New York Law Review

Tag: Unauthorized Practice of Medicine

  • People v. Corines, 4 N.Y.3d 231 (2005): Aiding and Abetting the Unauthorized Practice of Medicine

    4 N.Y.3d 231 (2005)

    Education Law § 6512(1) permits the prosecution of any individual, licensed or unlicensed, who aids and abets an unauthorized individual in the practice of medicine.

    Summary

    Dr. Corines, a licensed physician, was convicted of aiding and abetting Ana Marie Santi, whose medical license was suspended, in the unauthorized practice of medicine. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Education Law § 6512(1) does not exempt licensed professionals from prosecution for aiding and abetting unlicensed individuals. The court reasoned that the statute’s purpose is to protect the public, and exempting licensed professionals would lead to absurd results. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the conviction, even without expert testimony, and rejected claims of juror misconduct.

    Facts

    Dr. Peter Corines owned and operated medical offices. Ana Marie Santi, a licensed physician whose license was suspended, worked for Corines. Santi administered intravenous lines to three patients before Corines performed surgical procedures. The patients testified to experiencing sensations consistent with anesthesia. The Attorney General charged both Corines and Santi with unauthorized practice of medicine, alleging Santi administered anesthesia without a license, and Corines aided and abetted her.

    Procedural History

    Corines and Santi were convicted on multiple counts of unauthorized practice of medicine. The Appellate Division initially remanded for a hearing on juror misconduct. After the hearing, the trial court upheld the verdict. The Appellate Division then affirmed the convictions on the merits. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Education Law § 6512(1) exempts licensed physicians from prosecution for aiding and abetting the unauthorized practice of medicine.
    2. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the convictions for unauthorized practice of medicine and aiding and abetting, absent expert testimony on the effects of anesthesia.
    3. Whether the trial court’s response to a jury inquiry during deliberations was adequate.
    4. Whether alleged juror misconduct warranted setting aside the verdict.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute’s purpose is to protect the public, and exempting licensed professionals would lead to unreasonable and absurd results.
    2. Yes, because the jury could reasonably infer from the patient’s testimony and other evidence that Santi administered anesthesia, and Corines aided and abetted her.
    3. Yes, because rereading the original instruction was a meaningful response in this specific context.
    4. No, because the juror’s participation did not rise to the level of misconduct; she gave lay opinions based on her life experiences and the trial evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that a literal reading of Education Law § 6512(1) to exempt licensed individuals would lead to absurd results, undermining the statute’s intent to protect the public. The Court emphasized that legislative intent should guide statutory interpretation. The statute was designed to regulate professions and ensure public safety, which would be undermined by allowing licensed professionals to assist unlicensed individuals. The Court stated, “[i]n implementing a statute, the courts must of necessity examine the purpose of the statute and determine the intention of the Legislature.”

    Regarding sufficiency of the evidence, the court held expert testimony wasn’t required because the effects of anesthesia are within the common knowledge of jurors. Patient testimony describing sensations and loss of consciousness, combined with Corines’s own admissions, provided sufficient evidence. As the court stated, “modern juries are not bereft of education and intelligent persons who can be expected to apply their ordinary judgment and practical experience.”

    On the jury inquiry, the court found rereading the original instruction adequate because the jury didn’t express confusion about the meaning of the relevant elements. Finally, the court rejected the juror misconduct claim because the juror’s opinions were based on her life experiences and the trial evidence, not specialized expertise outside the record. The court noted, “Jurors are not, however, required to ‘check their life experiences at the courtroom door’.”

  • Society of New York Neurologists, Inc. v. Adelphi University, 218 N.E.2d 373 (N.Y. 1966): Standing to Sue for Unauthorized Practice of Medicine

    Society of New York Neurologists, Inc. v. Adelphi University, 18 N.Y.2d 370, 218 N.E.2d 373, 275 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1966)

    A private organization generally lacks standing to sue to enjoin the unauthorized practice of a profession when the state has established a comprehensive statutory scheme for licensing, regulation, and enforcement, unless the organization demonstrates special damages distinct from the general public.

    Summary

    A society of neurologists and psychiatrists sued Adelphi University and one of its employees, alleging they were illegally teaching and practicing medicine without a license. The plaintiffs sought an injunction to stop the university’s psychoanalytic program and the employee’s alleged practice of medicine. The lower courts dismissed the suit, finding the society lacked standing because New York’s Education Law provides a comprehensive scheme for regulating medical practice, with enforcement primarily the responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department of Education. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the society, absent special damages, could not maintain the action.

    Facts

    The Society of New York Neurologists, Inc., representing physicians specializing in neurology and psychiatry in Nassau County, filed suit against Adelphi University and Goldman, an Adelphi employee. The society alleged that Adelphi, which did not include a recognized medical school, and Goldman, who was not licensed to practice medicine in New York, were providing medical treatment by unlicensed individuals and training unlicensed individuals to practice medicine. The society claimed this endangered public health and constituted a public nuisance.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Special Term granted the motion, holding that the society lacked standing and that primary jurisdiction belonged to the State Department of Education. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal and granted the society leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a society of physicians has standing to sue for an injunction to prevent a university and its employee from allegedly engaging in the unauthorized practice of medicine, given the comprehensive regulatory scheme in place under New York’s Education Law.

    Holding

    No, because the New York State Education Law provides a comprehensive scheme for licensing and regulating the practice of medicine, and the society has not demonstrated any special damages distinct from those suffered by the general public.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, emphasizing that Article 131 of the Education Law provides a comprehensive framework for licensing and regulating medical practice in New York. This framework includes provisions for prosecuting those who unlawfully practice medicine, with the Attorney General and the State Education Department primarily responsible for enforcement. The court noted that while the Attorney General has the power to sue for an injunction, the statute does not explicitly authorize suits by private professional associations.

    The court distinguished the case from instances where bar associations are statutorily authorized to bring injunction suits, highlighting the absence of similar authorization for medical societies. The court also rejected the society’s argument that its “quasi-public status” conferred standing, citing Matter of Salter v. New York State Psychological Assn., 14 N.Y.2d 100 (N.Y. 1964), which held that a medical society cannot identify itself with the State for such purposes.

    The court further noted that the society, as an association, had not sustained any special damages distinct from those suffered by the general public. The court stated, “It should be remarked, too, that whatever may be the interests of its members this plaintiff association as such has not sustained any special damage.”

    The Court acknowledged the State Education Department’s uncertainty regarding whether “psycho-therapy” constitutes the practice of medicine under Education Law § 6501. However, the court clarified that this uncertainty did not grant the society the right to bring an injunction suit it would not otherwise possess. The court suggested the society should first exhaust its remedies by demanding that the Attorney General commence criminal or civil action.