New York Law Review

Tag: Trial in Absentia

  • People v. Epps, 63 N.Y.2d 730 (1984): Trial In Absentia Requires Knowing Waiver of Right to Be Present

    People v. Epps, 63 N.Y.2d 730 (1984)

    A defendant may only be tried in absentia if they knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive their right to be present, which requires, at a minimum, being informed of the right to be present and the consequences of failing to appear.

    Summary

    Epps was convicted of petit larceny after failing to appear for his trial, which had been rescheduled. The trial court proceeded in absentia, rejecting defense counsel’s request for a continuance. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that a defendant must knowingly and intelligently waive their right to be present at trial before a trial can proceed in absentia. The court emphasized that the defendant must be informed of the right to be present and the consequences of failing to appear. This requirement applies even in misdemeanor cases, as the right to be present stems from constitutional confrontation clauses.

    Facts

    Epps was charged with petit larceny for stealing two pairs of sunglasses from a drug store.

    The Town Court of Guilderland initially set the trial date for February 12, 1980.

    The trial was subsequently rescheduled for February 13, 1980.

    Epps failed to appear on February 13.

    His attorney requested a continuance, explaining he couldn’t reach Epps to inform him of the date change.

    The court noted a bench warrant had been issued, but Epps had left his job and home a week prior.

    The trial court concluded Epps knowingly and intentionally waived his right to be present and proceeded with the trial in absentia over counsel’s objection.

    Epps voluntarily appeared for sentencing approximately two weeks after the conviction.

    He received the maximum sentence: a one-year jail term.

    Procedural History

    The Town Court convicted Epps of petit larceny.

    The County Court affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be tried in absentia when there is no evidence that the defendant was informed of the right to be present at trial and the consequences of failing to appear.

    Holding

    No, because to effect a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver, “the defendant must, at a minimum, be informed in some manner of the nature of the right to be present at trial and the consequences of failing to appear for trial.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its recent decision in People v. Parker, which established the standard for a valid waiver of the right to be present at trial. The court emphasized that the record was devoid of any indication that Epps was informed that the trial would proceed in his absence. The court rejected the People’s argument that the Parker rule should not apply to misdemeanor prosecutions, stating that the constitutional right to be present at a criminal trial cannot be compromised simply because only a misdemeanor is charged. The court stated, “[T]o effect a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver, ‘the defendant must, at a minimum, be informed in some manner of the nature of the right to be present at trial and the consequences of failing to appear for trial’ (People v Parker, supra, at p 141).” The court distinguished the present case from situations where a defendant’s disruptive behavior leads to removal from the courtroom, highlighting that Epps’ absence was due to a lack of notification regarding the rescheduled trial date, not a deliberate attempt to disrupt the proceedings.

  • People v. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d 136 (1982): Knowing Waiver Required for Trial in Absentia

    People v. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d 136 (1982)

    A defendant’s voluntary absence from trial, even with knowledge of the trial date, is insufficient on its own to constitute a waiver of the right to be present; the defendant must also be aware that the trial will proceed in their absence.

    Summary

    Parker was indicted for criminal sale of a controlled substance. After being notified of her trial date, she told her attorney she might be too ill to attend. She did not appear, and the trial court, after a hearing, determined her absence was voluntary and proceeded with a trial in absentia, over defense counsel’s objection, without issuing a bench warrant. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that a voluntary absence, even with knowledge of the trial date, is insufficient to waive the constitutional right to be present at trial. The Court emphasized that the defendant must be aware that the trial will proceed in their absence for a valid waiver.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on drug charges in February 1977.
    Defense counsel was notified on July 5, 1977, that the trial was scheduled for July 8, 1977.
    Defense counsel informed the defendant, who stated she was ill and might not be able to attend.
    The defendant did not appear on July 8, and the trial was adjourned to July 11.
    The defendant again failed to appear on July 11.
    Jeanette Harris, who posted bail for the defendant, testified that the defendant had mentioned an intention to leave town but never said she was ill. On cross, Harris admitted that her son told her the defendant was “out in the street.”
    The trial court found that the defendant’s absence was voluntary.

    Procedural History

    The trial court tried the defendant in absentia, and the jury found her guilty.
    The defendant was sentenced in absentia.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding the trial court’s finding of voluntary absence insufficient to establish an implicit waiver of the right to be present.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a criminal defendant’s voluntary failure to appear for trial, with knowledge of the trial date, is sufficient to constitute a waiver of their right to be present at trial, thus permitting the court to proceed with a trial in absentia.

