New York Law Review

Tag: Unconstitutional Statute

  • People v. Wright, 47 N.Y.2d 223 (1979): Consequences of Unconstitutional Alibi Notice Statutes

    People v. Wright, 47 N.Y.2d 223 (1979)

    When a trial court erroneously excludes alibi testimony based on an unconstitutional notice-of-alibi statute, the error is not harmless if the excluded witness’s testimony could have significantly strengthened the alibi defense, especially when the prosecution emphasizes the weakness of the presented alibi.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of narcotics possession and sale. At trial, the court precluded an alibi witness from testifying because the defendant failed to include her in the pre-trial alibi notice, as required by a statute later deemed unconstitutional. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the sale conviction, holding that the exclusion of the witness’s testimony was not harmless error. The court reasoned that the witness could have bolstered the alibi defense, and the prosecution highlighted the alibi’s reliance on biased witnesses. However, the other convictions based on evidence seized at the defendant’s apartment were affirmed as the alibi defense did not extend to those charges.

    Facts

    A plainclothes officer testified he bought drugs from the defendant at his apartment on February 1, 1972. The next day, officers with a search warrant found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a weapon in the apartment, arresting the defendant, his wife, and another man. The defendant was charged with possession and sale of drugs on February 1, and various possession offenses related to the February 2 search. The defense presented alibi witnesses claiming the defendant was in New Jersey at the time of the alleged sale.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of selling drugs on February 1 and possessing contraband seized on February 2. After the verdict, the Supreme Court held similar notice-of-alibi statutes unconstitutional. The New York Court of Appeals then ruled that preclusion of alibi witness testimony based on the unconstitutional notice statute was grounds for reversal on direct appeal. The prosecution conceded the error but argued it was harmless.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s erroneous exclusion of an alibi witness’s testimony, based on an unconstitutional notice-of-alibi statute, constituted harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Holding

    No, because there was a reasonable possibility that the exclusion of the alibi witness’s testimony contributed to the defendant’s conviction on the sale charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that because the error involved the defendant’s constitutional rights, it could only be considered harmless if there was no reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction. The court found that the excluded witness, Charlene Latham, could have provided less biased corroboration of the defendant’s alibi. The prosecutor emphasized that the alibi rested primarily on the testimony of family members and a close friend. The court noted, “Although Charlene Latham may not have been a completely disinterested third party, she was certainly less susceptible to impeachment for personal bias than the defendant’s other alibi witnesses.” The exclusion of Latham’s testimony left a gap in the alibi defense that the prosecutor exploited during summation. The court concluded that it could not say the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, citing People v Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 237. However, because the alibi defense did not relate to the other charges stemming from the search of the apartment, the court affirmed those convictions.

  • Paramount Film Distributing Corp. v. State, 30 N.Y.2d 415 (1972): Recovery of Fees Paid Under an Unconstitutional Statute

    Paramount Film Distributing Corp. v. State, 30 N.Y.2d 415 (1972)

    Payments made to the state under a statute later declared unconstitutional are recoverable only if the payments were made under duress or protest; otherwise, they are considered voluntary and non-refundable.

    Summary

    Paramount Film sought to recover motion picture license fees paid to New York State between 1959 and 1965, after the statute requiring these fees was deemed unconstitutional. The fees, though totaling a significant sum over time, were a minor expense relative to film production costs. Paramount had paid these fees without protest. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the payments were voluntary and made without protest, Paramount could not recover the fees, except for a small percentage paid under protest. The court emphasized that the fees were reasonable, the services were rendered, and the costs were likely passed on to consumers.

    Facts

    Paramount Film Distributing Corp. paid motion picture license fees to the State of New York from June 10, 1959, to June 10, 1965. The fees were mandated by Education Law § 120-132. The fee was $3.50 per 1,000 feet for original films, and $4 per 1,000 feet for copies. These statutes were later nullified in Matter of Trans-Lux Distr. Corp. v. Board of Regents. Paramount paid the fees without protest, despite employing legal counsel.

    Procedural History

    Paramount Film sought recovery of the fees in the New York Court of Claims. The Appellate Division sustained Paramount’s right to recover all fees paid since 1959. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether payments of motion picture license fees to the State of New York, made without protest under a statute later declared unconstitutional, were voluntary or involuntary under duress, thus entitling the payor to recover the fees.

    Holding

    No, because the payments were voluntary, made without protest, and the state has already provided the services and expended the funds. Restitution is not warranted where the payer did not object to the fee and the payee has already disbursed the funds.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished between voluntary and involuntary payments of taxes or fees later declared void, referencing Mercury Mach. Importing Corp. v. City of New York and Five Boro Elec. Contrs. Assn. v. City of New York. In Mercury, the court denied recovery of taxes paid without protest, even though the statute was later deemed unconstitutional, emphasizing that a mistake of law alone does not make a payment involuntary. In Five Boro, recovery was allowed because the fees were deemed involuntary, as electricians would have been barred from working without paying them.

    The court found Paramount’s payments were voluntary because the company did not protest the fees despite having the means to do so. The court stated: “Surely one would expect motion picture distributors, and especially a corporation as large as claimant with its staff of lawyers, to protest if the fees were thought illegal.” The court also noted that the fees were reasonable, the services were rendered, and the costs were likely passed on to consumers.

    Furthermore, the court reasoned that allowing recovery would unjustly enrich Paramount at the expense of the state, which had already used the fees to fund the licensing program. The court cited general principles of restitution, asking whether it is against equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what is sought to be recovered. The court found that the state did not receive unjust enrichment, as the fees defrayed the costs of a regulatory program intended to benefit both the industry and the public.

    The court distinguished the case from Trans-Lux and Freedman v. Maryland, noting those cases involved challenges to the licensing requirement itself, whereas this case involved a challenge to the fees after the licensing statute was invalidated on procedural grounds. The court also cited Universal Film Exch. v. Board of Finance & Revenue, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied recovery of license fees paid without protest, citing long acquiescence, services rendered, benefit to the industry, and passing on costs to the public.