New York Law Review

Tag: trust fund

  • People v. Flayhart, 72 N.Y.2d 737 (1988): Accomplice Liability for Criminally Negligent Homicide

    People v. Flayhart, 72 N.Y.2d 737 (1988)

    A defendant can be held accessorially liable for criminally negligent homicide under Penal Law § 20.00, not for aiding another to reach a particular mental state, but for intentionally aiding another to engage in conduct constituting the charged offense, while himself acting with the mental culpability required for the commission of that offense.

    Summary

    Richard and Beatrice Flayhart were convicted of criminally negligent homicide in the death of Richard’s brother, Terry Flayhart, who had cerebral palsy, epilepsy and was mentally retarded. The prosecution argued that Terry died of neglect while living with and dependent on the Flayharts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that accomplice liability can be applied to criminally negligent homicide when the defendant intentionally aids another in conduct that constitutes the offense, while failing to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death. The court also found no error in the admission of evidence regarding a trust fund for Terry’s care, or in the handling of photographic evidence.

    Facts

    Terry Flayhart, who was mentally retarded and suffered from cerebral palsy and epilepsy, lived with his brother Richard and Richard’s wife, Beatrice. Terry was dependent on the Flayharts for care. He died from malnutrition and lung inflammation, exacerbated by pneumonia, and evidence suggested that he had aspirated food. He weighed approximately 75 pounds at the time of his death. A $122,000 trust fund had been established to pay for Terry’s care, and Terry had not seen his regular doctor in two years.

    Procedural History

    Richard and Beatrice Flayhart were charged with reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. The trial court instructed the jury on accomplice liability. The jury found them guilty of criminally negligent homicide, and they were sentenced to imprisonment. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgments of conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission for appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether it is logically possible to “aid and abet” criminally negligent homicide, given that it is an unintentional crime, specifically, whether one can intentionally aid another to fail to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death?

    2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence that Richard Flayhart was in line to inherit the trust fund established for Terry’s care?

    3. Whether the trial court erred in the manner in which it handled photographs of Terry’s body during the trial?

    Holding

    1. No, because Penal Law § 20.00 imposes accessorial liability for intentionally aiding conduct that constitutes the charged offense, acting with the required mental culpability, not for aiding another to reach a particular mental state.

    2. No, because the trust fund evidence was relevant to the charge of reckless manslaughter, which includes an element of deliberate conduct, providing a possible motive for disregarding the risk to Terry’s life.

    3. No, because the trial court has discretionary power to manage courtroom proceedings and determine how the jury is exposed to photographic evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Penal Law § 20.00 imposes liability for intentionally aiding conduct constituting the offense, while the accomplice acts with the mental culpability required for that offense. The defendants were convicted because the jury found that each of them, while failing to perceive a substantial risk of death, intentionally aided the other to engage in conduct, such as failing to provide food and medical care, that brought about Terry Flayhart’s death. The court cited People v. Abbott, 84 A.D.2d 11 in its analysis.

    Regarding the trust fund, the court noted that while the defendants were convicted of criminally negligent homicide, they were also charged with reckless manslaughter. Because reckless manslaughter includes an element of deliberate conduct (conscious disregard for a known risk), evidence of a motive may be relevant. The court stated, “Because reckless manslaughter includes an element of deliberate conduct, the admission of evidence of a motive may be justified in a proper case.” The jury could have considered the trust fund as evidence of Richard Flayhart’s incentive to disregard the risk to his brother.

    Finally, the court determined that the trial court’s handling of the photographs was within its discretionary power to manage courtroom proceedings. The trial court was concerned that the jury would be distracted by the graphic evidence during cross-examination and summations, potentially forming an opinion prematurely. The court cited People v. Pobliner, 32 NY2d 356, affirming the broad discretion afforded to trial courts in managing evidence presentation.

  • Dittmar Explosives, Inc. v. A. E. Ottaviano, Inc., 20 N.Y.2d 498 (1967): Amending Pleadings to Assert Trust Fund Claim After Lien Lapse

    Dittmar Explosives, Inc. v. A. E. Ottaviano, Inc., 20 N.Y.2d 498 (1967)

    A court may allow a plaintiff to amend their complaint, even after trial, to assert a claim under the trust fund provisions of the Lien Law, despite the original mechanic’s lien lapsing due to failure to file a notice of pendency.

    Summary

    Dittmar Explosives, an unpaid materialman, sued to foreclose a mechanic’s lien against the general contractor, Ottaviano, and its surety. The lien had lapsed because Dittmar failed to file a notice of pendency within the statutory timeframe. At trial, Dittmar sought to amend its complaint to assert a claim under the trust fund provisions of the Lien Law. The trial court dismissed the action, holding that the lien had lapsed and that it lacked the power to grant relief under the trust fund provisions because the action was not brought on behalf of all beneficiaries. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court had the power to allow the amendment and should exercise its discretion to determine whether to grant it, considering the defendants’ delay in raising the defense and the potential for recovery under the trust fund theory.

    Facts

    Ottaviano was the general contractor for a highway construction project and subcontracted work to Curly Construction Co. Curly purchased explosives from Dittmar Explosives for the project but failed to pay the full amount. Dittmar filed a mechanic’s lien for the unpaid balance. The lien was discharged by a bond filed by Ottaviano and its surety. More than six months later, Dittmar extended the lien by court order, but did not file a notice of pendency. Dittmar then initiated an action to foreclose the lien. Curly went bankrupt and paid Dittmar a small portion of its claim. At trial, Ottaviano raised the issue of the lien’s lapse due to the lack of a notice of pendency.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed Dittmar’s action to foreclose the mechanic’s lien. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remanded the case to the Supreme Court, instructing it to consider Dittmar’s application to amend its complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in holding that it lacked the power to allow Dittmar to amend its complaint to assert a claim under the trust fund provisions of the Lien Law after the mechanic’s lien had lapsed.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court has discretion under CPLR 3025(c) to permit amendment of a complaint during or even after trial, even if the amendment substantially alters the theory of recovery.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the mechanic’s lien had indeed lapsed because Dittmar failed to file a notice of pendency within six months as required by Section 18 of the Lien Law, this did not preclude Dittmar from pursuing a claim under the trust fund provisions of the Lien Law. The court emphasized the broad discretion afforded to trial courts under CPLR 3025(c) to allow amendments to pleadings, even after trial, and even if such amendments substantially alter the theory of recovery. The court noted that CPLR states that leave to amend should be granted “freely”. The court distinguished the issue of whether the court *had* the power to allow the amendment from whether the court *should* exercise that power, stating that it was reversing the trial court because the trial court incorrectly believed it lacked the power to allow the amendment. The Court acknowledged the defendants’ argument regarding undue delay but noted that Dittmar sought to amend its complaint as soon as the defense of the lien’s lapse was raised. The Court also addressed the potential statute of limitations issue under Lien Law § 75, clarifying that the dispute over the completion date of the work created a factual issue to be resolved at trial. The Court cited National Bank of Deposit v. Rogers, 166 N.Y. 380, 387-388, noting that where a motion to test the validity of a complaint is reserved until trial, “the court usually will permit amendment and allow the case to be heard and determined on its merits”.