Tag: Triborough Doctrine

  • In re Claims of Goodman, 94 N.Y.2d 18 (1999): Harmonizing Strike and Academic Recess Unemployment Benefits

    In re Claims of Goodman, 94 N.Y.2d 18 (1999)

    When an industrial strike overlaps with an academic recess, both Labor Law § 590(11) (regarding reasonable assurance of employment) and § 592 (regarding strike-related unemployment) can apply, and the ‘Triborough Doctrine’ (preserving terms of expired public sector CBAs) does not extend to private sector disputes to establish ‘reasonable assurance’.

    Summary

    Employees of Barnard College went on strike six weeks before the end of the spring semester in 1996. They applied for unemployment benefits. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board denied benefits, relying on Labor Law § 590(11), which prohibits benefits during academic recesses if there’s reasonable assurance of re-employment. The employees argued this section didn’t apply because they were on strike, and only Labor Law § 592 (suspending benefits for seven weeks during a strike) should apply. The Court of Appeals held that both sections could be harmonized. However, the Court reversed the Board’s decision because it erroneously relied on the ‘Triborough Doctrine’ (applicable to public sector labor disputes) to determine that the employees had ‘reasonable assurance’ of employment. The case was remitted for a new determination of ‘reasonable assurance’ without considering the expired collective bargaining agreement.

    Facts

    The petitioners were non-professional employees of Barnard College, represented by a union. Their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) expired on December 31, 1995, but they continued working. They engaged in two strikes during 1996: one in February/March, and another beginning on April 10, six weeks before the end of the spring semester, lasting until September. Barnard did not send out customary letters regarding fall semester work to striking desk attendants, fearing it would violate federal labor law. The CBA prohibited Barnard from terminating employees without good cause and the employees were considered permanent, not temporary.

    Procedural History

    The local unemployment insurance office initially approved the employees’ applications for benefits. Barnard objected, arguing Labor Law § 590(11) precluded benefits due to the academic recess. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially ruled in favor of the employees, finding no affirmative expression of intent to rehire. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board reversed, concluding that the employees had a “reasonable assurance” of employment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Labor Law § 590(11) and § 592 can be reconciled when an industrial strike overlaps an academic recess.

    2. Whether the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board erred in relying on the “Triborough Doctrine” to determine the existence of a ‘reasonable assurance’ of employment.

    3. Whether under Labor Law § 590(11)(d), the denial of unemployment insurance benefits was improper because the strike lasted several weeks into the fall semester.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statutes can be read together without undermining each other.

    2. Yes, because the “Triborough Doctrine” is only applicable in the public employment context.

    3. No, because the employees returned to work for the fall semester once the strike was settled, precluding application of this section.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while § 590(11) addresses unemployment during academic recesses, and § 592 addresses unemployment due to strikes, nothing prevents them from operating together when both situations occur. Applying only § 592 would nullify § 590(11) during strikes overlapping summer recesses. The Court emphasized that statutes should be harmonized if possible. The strike began less than seven weeks before the summer recess, triggering § 592. Once the recess began, § 590(11) took effect, contingent on “reasonable assurance” of employment. However, the Court found the Appeal Board erred in relying on the ‘Triborough Doctrine,’ which preserves the status quo under an expired CBA in the public sector. As the Court explained, “[N]otably, the ‘Triborough Doctrine’ has never been applied in the private employment context because the doctrine is grounded in the limitations imposed on public employee organizations by the Civil Service Law.” The Court noted that both parties agreed that the ‘Triborough Doctrine’ cannot supersede an employer’s right under federal law to replace striking workers. Because an error of law occurred the Court remitted the case for reconsideration of the “reasonable assurance” question, without reliance on the expired collective bargaining agreement, and clarified that because the employees did return to work after the strike, they could not claim retroactive benefits under section 590(11)(d).