Williams v. Town of Oyster Bay, 32 N.Y.2d 78 (1973)

A zoning ordinance is unconstitutional only if it prevents a property owner from using their property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted, and the owner bears the burden of proving such invalidity by demonstrating that the property cannot yield a reasonable return under any permitted use.

Summary

The plaintiffs, Catherine and Gene Williams, challenged the constitutionality of the Town of Oyster Bay’s zoning ordinance as applied to their property, arguing it prevented them from using it for business purposes. The property was zoned residential, while adjacent property was zoned for business. The New York Court of Appeals held that the zoning ordinance was constitutional as applied to the plaintiffs’ property, because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the property could not yield a reasonable return under any permitted residential use. The court emphasized the importance of demonstrating that no reasonable return could be obtained from any permitted use before a zoning ordinance can be deemed unconstitutional.

Facts

Catherine and Gene Williams owned property in the Village of Massapequa, part of which was zoned for residential use (“Residence D”), and part for business use (“Business F”). The residential portion of their property was located on Merrick Road, surrounded primarily by residential properties, with some non-conforming professional offices and a gift shop nearby. The Williamses sought to have the residential zoning declared unconstitutional, claiming it prevented them from using the property for business purposes. They had previously been denied a business use variance. Evidence regarding the property’s salability for residential purposes was weak, and the lower court found substantial economic loss due to the residential zoning.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court, Special Term, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the zoning ordinance unconstitutional as applied to their property. The Appellate Division reversed the Special Term’s judgment, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the ordinance served no legitimate purpose and was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the Town of Oyster Bay’s zoning ordinance, as applied to the Williams’ property, was confiscatory and unconstitutional because it prevented them from using their property for any purpose for which it was reasonably adapted.

Holding

No, because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that their property could not yield a reasonable return if used only for purposes allowed under the residential zoning ordinance.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that a zoning ordinance is confiscatory and unconstitutional only if it prevents a plaintiff from using their property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. The burden of proving the ordinance’s invalidity rests on the plaintiff. The court stated, “If the legislative classification is ‘fairly debatable,’ it must be allowed to control.” The Court analogized the considerations for determining the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance to those used in granting or denying a variance. Referencing the established rule for use variances from Matter of Otto v. Steinhilber, the court highlighted that the plaintiffs needed to show that the land could not yield a reasonable return if used only for a purpose allowed in the zone, that their plight was due to unique circumstances, and that the use authorized by the variance would not alter the locality’s essential character.

The court emphasized that it is insufficient for the plaintiff to merely show that they would realize a greater return under a less restricted use. The pertinent inquiry is whether the present allowed use is yielding a reasonable return. The court further explained, quoting Matter of Forrest v. Evershed, “In order to establish a lack of ‘reasonable return,’ the applicant must demonstrate that the return from the property would not be reasonable for each and every permitted use under the ordinance.”

Applying these principles, the court found that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proof. The evidence was conflicting regarding the property’s reasonable return and adaptation for residential use, as well as whether the neighborhood’s character had changed due to nonconforming uses and traffic conditions. Crucially, the plaintiffs made no attempt to show that the sale of their property for any of the permitted uses other than one-family dwellings would be impossible or economically impracticable. The court distinguished this case from situations, like in Jayne Estates, where the property was in the middle of a commercial area with little chance of the nonconforming uses disappearing. The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ proper avenue of relief would be an application for a special exception from the town board or board of appeals.