New York Law Review

Tag: Undercover Officer

  • People v. Kropman, 47 N.Y.2d 1002 (1979): Conspiracy Conviction Upheld Despite Feigned Agreement of Co-conspirator

    47 N.Y.2d 1002 (1979)

    A defendant may be guilty of criminal conspiracy even if the sole co-conspirator only feigned agreement and did not actually share the defendant’s criminal intent.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a conspiracy conviction could stand when one of the alleged co-conspirators was an undercover officer feigning agreement. The court held that a defendant can be guilty of conspiracy even if the only co-conspirator lacked genuine criminal intent due to feigned agreement. The trial court’s instruction that the jury could not convict one defendant without the other was erroneous. As one defendant’s attorney objected to the charge, his conviction was reversed; the other defendant’s conviction was affirmed because her attorney failed to object to the improper charge.

    Facts

    Defendant Teeter and an undercover officer, Cantaben, allegedly conspired. The indictment also charged Kropman as a co-conspirator. The underlying facts of the conspiracy are not explicitly detailed in the Court of Appeals decision, but the key fact is that Cantaben was an undercover officer who only feigned agreement with the conspiracy.

    Procedural History

    The Trial Judge charged the jury that they could not convict one defendant and not the other on the conspiracy charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions of both Teeter and Kropman. Kropman appealed, arguing the jury instruction was erroneous. Teeter also appealed but had not properly preserved the objection to the jury charge. The Court of Appeals addressed the validity of the conspiracy conviction given the feigned agreement of Cantaben, the undercover officer.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be convicted of conspiracy when the only alleged co-conspirator is an undercover officer who feigned agreement and did not share the defendant’s criminal intent.

    Holding

    Yes, because under Penal Law § 105.30, it is not a defense to conspiracy that a co-conspirator could not be guilty of conspiracy due to factors precluding the required mental state. The improper jury charge, unobjected to by Teeter’s attorney, stood, but Kropman’s conviction was reversed because his attorney properly objected.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its companion cases, People v. Schwimmer and People v. Villetto, which adopted the reasoning of Justice Samuel Rabin’s opinion in People v. Schwimmer (66 AD2d 91). That reasoning held that a defendant may be guilty of criminal conspiracy even though the only co-conspirator feigned agreement and did not share the defendant’s criminal intent. The court emphasized Penal Law § 105.30, which states that “It is no defense to a prosecution for conspiracy that, owing to * * * exemption * * * or to other factors precluding the mental state required * * * one or more of the defendant’s co-conspirators could not be guilty of conspiracy”. The court reasoned that, given a proper charge, the jury could have found a conspiracy between Teeter and the undercover officer, Cantaben, to which Kropman was not a party. The court acknowledged the error in the trial court’s charge, stating, “The instruction that the jury could not convict one defendant and not the other on the conspiracy charge was error in light of the present wording of section 105.10 of the Penal Law and the expressed provision in section 105.30”. Because Teeter’s attorney failed to object to the erroneous charge, the court lacked jurisdiction to correct the error in her case. However, Kropman’s attorney preserved the error, and thus his conviction was reversed.

  • People v. Leonard, 29 N.Y.2d 606 (1971): Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence for Drug Indictment

    People v. Leonard, 29 N.Y.2d 606 (1971)

    Circumstantial evidence, such as an undercover officer’s testimony about a drug sale, can be sufficient to establish the corpus delicti and support an indictment for drug-related charges, even without the introduction of the actual drug itself before the grand jury.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the indictment against the defendant for drug-related charges. The court held that the prosecution was not required to introduce the actual LSD tablet before the grand jury. The undercover officer’s testimony regarding the sale of “purple acid” was sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish the corpus delicti. The court also found that the laboratory certificate, competent by statute, established the content and source of the tablet. This case clarifies that direct physical evidence is not always necessary for a drug indictment, especially when reliable circumstantial evidence is presented.

    Facts

    An undercover State policeman testified before the Grand Jury that the defendant offered to sell him “purple acid.” The officer testified about the actual sale. The LSD tablet was transmitted through the officer to the State Police Laboratory for analysis.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for criminally selling a dangerous drug in the fourth degree and criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the fifth and sixth degrees. The Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s decision, leading to an appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution was required to introduce the actual LSD tablet before the Grand Jury in order to obtain an indictment for drug-related charges, given the presence of the undercover officer’s testimony regarding the drug sale.

    Holding

    No, because the undercover officer’s testimony about the drug sale, combined with the laboratory certificate, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish the corpus delicti and support the indictment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the testimony of the undercover officer regarding the offer to sell and the actual sale of “purple acid” constituted sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish the corpus delicti. The court cited People v. Transamerican Frgt. Lines, 24 N.Y.2d 727, 730 and People v. Leonard, 8 N.Y.2d 60, 61-62 to support this proposition. The court further noted that while the grand jury proceedings were informal, the evidence clearly indicated that the LSD tablet had been transmitted through the officer to the State Police Laboratory. The laboratory certificate, which is competent evidence by statute (Code Crim. Pro., § 248, subd. 3), established both the content of the tablet and its source via the officer. The court emphasized the constitutionality of such statutes, referencing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363. The court implicitly found that the circumstantial evidence presented was reliable and probative, thus negating the need for the actual physical evidence to be presented before the grand jury. The court concluded by stating, “Although the proceedings before the Grand Jury were more informal than would be advisable generally, the import of the evidence was clear that the LSD tablet had been transmitted through Officer Turner to the State Police Laboratory.”