New York Law Review

Tag: Trial Preparation

  • People v. Herner, 85 N.Y.2d 877 (1995): Admissibility of Prior Lineup Photo for Trial Preparation

    85 N.Y.2d 877 (1995)

    Showing a witness a photograph of a prior lineup identification to prepare them for trial testimony does not constitute a new identification procedure requiring notice under CPL 710.30.

    Summary

    William Herner was convicted of robbery. Before trial, the victim identified him in a lineup, and the prosecution properly notified the defense. However, the prosecutor showed the victim a photograph of the lineup prior to her testimony as trial preparation. The defendant argued this violated CPL 710.30 because no notice was given for this subsequent viewing. The Court of Appeals held that showing the victim a photo of the lineup for trial preparation wasn’t an identification procedure that triggered the notice requirement under CPL 710.30, thus affirming the lower court’s decision to admit the identification testimony.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with robbery. The victim identified the defendant in a pre-trial lineup. The prosecutor disclosed the lineup identification to the defense as required. Prior to trial testimony, the prosecutor showed the victim a photograph of the lineup she had previously identified the defendant in to prepare her testimony. The victim viewed the photograph again on the morning of her trial testimony. During the trial, it was revealed that the victim had been shown the lineup photo the night before her testimony. The defendant moved to suppress the identification testimony.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the identification testimony. The defendant was subsequently convicted of robbery in the first and second degrees after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that showing the photograph was merely trial preparation. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether showing a witness a photograph of a prior lineup identification, for the purpose of preparing the witness’s testimony, constitutes an “identification procedure” requiring notice to the defendant under CPL 710.30.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecutor’s action of showing the victim a photograph of the lineup was clearly preparation for trial and not a new identification procedure under CPL 710.30.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the prosecutor’s showing the victim a photo of the lineup was merely trial preparation. The court emphasized that the initial lineup identification, for which proper notice was given, was the actual identification procedure. Showing the photograph was intended to refresh the witness’s memory and prepare them for trial, not to elicit a new identification. The Court held that CPL 710.30 is designed to provide notice of actual identification procedures, not preparatory steps taken by the prosecution. To require notice for every instance a witness is shown a photo of a prior identification would unduly burden trial preparation without providing additional protection against suggestive identification procedures. The court thus distinguished between an identification procedure and legitimate trial preparation, finding the latter does not trigger the notice requirement of CPL 710.30.

  • People v. Droz, 39 N.Y.2d 457 (1976): Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

    People v. Droz, 39 N.Y.2d 457 (1976)

    To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that their attorney failed to provide reasonably competent representation, including adequate preparation and familiarity with basic principles of criminal law.

    Summary

    Defendant Droz was convicted of drug possession and sale. He appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. His assigned counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial, neglecting to contact potential witnesses, review the defendant’s record, or utilize readily available impeachment tools like prior testimony. The attorney’s ignorance of basic criminal law principles, such as the inadmissibility of a withdrawn guilty plea, prejudiced the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the cumulative errors demonstrated inadequate legal representation that deprived Droz of a fair trial. The court emphasized that effective representation requires preparation, knowledge of relevant law, and the diligent application of that knowledge to the client’s defense.

    Facts

    Droz was arrested following an undercover drug sale. Detective McGuckin, accompanied by an informant, allegedly purchased drugs from Droz on two occasions. A subsequent search of Droz’s apartment yielded heroin, needles, and other paraphernalia. Six individuals were present and arrested. Droz was indicted on nine counts related to drug sales and possession. He pleaded guilty to some charges, then withdrew the plea.

