New York Law Review

Tag: Troxel v. Granville

  • E.S. v. P.D., 8 N.Y.3d 150 (2007): Grandparent Visitation Rights and Parental Authority After Troxel

    E.S. v. P.D., 8 N.Y.3d 150 (2007)

    New York’s grandparent visitation statute (Domestic Relations Law § 72(1)) is constitutional, both facially and as applied, because it allows judicial intervention only when equitable circumstances exist, requires consideration of the child’s best interests, and presumes that a fit parent’s decisions are in the child’s best interests.

    Summary

    After a mother’s death, the maternal grandmother provided substantial care for her grandson for several years. When the relationship between the grandmother and the child’s father soured, the father limited the grandmother’s access to the child. The grandmother petitioned for visitation rights under Domestic Relations Law § 72(1). The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute was constitutional and that the visitation order was appropriate, emphasizing that the statute provides a procedural mechanism for grandparents to acquire standing, while still according special weight to the parent’s decisions regarding the child’s best interests, in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville.

    Facts

    A mother (A.D.) died of cancer, and her mother (E.S., the grandmother) moved into the marital home to care for A.D. and her son (C.D.). After A.D.’s death, the grandmother continued to live with the father (P.D.) and C.D. for 3.5 years, providing significant care for C.D. The relationship between the father and grandmother deteriorated, leading the father to demand that the grandmother move out and restricting her contact with C.D.

    Procedural History

    The grandmother commenced a proceeding in Supreme Court seeking visitation rights. The Supreme Court granted visitation to the grandmother. The Appellate Division affirmed, modifying the visitation schedule in deference to the father’s wishes. The father appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) was unconstitutional in light of Troxel v. Granville.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) is facially unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville?

    2. Whether Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) was unconstitutionally applied in this case?

    Holding

    1. No, because Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) is narrowly drafted, affording a grandparent standing only when a parent is deceased or where equitable circumstances exist, and requires a determination of the child’s best interest, giving the parent’s decision presumptive weight.

    2. No, because the trial court was mindful of the father’s parental rights and employed the presumption that the parent’s wishes represent the child’s best interests, but the grandmother overcame this presumption by demonstrating the extraordinarily close relationship she had with the child and the child’s deep love for her.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) is facially constitutional because it is narrower than the Washington statute in Troxel, which allowed “any person” to petition for visitation “at any time.” New York’s statute requires either the death of a parent or a showing of circumstances where equity would intervene. The court emphasized that the statute provides a procedural mechanism for grandparents to acquire standing to seek visitation, but the court must still determine if visitation is in the best interest of the grandchild, giving special weight to the parent’s determination. The court noted the Troxel decision requires that courts accord “at least some special weight to the parent’s own determination.”

    The court distinguished this case from Troxel, noting that the trial court was “mindful” of the father’s parental prerogatives and employed the presumption that the parent’s wishes represent the child’s best interests. The grandmother successfully demonstrated an extraordinarily close relationship with the child during the nearly five years she lived with him, essentially acting as his surrogate mother. The court found the father’s complaints about the grandmother’s caregiving skills were contrived. The court properly considered all the circumstances and the law guardian’s assessment before granting visitation.

    The Court of Appeals cited Matter of Emanuel S. v Joseph E., 78 NY2d 178, 181 (1991), emphasizing that visits with a grandparent are “often a precious part of a child’s experience” and provide benefits the child cannot derive from other relationships.

  • E.S. v. A.D., 861 N.E.2d 466 (N.Y. 2006): Grandparent Visitation Rights and Parental Authority

    E.S. v. A.D., 8 N.Y.3d 151, 861 N.E.2d 466, 831 N.Y.S.2d 360 (2006)

    New York’s Domestic Relations Law § 72(1), allowing grandparent visitation, is constitutional both facially and as applied, provided courts give special weight to a fit parent’s decisions regarding their child’s best interests.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a grandmother was properly granted visitation rights with her grandson under New York Domestic Relations Law § 72(1), and whether the statute is constitutional under Troxel v. Granville. The Court of Appeals held that § 72(1) is constitutional, both facially and as applied. The Court emphasized that while grandparents can seek visitation, courts must give special weight to the decisions of fit parents. The Court found the grandmother established a close relationship with the child, making visitation in the child’s best interest, and the trial court properly considered the father’s parental rights.

    Facts

    A.D. (mother) married E.D. (father) and had a son, C.D., in 1993. In 1997, A.D. was diagnosed with cancer. A.D.’s mother, E.S. (grandmother), moved in to care for A.D. and C.D. After A.D.’s death in 1998, the grandmother continued living with the father and son for 3.5 years, providing significant care for the child. In 2001, the relationship between the father and grandmother deteriorated. In 2002, the father asked the grandmother to move out and initially forbade contact between her and C.D. Later, he allowed limited, supervised visits. In 2003, the grandmother sought court-ordered visitation.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted visitation to the grandmother. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s judgment, modifying the visitation schedule to accommodate the father’s wishes. The Appellate Division also rejected the father’s constitutional challenge to the statute. The father then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Was the grandparent properly granted visitation with her grandson pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72(1)?

