New York Law Review

Tag: Trial Order of Dismissal

  • Babayan v. People, 72 N.Y.2d 561 (1988): Limits on Trial Court Power to Dismiss Criminal Cases

    Babayan v. People, 72 N.Y.2d 561 (1988)

    A trial court in a criminal case exceeds its authorized powers when it dismisses an indictment on the merits due to the prosecution’s inability to proceed without presenting evidence, as such action is not authorized by statute or inherent judicial power.

    Summary

    This case concerns the extent of a trial court’s authority to dismiss a criminal case when the prosecution is unable to proceed. The trial court dismissed an indictment on the merits after the prosecution was unable to locate the complaining witness and requested an adjournment, which the court denied. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court exceeded its power by entering a trial order of dismissal without any evidence presented, and that prohibition was the appropriate remedy. The court emphasized that dismissal powers are statutory and must be exercised within the bounds defined by the legislature.

    Facts

    Richard Babayan was indicted on charges of grand larceny and criminal possession of a forged instrument stemming from a check that was refused payment. The complaining witness, Mahmoud Shahhosseini, was in Iran. The People requested an adjournment to secure his presence. The trial court, skeptical of the People’s ability to produce the witness, and over the People’s objection, dismissed the indictment after the People said they were unable to proceed.

    Procedural History

    The People commenced an Article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division, seeking to prohibit the enforcement of the trial court’s order. The Appellate Division found prohibition appropriate but upheld the trial court’s actions, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the adjournment. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court has the power to dismiss a criminal indictment on the merits, based on the prosecution’s inability to proceed due to the absence of a complaining witness, when no evidence has been presented.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court’s dismissal was not authorized by statute or inherent judicial power; thus, the dismissal was an act in excess of the court’s jurisdiction, warranting prohibition.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the issue through the lens of prohibition, examining whether the trial court acted in excess of its authorized powers. The Court emphasized that while trial courts have the power to dismiss indictments, this power is not unlimited and must be exercised within statutory confines. CPL 290.10(1)(a) allows for dismissal only upon the defendant’s motion at the conclusion of the People’s case or all evidence, which was not the situation here. The court noted the legislature’s intent to limit the appealability of trial orders of dismissal to instances where double jeopardy does not bar further review, underscoring the absence of legislative intent to permit non-appealable dismissals before a trial commences.

    Further, the court rejected the argument that the dismissal could be upheld as a permissible pretrial dismissal under CPL 210.20 because the order stated it was a dismissal on the merits and the court did not follow the procedures (consideration of factors in CPL 210.40) for a dismissal in the interest of justice. The court also reiterated the principle from People v. Douglass, 60 N.Y.2d 194, that courts lack inherent power to dismiss criminal proceedings for failure to proceed. The Court distinguished the powers of courts in civil and criminal proceedings, noting the separation of powers concerns implicated when a court interferes with a District Attorney’s prosecutorial discretion. The Court pointed out that the trial court could have placed the case on a reserve calendar or considered contempt powers. The Court stated, “Dismissal in the interest of justice may well be appropriate for just such abuses; indeed, ‘the attitude of the complainant’ is specifically identified among the factors to be considered on a motion to dismiss in furtherance of justice (CPL 210.40 [1] [i]).” Because the trial court did not follow CPL 210.40 when dismissing the case, the Court found the dismissal was improper.

  • People v. Fellman, 35 N.Y.2d 158 (1974): People’s Right to Appeal Dismissals in Non-Jury Trials

    People v. Fellman, 35 N.Y.2d 158 (1974)

    The People have the right to appeal a trial order of dismissal in both jury and non-jury cases when the dismissal is based on the legal insufficiency of the evidence.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases address whether the People can appeal a trial order of dismissal in a non-jury trial. In Fellman, the defendant was indicted for perjury. At the close of the People’s case, the trial court granted a trial order of dismissal, finding the evidence legally insufficient. In Sabella, the defendant requested a judgment of acquittal after a non-jury trial, which the court granted. The Court of Appeals held that the People may appeal a trial order of dismissal in both jury and non-jury cases when the dismissal is based on the legal insufficiency of the evidence. However, the court found that in Sabella, the defendant was acquitted on the merits, precluding appeal. In Fellman, the court found the dismissal was based on legal insufficiency and thus appealable, reinstating the indictment.

    Facts

    In Fellman:

    • Fellman, an architect, testified before a grand jury investigating corruption.
    • He stated that payments to Wingler, a health department employee, were legitimate fees for engineering services.
    • He specifically claimed a $1,000 check related to an alternate pool plan due to a soil failure.
    • At trial, Roberts, the pool project designer, testified there was no soil failure and the alternate plan was received earlier. Roberts further testified that Fellman told him that the payments were payoffs.
    • The People presented additional testimony contradicting Fellman’s claims.

    In Sabella, the defendant was subpoenaed before a grand jury. He refused to answer questions, claiming illegal wiretap evidence was being used. He was subsequently indicted for contempt.

    Procedural History

    In Fellman:

    • The trial court granted Fellman’s motion for a trial order of dismissal.
    • The Appellate Division was divided on whether the circumstantial evidence sufficiently corroborated Roberts’ testimony, leaving the trial court’s order standing.

    In Sabella:

    • The trial court granted the defendant’s request for a judgment of acquittal.
    • The Appellate Division dismissed the People’s appeal, holding that no appeal lies from a judgment on the merits in a criminal case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People may appeal from a trial order of dismissal in a non-jury case.

    2. Whether the trial courts in Fellman and Sabella dismissed on the law or acquitted the defendants on the merits.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because CPL 450.20(2) applies to both jury and non-jury cases, authorizing the People to appeal a trial order of dismissal when a charge is dismissed due to insufficient evidence as a matter of law.

    2. In Fellman, the court dismissed on the law, but erred in doing so. In Sabella, the court acquitted the defendant on the merits.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 450.20(2) allows the People to appeal trial orders of dismissal in both jury and non-jury cases. The Court acknowledged the difficulty in distinguishing legal from factual determinations in non-jury trials but stated that this is a normal part of the appellate process. Regarding Sabella, the Court determined that the defendant requested an acquittal, not a trial order of dismissal, and the court’s finding of insufficient proof of intent was based on the factual determination that the defendant acted in good faith, indicating an acquittal on the merits. The court stated, “Here the defendant was clearly acquitted on the merits and it matters not that the court chose to characterize the holding as a dismissal on the law, which the defendant in any event had not requested.” Allowing an appeal in Sabella would violate the defendant’s protection against double jeopardy.

    In Fellman, the defendant explicitly requested a trial order of dismissal based on the legal insufficiency of the evidence. The court held that, for the purpose of the motion, all evidence favoring the People is deemed credible. The finding of insufficiency turned on the legal conclusion that the circumstantial evidence of corroboration in a perjury case must meet the standard applicable to cases based wholly on circumstantial proof. According to CPL 70.10(1), legally sufficient evidence is “competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged…” Therefore, the People have the right to appeal the dismissal. The court also clarified the standard for corroborating perjury testimony, stating that “the circumstantial evidence serves only to corroborate the direct testimony of a single witness, it need not exclude to a moral certainty every hypothesis but guilt.” The court found that the evidence presented was legally sufficient to establish a prima facie case of perjury.

    The court quoted the Commission Staff Comment to Proposed CPL 150.20, noting that the change allowing the People to appeal “stems from the apparent injustice of denying the People any remedy when the trial court dismisses a charge during trial upon the basis of an erroneous determination of law that the trial evidence does not establish a prima facie case.”