    Holding

    No, because a valid waiver of the right to be present at trial requires, at a minimum, that the defendant be aware that the trial will proceed in their absence. Mere voluntary absence, even with knowledge of the trial date, is insufficient to establish such a waiver.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the constitutional right to be present at a criminal trial, as protected by the Confrontation Clauses of both the State and Federal Constitutions. While this right can be waived, any such waiver, including an implied one, must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
    The court distinguished its prior holdings in People v. Epps and People v. Johnson, where the defendants were present at the start of trial and were warned of the consequences of their conduct (disruptive behavior or refusal to leave a jail cell). In those cases, the defendants’ conduct clearly expressed a desire not to be present at trial.
    The court rejected the argument that a forfeiture analysis should apply, where a right can be lost without a knowing and intelligent decision to relinquish it. The Court emphasized the need for a constitutional waiver analysis in this case because the defendant’s mere disappearance was more ambiguous than the clear expressions of intent in Epps and Johnson. There was no evidence that she was ever informed that the trial would proceed in her absence.
    The court stated that “in order to effect a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver, the defendant must, at a minimum, be informed in some manner of the nature of the right to be present at trial and the consequences of failing to appear for trial.”
    The Court noted that even after a valid waiver, a trial in absentia is not automatically authorized. The trial court must exercise sound discretion, considering factors like the possibility of locating the defendant, the difficulty of rescheduling, and the risk of lost evidence or witnesses.
    The Court emphasized that “the simple expedient of adjournment pending execution of a bench warrant could provide an alternative to trial in absentia unless, of course, the prosecution can demonstrate that such a course of action would be totally futile.”

  • People v. Aiken, 45 N.Y.2d 394 (1978): Effective Assistance of Counsel and Defendant’s Absence from Trial

    People v. Aiken, 45 N.Y.2d 394 (1978)

    A defendant’s voluntary absence from trial, while not waiving the right to effective assistance of counsel, significantly impacts the assessment of counsel’s effectiveness, particularly where counsel’s actions are strategic responses to the defendant’s absence.

    Summary

    Aiken was convicted of burglary after voluntarily absenting himself from his trial. On appeal, he argued ineffective assistance of counsel, citing his lawyer’s limited participation in the trial. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while a defendant’s absence does not automatically waive the right to effective counsel, it must be considered when evaluating counsel’s performance. The court found that the attorney’s actions, including limited cross-examination and foregoing opening and closing statements, appeared to be a strategic decision in response to Aiken’s absence, aimed at securing a mistrial, and did not constitute ineffective assistance under the circumstances.

    Facts

    Police responded to a burglary call and found Aiken at the scene, attempting to hide. A windowpane was broken, and the master bedroom was in disarray. Aiken was charged with burglary in the second degree. He attended the first day of jury selection but failed to appear on subsequent days. The trial court determined his absence was willful and voluntary and proceeded with the trial in absentia.

    Procedural History

    Aiken was convicted of burglary in the second degree. He appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s limited participation in the trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Aiken then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, by voluntarily absenting himself from trial, is denied the right to effective assistance of counsel when his attorney makes strategic decisions, such as limiting cross-examination and foregoing opening and closing statements, in response to the defendant’s absence.

    Holding

    No, because while a defendant’s absence does not waive his right to effective counsel, the court must consider that absence in assessing counsel’s effectiveness, and strategic decisions made in response to that absence do not necessarily constitute ineffective assistance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by both the Federal and State Constitutions, but noted that the standard for evaluating effectiveness is not precisely defined. The court shifted away from the older “mockery of justice” standard to a more flexible, fact-specific inquiry, considering whether counsel’s representation was “adequate or effective in any meaningful sense.” The court emphasized that a defendant’s absence from trial significantly impacts counsel’s ability to provide effective representation. The court found that the attorney’s actions were a strategic attempt to obstruct the trial and pressure the court into declaring a mistrial. Waiver of opening and closing statements, failure to cross-examine, and failure to call witnesses were all seen as strategic choices, not necessarily indicative of ineffectiveness, given the defendant’s absence and the strength of the prosecution’s case. The court explicitly stated that “a defendant who absents himself from trial may not succeed on appeal by raising counsel’s purported ineffectiveness where counsel affirmatively, as a matter of trial strategy, sought to obstruct the trial of his client.” Ultimately, the court reasoned that allowing the appeal would permit the defendant to benefit from his own misconduct. The court also rejected the argument that retained counsel should be held to a different standard than appointed counsel, finding this distinction irrelevant to the core issue of effective representation.