Schozer v. William Penn Life Ins. Co. of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 639 (1994)

Secondary evidence, such as a medical report or expert testimony, is admissible to prove the contents of an original X-ray when the original X-ray is unavailable, provided the proponent sufficiently explains the unavailability and demonstrates that the secondary evidence accurately reflects the contents of the original.

Summary

William Penn Life Insurance Company denied life insurance coverage to Andrew Schozer’s beneficiary, claiming Schozer had an enlarged heart, making him an unacceptable risk. The original X-ray, taken during the underwriting process, was lost. The insurance company attempted to introduce a radiologist’s report and testimony as secondary evidence of the X-ray’s contents, but the trial court excluded this evidence based on the best evidence rule. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the best evidence rule does not create an absolute bar to secondary evidence when the original is unavailable, provided a sufficient foundation is laid to establish the unavailability of the original and the reliability of the secondary evidence.

Facts

Andrew Schozer applied for a life insurance policy with William Penn Life Insurance Company and received a conditional receipt providing temporary coverage if he was deemed an acceptable health risk. The insurance company requested a physical examination and X-ray due to concerns about a potential heart condition. Dr. Sidney Dann, an authorized examiner, completed these procedures. Dr. Walter Ploss, the insurance company’s medical director and radiologist, analyzed the X-ray and noted a cardiac-thoracic ratio suggesting an enlarged heart, annotating the results with “EH”. Schozer died before the policy was finalized. The insurance company rejected the application and returned the premium, claiming Schozer was an unacceptable risk due to his enlarged heart.

Procedural History

Schozer’s wife sued the insurance company to recover the insurance proceeds. The insurance company could not locate the original X-ray, claiming it had been transferred to a storage facility. The company sought to introduce Dr. Ploss’s report and testimony as secondary evidence. The trial court excluded the evidence, citing the best evidence rule. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and granted a new trial.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court erred in barring the admission of an X-ray report and expert medical testimony regarding the X-ray’s contents when the original X-ray film was unavailable at trial.

Holding

Yes, because the best evidence rule does not create an absolute bar to secondary evidence of a writing (including an X-ray) when the original is unavailable, provided the proponent sufficiently explains the unavailability and demonstrates that the secondary evidence accurately reflects the contents of the original.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals clarified that the best evidence rule requires the production of an original writing only when its contents are in dispute and sought to be proven. An exception exists when the original is unavailable. The Court stated that secondary evidence is admissible if the proponent sufficiently explains the unavailability of the primary evidence and has not procured its loss or destruction in bad faith. Loss can be established through a diligent search of the location where the document was last known to be kept, and testimony from the person who last had custody of the original. The Court emphasized that the more important the document, the stricter the requirement of the evidentiary foundation establishing loss. The Court noted that X-rays are considered writings for the purposes of the best evidence rule. Once the absence of the X-ray film is excused, all competent secondary evidence is generally admissible to prove its contents, provided that its admission does not offend any other exclusionary rule or policy. The proponent of the secondary evidence bears the burden of establishing that it is a reliable and accurate portrayal of the original. The trial court erred in refusing to allow the insurance company to establish that the X-ray was lost and in ruling that the unavailability of the X-ray unconditionally precluded the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents. The Court distinguished its prior holdings in Hambsch v. New York City Tr. Auth. and Marion v Coon Constr. Co., finding they did not establish a per se rule against admitting secondary evidence of an X-ray.