New York Law Review

Tag: Triable Issue of Fact

  • Bannister v. Cheek, 9 N.Y.3d 752 (2007): Establishing Negligence and Default Judgments

    9 N.Y.3d 752 (2007)

    A defendant is entitled to summary judgment where the plaintiff fails to establish a triable issue of fact regarding the defendant’s alleged negligence. Additionally, a default judgment can be vacated if the moving party demonstrates a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious cause of action.

    Summary

    This case concerns a negligence claim where the plaintiffs, Bannister, sought damages from defendants, Cheek and the Bannisters. Defendant Cheek moved for summary judgment, arguing a lack of negligence. Supreme Court granted Cheek’s motion. The Appellate Division reversed this decision. Regarding a default judgment against the Bannister defendants, the Appellate Division vacated the judgments and reinstated the complaint, finding a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious cause of action. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, granting Cheek’s motion for summary judgment, finding no triable issue of fact on Cheek’s negligence.

    Facts

    The relevant facts involve a negligence claim brought by the plaintiffs, Bannister, against the defendants, Cheek and other Bannisters. Specific details of the underlying negligent act are not explicitly detailed in the provided memorandum. However, the key fact is that Leann Cheek moved for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiffs could not establish a triable issue of fact regarding her alleged negligence.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially granted defendant Cheek’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint against her. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order, reinstating the complaint against Cheek. The Appellate Division also vacated default judgments against the Bannister defendants and reinstated the complaint against them. Cheek appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, granting Cheek’s original motion for summary judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division erred in reversing the Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant Cheek, based on the existence of a triable issue of fact regarding her alleged negligence?
    2. Whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion in vacating the default judgments against the Bannister defendants and reinstating the complaint against them?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the plaintiffs failed to establish a triable issue of fact regarding defendant Leann Cheek’s alleged negligence.
    2. No, because the plaintiffs proffered a reasonable excuse for their default and facts indicating a meritorious cause of action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Appellate Division erred in reversing the Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to Cheek. The Court found that the plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact concerning Cheek’s negligence. The court applied the standard for summary judgment, which requires the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Since the plaintiffs failed to meet this burden regarding Cheek’s negligence, summary judgment was appropriate.

    Regarding the default judgments against the Bannister defendants, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division. The court cited CPLR 5015 (a) (1) and prior case law (Alliance Prop. Mgt. & Dev. v Andrews Ave. Equities, 70 NY2d 831, 832-833 [1987]; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]) to support the principle that a default judgment can be vacated where the defaulting party demonstrates a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious cause of action. Because the Bannister defendants met this standard, the Appellate Division’s decision to vacate the default judgments was upheld.

    The court’s decision emphasizes the importance of establishing a factual basis for negligence claims to survive summary judgment. It also reaffirms the standard for vacating default judgments, requiring both a reasonable excuse and a meritorious claim.

  • Zodiac Petroleum, S.A. v. Race Rederiet, 392 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1977): Summary Judgment Requires Raising Triable Issues in Affidavits

    Zodiac Petroleum, S.A. v. Race Rederiet, 392 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1977)

    On a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must demonstrate a triable issue of fact through pleadings and affidavits; arguments raised only in briefs or post-argument memoranda are insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

    Summary

    Zodiac Petroleum, S.A. (insurer) sued Race Rederiet (assured) to recover unpaid insurance premiums. The assured moved for summary judgment, arguing English law barred direct actions for nonpayment. The insurer countered that the suit was for breach of contract (failure to declare shipments), not unpaid premiums. The assured then asserted that, even under this theory, English law imposed no obligation to declare all shipments. The insurer failed to refute this assertion in its affidavits, instead arguing the assured’s point was irrelevant. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the assured, holding the insurer failed to raise a triable issue of fact in its affidavits.

    Facts

    The insurer, Zodiac Petroleum, S.A., sought to recover premiums allegedly owed by the assured, Race Rederiet, under a marine insurance policy. The insurer claimed the assured failed to declare all shipments that should have been covered. The assured denied the allegations and asserted an affirmative defense based on English law. The assured contended that under English law, the insurer could not directly sue the assured for unpaid premiums but had to proceed through the procuring broker.