    2. Is Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) facially unconstitutional in light of Troxel v. Granville?

    3. Was Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) unconstitutionally applied in this case?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the record supported the determination that visitation was in the child’s best interest.

    2. No, because the statute can be interpreted to accord deference to a parent’s decision.

    3. No, because the trial court properly considered the father’s parental prerogatives and applied the presumption that the parent’s wishes represent the child’s best interests.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that § 72(1) provides a procedural mechanism for grandparents to seek visitation, but it does not create an absolute right. The statute requires a two-part inquiry: first, the court must find standing based on death or equitable circumstances; second, the court must determine if visitation is in the best interest of the grandchild. The court emphasized that the presumption that a fit parent’s decisions are in the child’s best interests is a strong one. The Court distinguished Troxel, where the trial court failed to give special weight to the parent’s decision and effectively placed the burden on the parent to disprove that visitation was in the child’s best interest. Here, the trial court was mindful of the father’s right to raise his child, but the grandmother had established an extraordinarily close relationship with the child. The Court noted that, “so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children”. Because the trial court gave proper weight to the father’s parental rights and then considered the child’s best interest, § 72(1) was constitutionally applied. The Court stated, “Troxel does not prohibit judicial intervention when a fit parent refuses visitation, but only requires that a court accord ‘some special weight to the parent’s own determination’ when applying a nonparental visitation statute”.

  • E.S. v. P.D., 8 N.Y.3d 150 (2007): Grandparent Visitation Rights and Parental Authority

    E.S. v. P.D., 8 N.Y.3d 150, 863 N.E.2d 100, 831 N.Y.S.2d 96 (2007)

    Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) grants grandparents standing to seek visitation under specific circumstances, but courts must give special weight to a fit parent’s decisions regarding their child’s best interests.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a grandparent was properly granted visitation rights under New York’s Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) and whether that statute is constitutional under Troxel v. Granville. After the child’s mother died, the grandmother lived with the father and child for 3.5 years, becoming a primary caregiver. When the father ended the arrangement and limited visitation, the grandmother sought court-ordered visitation. The Court of Appeals held that the statute was properly applied and is constitutional, both facially and as applied, emphasizing that while the statute allows for grandparent visitation, it requires significant deference to the decisions of a fit parent.

    Facts

    A.D. (mother) died of cancer, and her mother, E.S. (grandmother), moved in with A.D.’s husband, P.D. (father), and their son, C.D., to help care for them. After the mother’s death, the grandmother continued to live with the father and child for 3.5 years, providing significant care and support for the child. The relationship between the father and grandmother deteriorated, leading the father to demand the grandmother move out and severely restrict her access to the child. The grandmother then sought court-ordered visitation.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the grandmother visitation rights. The Appellate Division affirmed, modifying the visitation schedule in deference to the father’s wishes. The father appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing the statute was unconstitutional in light of Troxel v. Granville and that the visitation order was an abuse of discretion.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the grandparent was properly granted visitation rights with her grandson pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72(1)?

    2. Whether Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) is facially unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville?

    3. Whether Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) was unconstitutionally applied in this case?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the grandmother established an extraordinarily close relationship with the child for several years, and the trial court properly considered the child’s best interests.

    2. No, because Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) is narrowly drafted and can be interpreted to accord deference to a parent’s decision, aligning with the principles established in Troxel v. Granville.

    3. No, because the trial court properly employed the presumption that a fit parent acts in the best interest of his child and then thoroughly considered all relevant circumstances before granting visitation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) provides a procedural mechanism for grandparents to seek visitation, but it does not create an absolute right. The court emphasized the importance of the two-part inquiry: first, determining standing based on death or equitable circumstances, and second, determining whether visitation is in the child’s best interest. The court stressed that the presumption that a fit parent’s decisions are in the child’s best interests is strong, and courts should not lightly intrude on the family relationship against a fit parent’s wishes.

    The court distinguished this case from Troxel v. Granville, where the Washington statute was deemed overly broad. The Court quoted Justice Altman, stating that section 72(1) “can be, and has been, interpreted to accord deference to a parent’s decision, although the statute itself does not specifically require such deference. Further, [section 72(1)] is drafted much more narrowly than the Washington statute [considered in Troxel].” The court noted that the trial court in this case was “mindful” of the father’s parental prerogatives and employed the strong presumption that the parent’s wishes represent the child’s best interests.

    The Court of Appeals concluded that, unlike in Troxel, the trial court did not presuppose that grandparent visitation was warranted. Instead, the court properly considered all circumstances, including the child’s wishes, the grandmother’s caregiving skills, and the father’s objections, before granting visitation. The Court reiterated that affirmed findings of fact from the lower courts are binding and that there was no abuse of discretion in applying the statute.