philadelphia without Brensic’s knowledge after he violently resisted arrest and fled. Brensic was subsequently charged and convicted of hindering prosecution in the first degree.

    Procedural History

    Following a non-jury trial, Brensic was convicted of two counts of hindering prosecution in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Brensic appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission of an Appellate Division Justice.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to sustain Brensic’s conviction for hindering prosecution in the first degree.
    2. Whether the People provided sufficient corroboration under CPL 60.50 of Brensic’s statement that a class A felony (murder) had occurred.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Brensic’s detailed statement provided an eyewitness account of the intentional murder of Corperone, and the detectives’ testimony supported the conclusion that Brensic warned Rivera of impending apprehension.
    2. Yes, because CPL 60.50 requires some independent evidence that the underlying felony occurred. Here, the testimony of the investigating officers regarding Corperone’s murder, Rivera’s status as a suspect and fugitive, his indictment, and his violent flight from police provided sufficient corroboration.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that to prove hindering prosecution in the first degree, the People must prove that the assisted person committed a class A felony. While the statute does not require proof of arrest or conviction, it does require proof of each element of the underlying felony. The court stated that the standard of review for legal sufficiency is “whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, could lead a rational trier of fact to conclude that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

    Regarding corroboration, the court explained that CPL 60.50 requires “additional proof that the offense charged has been committed,” but does not mandate independent evidence of every component of the crime. The statute requires “some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone” to avert ” ‘the danger that a crime may have been confessed when no crime in any degree has been committed by anyone.’ ” The court distinguished felony murder cases, where corroboration of the underlying felony is not required, because in those cases, the felony serves as a substitute for malicious intent. In contrast, without the underlying felony in a hindering prosecution case, no crime has been committed at all.

    The court emphasized the relatively low threshold for corroboration under CPL 60.50. Here, the detectives’ testimony that Corperone had been murdered, that Rivera was the immediate suspect, that a fugitive warrant was issued for his arrest, and that Rivera violently resisted arrest and fled from police constituted sufficient corroboration. Specifically, the court pointed to Rivera’s “consciousness of guilt” as crucial corroborating evidence. As the Court stated, “proof of motive or flight, may ‘be held to constitute the essential additional proof.’ ”

  • People v. Martinez, 86 N.Y.2d 630 (1995): Sufficiency of Evidence for Escape in the First Degree

    People v. Martinez, 86 N.Y.2d 630 (1995)

    To secure an indictment for escape in the first degree, the prosecution needs to demonstrate that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the defendant committed a Class A or Class B felony; the ultimate disposition of the underlying charge is irrelevant.

    Summary

    Martinez was arrested for selling narcotics (a Class B felony) after an undercover officer radioed that a “positive buy” occurred. While being transported, Martinez escaped. Subsequent lab analysis revealed the substance sold was not narcotics. The Grand Jury indicted Martinez for escape in the first degree. The New York Court of Appeals held that the prosecution only needed to establish that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe Martinez committed a Class B felony at the time of arrest, not that the underlying crime was actually committed. The officer’s reasonable belief, based on the undercover’s report, was sufficient.

    Facts

    An undercover officer negotiated a drug purchase and signaled a “positive buy” to his backup team, describing the seller. Officer Combs, part of the backup team, arrested Martinez based on the description, for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (a Class B felony). Martinez was placed in a police van but escaped during transport. A lab analysis later revealed the substance sold was not narcotics.

    Procedural History

    The Grand Jury indicted Martinez for escape in the first degree (Penal Law § 205.15 [2]). The Supreme Court dismissed the indictment, finding insufficient evidence of the underlying narcotics crime. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment, concluding that probable cause for the underlying narcotics arrest was sufficient. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People presented sufficient evidence of the underlying narcotic crime to support an indictment for escape in the first degree, specifically, whether the People must prove the A or B felony or merely establish probable cause for the arrest of such felony.

    Holding

    No, because the People need only establish that the police had reasonable cause to believe at the time of the arrest that an A or B felony had been committed; the ultimate disposition of the underlying charge is irrelevant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the statute (Penal Law § 205.15 [2]) requires only that the defendant have been “arrested for, or charged with” an A or B felony. A person is in custody when restrained by a public officer following an authorized arrest. The key question is whether the police had probable cause to believe an A or B felony had been committed at the time of the arrest.

    The court rejected the argument that the prosecution must prove the underlying felony. The degree of escape is based not on the arrestee’s ultimate guilt, but on the potential impact on society of an escaped prisoner charged with a serious crime. The court distinguished cases involving larceny, where value must be proven to establish probable cause for grand larceny. In narcotics cases, the police don’t need to know the exact nature or amount of the drug before making an arrest for criminal sale.

    Probable cause exists when an officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances “sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed” (People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423). The “fellow officer rule” allows an arresting officer to rely on information from another officer with probable cause. Here, Officer Combs relied on the undercover officer’s report of a “positive buy” to reasonably believe Martinez had sold narcotics. According to the court, “[a]lthough it was subsequently revealed that the substance purchased was not a narcotic…[the officers] could reasonably believe, based upon their experience and all the circumstances surrounding the transaction, that defendant had sold narcotics to the undercover.” This was sufficient to support the indictment for escape in the first degree.