    Procedural History

    The assured moved for summary judgment based on the argument that English law barred the insurer’s direct action for unpaid premiums. The insurer opposed the motion, arguing that the complaint was for breach of contract, not unpaid premiums. The assured responded that even under the breach of contract theory, English law imposed no obligation to declare all shipments. The insurer did not refute this legal assertion in its reply affidavits. The lower court granted summary judgment to the assured, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The insurer appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the insurer, in opposing the motion for summary judgment, raised a triable issue of fact by failing to controvert the assured’s assertion of applicable English law in its affidavits.

    Holding

    No, because the insurer failed to controvert the assured’s assertion of applicable English law in its affidavits; arguments presented solely in briefs or post-argument memoranda cannot create a triable issue where the affidavits fail to do so.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the insurer failed to raise a triable issue of fact because it did not dispute the assured’s assertion of English law in its affidavits. The court emphasized that summary judgment is to be determined based on all the papers before the court, including pleadings and affidavits. The court stated, “Resort may not now be had to briefs or postargument memoranda to supplement the record or to import a triable issue not otherwise presented.” The court also noted that the assured’s notice of motion did not limit the grounds for summary judgment, and the insurer itself had argued that the theory of the complaint had been misapprehended. The court implicitly relied on CPLR 3212(b), which specifies that summary judgment shall be granted if “the cause of action or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in favor of any party” and requires that the motion be supported by affidavit, a copy of the pleadings, and other available proof. The court also cited CPLR 3212(f) which allows for denial of summary judgment if facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated. By not invoking CPLR 3212(f) and adequately rebutting the assured’s assertions in affidavit form, the insurer failed to meet its burden. The Court thus reasoned that the absence of a factual dispute shown in the affidavits justified the grant of summary judgment.

  • Indig v. Finkelstein, 23 N.Y.2d 730 (1968): Establishing Triable Issue of Fact in Summary Judgment

    Indig v. Finkelstein, 23 N.Y.2d 730 (1968)

    A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must present evidentiary facts demonstrating a triable issue of fact; mere repetition of allegations in pleadings or bills of particulars is insufficient.

    Summary

    In this defamation case, the defendants moved for summary judgment, supported by affidavits asserting the slanderous statements were not made in the presence of others, thus negating publication. The plaintiffs opposed the motion with an affidavit referencing potential witnesses but failed to provide specific evidentiary facts about their testimony or proximity to the alleged statements. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a triable issue of fact by merely reiterating allegations without providing supporting evidence.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs brought a defamation action against the defendants, alleging slanderous statements. The defendants moved for summary judgment, submitting affidavits asserting that the alleged verbal altercation occurred without any third parties present. Plaintiffs, in their opposition, submitted an affidavit referencing witnesses named in their bills of particulars who would testify at trial regarding the altercation. However, the affidavit failed to detail the content of the anticipated testimony or provide any facts demonstrating that these witnesses were actually present and able to hear the alleged slanderous statements.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved for summary judgment at the trial court level. The trial court’s decision is not explicitly mentioned in the Court of Appeals decision. The Appellate Division’s order, affirming the summary judgment in favor of the defendants, was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidentiary facts to rebut the defendants’ prima facie showing of no publication and demonstrate a triable issue of ultimate fact, thus precluding summary judgment.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiffs’ opposing affidavit merely referred to potential witnesses without providing specific evidentiary facts showing their proximity to the alleged slanderous statements or the content of their anticipated testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that once the defendants presented a prima facie case for summary judgment, the burden shifted to the plaintiffs to demonstrate a triable issue of fact with evidentiary proof. The court found the plaintiffs’ affidavit insufficient because it merely reiterated the allegations from their pleadings and bills of particulars. The affidavit failed to specify how the plaintiffs knew what the witnesses’ testimony would be, provide the content of their anticipated testimony, or establish that the witnesses were in a position to hear the alleged slanderous statements. The court cited CPLR 3212(b) and several precedents, including Shapiro v. Health Ins. Plan, emphasizing the need for more than just allegations to defeat summary judgment.

    The court reasoned that failing to provide specific facts about the witnesses’ location during the altercation or any circumstances indicating they likely heard the conversations meant that no genuine issue of material fact was presented. The court explicitly stated, “The burden upon a party opposing a motion for summary judgment is not met merely by a repetition or incorporation by reference of the allegations contained in pleadings or bills of particulars, verified or unverified”. This highlights the importance of providing concrete evidence, not just assertions, to defeat a motion for summary judgment. The court implicitly reinforced the policy of efficient dispute resolution by preventing cases lacking genuine factual disputes from proceeding to trial.