New York Law Review

Tag: Unconstitutionality

  • Pahmer v. Hertz Corp., 36 N.Y.2d 114 (1974): Upholding Judgment After Statute Declared Unconstitutional

    Pahmer v. Hertz Corp., 36 N.Y.2d 114 (1974)

    A court can uphold a judgment by affirming on grounds different from those initially argued if the relevant statute is later declared unconstitutional by the jurisdiction that enacted it.

    Summary

    This case concerns an accident in California involving New York residents. The defendants invoked the California guest statute as a defense. The New York Court of Appeals initially considered choice-of-law issues. However, after the California Supreme Court declared the guest statute unconstitutional, the New York court affirmed the lower court’s order striking the defense, basing its decision on the statute’s unconstitutionality rather than choice-of-law principles. This demonstrates the principle that a judgment can be upheld on different grounds if a key legal element changes during the appellate process.

    Facts

    Joyce Pahmer and William Cullen, New York residents employed by Airborne Instrument Laboratory, were temporarily working in Sacramento, California.
    While in California, Cullen rented a car from Hertz.
    On July 30, 1966, Pahmer and Cullen were involved in a car accident while driving to San Francisco.
    Pahmer sustained injuries and sued Cullen for negligent driving and Hertz for leasing a defective vehicle, also alleging breach of warranties.

    Procedural History

    The defendants raised three affirmative defenses: California’s one-year statute of limitations, the California guest statute, and New York’s Workmen’s Compensation Law.
    The plaintiffs moved to dismiss these defenses.
    Special Term struck the statute of limitations defense but upheld the other two.
    The Appellate Division modified the order, striking the guest statute defense.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, certifying the question of whether the guest statute could be relied upon as a defense.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendants can rely on the California guest statute as a defense, given that the accident occurred in California.

    Holding

    No, because the California Supreme Court declared the California guest statute unconstitutional in Brown v. Merlo, thus invalidating its use as a defense in this case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals initially addressed the choice-of-law issue, contemplating whether California law should apply.
    However, the California Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Merlo, 506 P. 2d 212, which declared the guest statute unconstitutional, fundamentally altered the legal landscape.
    The California Supreme Court found that the statute’s classifications between those allowed and denied recovery for negligently inflicted injuries lacked a rational basis, violating equal protection guarantees.
    The New York Court of Appeals acknowledged the widespread antipathy towards guest statutes due to their irrationality and unfairness, quoting, “In our view, the widespread antipathy to such [guest] statutes is in large part a reflection of the irrationality and unfairness of these legislative schemes, which strip the single class of automobile guests of any protection from negligently inflicted injuries… [S]uch irrational discrimination cannot be squared with the applicable constitutional standards” (506 P. 2d, at pp. 231-232).
    Given the California Supreme Court’s ruling, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the order striking the guest statute defense, basing its decision on the statute’s unconstitutionality.

  • People v. Tannenbaum, 27 N.Y.2d 753 (1970): Retroactivity of Unconstitutionality in Criminal Law

    People v. Tannenbaum, 27 N.Y.2d 753 (1970)

    When a substantive criminal statute is declared unconstitutional, the decision has retroactive effect, meaning a conviction under that statute cannot stand because the defendant committed no crime.

    Summary

    The defendant, Tannenbaum, was convicted under section 484-i of the former New York Penal Law. The Supreme Court subsequently declared this statute unconstitutional in Rabeck v. New York. This case addresses whether that declaration of unconstitutionality should apply retroactively to Tannenbaum’s conviction. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rabeck must be applied retroactively to Tannenbaum’s conviction. The court reasoned that declaring a statute unconstitutional means the defendant committed no crime, thus the conviction cannot stand.

    Facts

    Tannenbaum was convicted of violating section 484-i of the former New York Penal Law. This conviction was initially upheld by the New York Court of Appeals. Tannenbaum appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. However, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot.

    Procedural History

    1. Tannenbaum was convicted under section 484-i of the former New York Penal Law.
    2. The New York Court of Appeals initially sustained the conviction.
    3. The Supreme Court of the United States dismissed Tannenbaum’s appeal as moot.
    4. The Supreme Court then held section 484-i to be unconstitutional in Rabeck v. New York.
    5. The New York Court of Appeals granted Tannenbaum’s motion for reargument in light of Rabeck.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Rabeck v. New York, which declared section 484-i of the former New York Penal Law unconstitutional, should be applied retroactively to Tannenbaum’s conviction under that same statute.

    Holding

    Yes, because declaring a substantive criminal statute unconstitutional means that the defendant has committed no crime, and therefore, the conviction cannot stand.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Supreme Court’s decision in Rabeck v. New York, which declared section 484-i unconstitutional, must be applied retroactively. The core reasoning is that a declaration of unconstitutionality in a substantive criminal statute means that the defendant has, in effect, committed no crime. The court distinguished this situation from cases involving rules of criminal procedure, where retroactivity is not always required. The court stated, “Where a substantive criminal statute has been held unconstitutional, there is no alternative but to give the decision retroactive effect for the declaration of unconstitutionality is a statement that the defendant has committed no crime.” The court further noted that if Tannenbaum were currently imprisoned, he would be entitled to habeas corpus relief. The court emphasized the fundamental difference between substantive law and procedural rules in the context of retroactivity, stating that invalidating the statute negates the crime itself.