New York Law Review

Tag: unanimous verdict

  • People v. Bauman, 13 N.Y.3d 152 (2009): Indictment Duplicity When Charging Multiple Acts in a Single Count of Depraved Indifference Assault

    People v. Bauman, 13 N.Y.3d 152 (2009)

    An indictment is duplicitous when a single count alleges multiple distinct acts, each of which could constitute a separate offense, making it impossible to determine the specific act upon which the jury reached a unanimous verdict.

    Summary

    Defendants were charged with one count of intentional assault and one count of depraved indifference assault. The depraved indifference assault count alleged 11 distinct acts occurring over an eight-month period. The New York Court of Appeals held that the depraved indifference assault count was duplicitous because it encompassed multiple offenses within a single count, violating Criminal Procedure Law § 200.30 (1). The court reasoned that the use of “and/or” between each act made it impossible to determine which specific act the jury unanimously agreed upon for conviction, thus threatening the reliability of the verdict. This decision emphasizes the importance of separately charging distinct criminal acts in an indictment to ensure a unanimous jury verdict on each specific offense.

    Facts

    The indictment against the defendants included two counts: (1) intentional assault for causing injury with various instruments like a baseball bat and (2) depraved indifference assault. The second count alleged the defendants committed 11 different acts over an eight-month period, including striking the victim, burning the victim, and providing inadequate living conditions. Emergency personnel found the victim in a hypothermic condition and near death on April 7, 2005.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss both counts of the indictment, citing duplicity. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indictment charging depraved indifference assault under Penal Law § 120.10 (3), which alleges 11 acts over an eight-month period in a single count, violates Criminal Procedure Law § 200.30 (1), which prohibits duplicitous counts?

    Holding

    Yes, because the indictment’s second count, alleging 11 incidents over an eight-month period, encompassed such a multiplicity of acts as to make it virtually impossible to determine the particular act of assault as to which a jury could reach a unanimous verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, emphasizing that CPL 200.30 (1) mandates that each count of an indictment may charge only one offense. The court reasoned that the second count of the indictment, which alleged 11 separate incidents of assault over an eight-month period, was duplicitous because it made it impossible to determine which specific act the jury unanimously agreed upon to convict the defendants. Quoting People v. Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d 410 (1986), the court stated that an indictment should not encompass “such a multiplicity of acts … as to make it virtually impossible to determine the particular act of [assault] … as to which [a] jury [could] reach[] a unanimous verdict.” The court also noted the People’s use of “and/or” between each act allowed a jury to potentially convict on only one of the alleged acts, which may not be sufficient to establish a course of conduct, and it would be unclear which act the defendants were convicted of. The dissenting opinion argued that the indictment sufficiently alleged that the defendants’ conduct on April 7, 2005, resulted in serious physical injury and a grave risk of death. However, the majority rejected this argument, stating that setting this date would amount to an improper amendment to the indictment.

  • People v. Marilla, 46 N.Y.2d 1025 (1979): Jury Poll Sufficiency After Dismissal of Inclusory Count

    People v. Marilla, 46 N.Y.2d 1025 (1979)

    A single jury poll is sufficient when the jury clearly manifests a unanimous verdict, even if the trial court subsequently dismisses an inclusory concurrent count.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. After the jury rendered its verdict, each member confirmed their assent during a poll. Subsequently, the trial court dismissed the possession charge as an inclusory concurrent count. The defendant argued that the court should have polled the jury again after dismissing the possession charge. The New York Court of Appeals held that the initial poll, which demonstrated a unanimous verdict, satisfied the statutory requirement, and the subsequent dismissal did not necessitate a second poll.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with criminal sale and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree stemming from a single transaction.

    Following the jury’s verdict of guilty on both counts, the trial court conducted a poll of the jury, during which each juror affirmed their agreement with the verdict.

    After the jury poll, the trial court dismissed the criminal possession charge because it was an inclusory concurrent count of the criminal sale charge.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court was required to conduct a second jury poll after dismissing the inclusory concurrent count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, when the jury had already unanimously assented to the verdict during the initial poll.

    Holding

    No, because the initial jury poll clearly demonstrated that the verdict was unanimous, satisfying the requirement of CPL 310.80. The subsequent dismissal of the inclusory concurrent count did not vitiate this expression of unanimity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the purpose of a jury poll, as outlined in CPL 310.80, is to ensure that each juror individually assents to the verdict. Once this unanimity is established, the statutory requirement is satisfied. The court emphasized that the initial poll clearly manifested the jury’s unanimous agreement with the verdict on both counts.

    The subsequent dismissal of the possession charge, based on the principle that a defendant cannot be convicted of both the sale and possession of the same controlled substance in a single transaction (inclusory concurrent counts), did not undermine the validity of the initial unanimous verdict. The court stated, “During the initial poll, the jury clearly manifested that the verdict was unanimous, thus satisfying the statutory requirement set forth in CPL 310.80. The subsequent colloquy between counsel and the court concerning the People’s motion to dismiss an inclusory concurrent count did not vitiate that expression of unanimity. Therefore, the trial court’s acceptance of the verdict was proper.”

    The court distinguished the situation from cases where a juror expresses doubt or uncertainty during the poll, which would necessitate further inquiry. Here, there was no ambiguity in the jurors’ assent to the verdict when it was initially rendered. Therefore, the trial court’s decision to accept the verdict without a second poll was deemed proper.