    Procedural History

    Initially, the Legal Aid Society represented Droz and a co-defendant. Due to a conflict of interest, the court assigned new counsel to Droz. The first trial ended in a mistrial. During the second trial, Droz’s attorney’s performance was questioned, and the court ultimately dismissed three counts of the indictment. After further errors, the court declared a mistrial but then proceeded with the trial over the defendant’s objection. The jury convicted Droz on all remaining counts. The appellate division affirmed, and Droz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Droz was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s lack of preparation, ignorance of basic criminal law principles, and cumulative errors during trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because Droz’s counsel made little or no effort to prepare for trial, demonstrated a lack of familiarity with basic principles of criminal law, and made cumulative errors that prejudiced the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that effective representation includes adequate preparation, review of relevant law and facts, and familiarity with basic criminal law principles. Counsel’s failure to consult with Droz until the day of trial, his lack of effort to contact potential witnesses, and his ignorance of Droz’s prior guilty plea (and withdrawal thereof) were significant errors. The court highlighted the attorney’s damaging revelation of the withdrawn guilty plea, compounded by his incorrect advice that it would be admissible on cross-examination regardless. The court stated, “That, of course, is not correct since it is well settled that a guilty plea, once withdrawn, ‘is out of the case forever and for all purposes’ (People v Spitaleri, 9 NY2d 168, 173).” The failure to obtain Detective McGuckin’s prior testimony for potential impeachment was another significant omission. The Court concluded that the cumulative effect of these errors demonstrated that Droz did not receive adequate or effective legal representation. The court noted, “Whether counsel has adequately performed these functions is necessarily a question of degree, in which cumulative errors particularly on basic points essential to the defense, are often found to be determinative”.

  • People v. Bennett, 29 N.Y.2d 462 (1972): Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

    People v. Bennett, 29 N.Y.2d 462 (1972)

    The right to counsel means more than just having a person with a law degree nominally represent a defendant; it requires counsel to conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow themselves time for reflection and preparation for trial.

    Summary

    Bennett was convicted of manslaughter. Prior to and during the trial, Bennett requested a new lawyer, arguing that his assigned counsel was unprepared, did not understand him, and was providing inadequate representation. The trial judge denied these requests but intervened significantly during the trial, questioning witnesses and providing curative instructions due to counsel’s deficiencies. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Bennett’s conviction, holding that his counsel’s representation was so inadequate that it rendered the trial a “farce and a mockery of justice,” violating his Sixth Amendment rights. The court emphasized the need for counsel to conduct investigations and prepare adequately for trial.

    Facts

    Bennett was indicted for murder for allegedly shooting Clifford Van Putten in the presence of Amos Grant.

    Before and during the trial, Bennett requested the trial judge to replace his assigned counsel because he felt the lawyer was unprepared, did not understand him, and was not properly representing him.

    Defense counsel’s opening statement presented an accidental shooting defense but argued self-defense in summation, unsupported by evidence.

    The trial judge had to prompt defense counsel to review witness statements and actively cross-examine witnesses himself to elicit favorable information for the defense.

    Defense counsel failed to appear at Bennett’s sentencing, where Bennett received the maximum sentence.

    Procedural History

    Bennett was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree.

    He appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Bennett was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel due to his assigned lawyer’s inadequate preparation and representation at trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the record revealed a complete lack of investigation and preparation, and defense counsel rendered the trial a “farce and a mockery of justice.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that defense counsel’s performance was so deficient that it deprived Bennett of a fair trial. The court emphasized that the right to counsel requires more than nominal representation; it requires counsel to conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow themselves time for reflection and preparation for trial. “[I]t is impossible to define with any precision what constitutes ‘inadequate’ or ‘ineffective’ legal representation or to formulate standards which will apply to all cases. But, at the very least, the right of a defendant to be represented by an attorney means more than just having a person with a law degree nominally represent him upon a trial and ask questions.”

    The court noted the trial judge’s extensive efforts to ensure a fair trial, including prompting defense counsel and questioning witnesses. However, it held that the judge’s intervention could not substitute for effective representation by counsel. The court determined that the errors were not harmless and that the failure to present the accused’s cause in any fundamental respect required reversal.

    The Court distinguished between requiring “errorless counsel” and requiring assistance that is “susceptible of being deemed of an assistive nature.” The Court found the latter lacking in this case.