New York Law Review

Tag: underage drinking

  • Rust v. Reyer, 91 N.Y.2d 355 (1998): Defining ‘Furnishing’ Alcohol to Minors Under New York Law

    Rust v. Reyer, 91 N.Y.2d 355 (1998)

    Under New York General Obligations Law § 11-100, a person may be liable for “furnishing” alcohol to a minor, even if they did not directly serve the alcohol, if their actions were part of a deliberate plan to make alcohol available to underage individuals.

    Summary

    Carol Rust, a minor, sued Heidi Reyer for injuries sustained after being punched by an intoxicated minor, Stephen Tarantino, at a party hosted by Reyer. Reyer allowed a fraternity to bring kegs of beer to her party in exchange for a portion of the proceeds from cup sales, knowing that many attendees were underage. The New York Court of Appeals held that Reyer’s actions, if proven at trial, could constitute “furnishing” alcohol to minors under General Obligations Law § 11-100, even though she did not personally serve the alcohol. The Court emphasized that the statute’s purpose is to deter underage drinking and that a narrow interpretation would undermine this goal.

    Facts

    Heidi Reyer, 17, planned a party at her house while her parents were away. Representatives from a high school fraternity, including Stephen Tarantino, approached Reyer about bringing beer to the party and charging attendees for unlimited access. Reyer agreed in exchange for a share of the proceeds. Fraternity members brought kegs of beer, stored them at Reyer’s house, and sold cups to partygoers. Reyer attempted to get free beer for her friends and observed underage guests consuming alcohol. After the party was dispersed by police, Tarantino, intoxicated from the beer consumed at the party, punched Carol Rust, causing injury.

    Procedural History

    Rust sued Reyer, her parents, and Tarantino, alleging negligence and violations of General Obligations Law §§ 11-100 and 11-101. Tarantino settled. The Supreme Court dismissed the claim against Reyer, holding that she merely “facilitated” the furnishing of alcohol. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Reyer’s actions could constitute “furnishing” alcohol under the statute.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under General Obligations Law § 11-100, a person who allows a third party to furnish alcohol to minors at a party on their premises, in exchange for a portion of the proceeds, can be held liable as someone who unlawfully furnishes alcohol to minors, even if they did not directly serve the alcohol themselves.

    Holding

    Yes, because if proven at trial, Reyer’s actions could be considered “furnishing” alcohol under General Obligations Law § 11-100, as she played an integral role in making alcohol available to underage individuals at the party.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that “furnishing” should be understood in its ordinary sense, meaning “to provide in any way,” “to supply,” or “to give.” The Court emphasized that Reyer’s actions, including giving permission for alcohol at her party, providing storage for the kegs, negotiating a share of the proceeds, and attempting to arrange free beer for her friends, demonstrated her complicity in the scheme to furnish alcohol to underage individuals. The Court stated, “[Reyer] chose to participate in a scheme to furnish alcohol to underage individuals in return for a payment of money.” The Court acknowledged that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, but also emphasized that the primary directive is to give effect to the Legislature’s intention. The Court noted that the purpose of General Obligations Law § 11-100 is to deter underage drinking, as stated in the legislative history: “[t]his legislation seeks to protect minors from those persons uncaring enough to provide intoxicating beverages to minors in an indiscriminate manner and by so doing, to endanger the life and safety of the minor as well as of the general public.” The court distinguished Reyer’s actions from those of an unknowing bystander, an innocent dupe, or a passive participant. The court stated that reading the statute to foreclose responsibility in these circumstances would allow unintended circumvention of the legislation and negate its deterrent purpose.

  • People v. Bergerson, 17 N.Y.2d 398 (1966): Scope and Application of Child Endangerment Statutes

    People v. Bergerson, 17 N.Y.2d 398 (1966)

    A person can be held liable under a child endangerment statute for creating a situation where a child’s life, limb, health, or morals are endangered, even if the statute does not explicitly define the degree of control required over the child, provided the person exercised sufficient control in the given situation.

    Summary

    Bergerson was convicted of violating a child endangerment statute after providing beer to underage youths at a party he organized. One of the youths died after leaving the party. Bergerson argued that the statute was vague and that evidence of the youth’s death prejudiced the jury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague because a reasonable person would understand that it prohibits endangering a child’s well-being. The Court also found that evidence of the youth’s death was relevant to the charge of endangering his life.

    Facts

    The defendant, Bergerson, age 28, helped his brother-in-law and another individual, both age 16, to organize a beer party. Several youths contributed money to purchase a half keg of beer. Bergerson purchased the beer and transported it and some of the boys to a picnic area, where the party began. Later, the party moved to Bergerson’s house. Nine boys participated, and all were under the age of 18. One of the boys, 14-year-old Thomas Higgins, was killed on the highway after leaving Bergerson’s house, presumably after being struck by a car.

    Procedural History

    Bergerson was indicted on one count of violating subdivision 1 of section 483 of the Penal Law in connection with Higgins and three counts of violating subdivision 2 of section 483 of the Penal Law in connection with three other underage boys. The jury acquitted Bergerson of the counts concerning Higgins and two other boys but convicted him of the count involving Michael Connor. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Bergerson appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the indictment should have been dismissed because the Grand Jury was prejudiced by the introduction of evidence regarding Higgins’ death.
    2. Whether the introduction at trial of evidence regarding Higgins’ death denied Bergerson a fair trial.
    3. Whether section 483 of the Penal Law is so vague and indefinite as to violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court found nothing in the Grand Jury minutes to indicate that the evidence adduced violated defendant’s rights, and an indictment is presumed to be based on legal and sufficient evidence.

    2. No, because since Bergerson was on trial for endangering the life and limb and injuring the health of Thomas Higgins, the fact of Higgins’ death was highly relevant.

    3. No, because the statute clearly informed Bergerson that the offense prohibited was the endangering of the life, limb, health, or morals of a child and what was required of him was that he refrain from willfully causing or permitting such danger.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Grand Jury was not improperly prejudiced because, in order to obtain an indictment or conviction under the first count relating to Higgins, the prosecution had to allege and prove that Higgins’ life, limb, or health did in fact become endangered. Therefore, evidence of his death was relevant. Regarding the evidence at trial, the court reasoned that because Bergerson was on trial for endangering Higgins, the fact of Higgins’ death was highly relevant.

    As to the vagueness challenge, the court applied the test of “whether a reasonable man subject to the statute would be informed of the nature of the offense prohibited and what is required of him.” The court found that the statute clearly informed Bergerson that the offense prohibited was endangering a child’s well-being and that he was required to refrain from willfully causing or permitting such danger. The court emphasized that Bergerson “exercised sufficient control in this case to comply with and be subject to the statute—in fact, he had complete control over the youths and the party in his decision to purchase or not to purchase the beer.” The court distinguished the case from situations where the degree of control might be less clear, implying that the level of control exerted by the defendant is a key factor in determining liability under the statute. The court found that it need not specify *what* degree of relationship or control is presupposed.

    This case clarifies that even though the statute does not explicitly define the degree of control required over the child, a person can still be held liable if they exercised sufficient control in the specific situation. This ruling highlights the importance of considering the defendant’s actual level of control when assessing liability under child endangerment statutes. It affirms the broad scope of such statutes in protecting children’s welfare.