New York Law Review

Tag: trespasser

  • Morton v. State, 15 N.Y.3d 50 (2010): Labor Law § 241(6) Liability Requires Nexus Between Owner and Worker

    15 N.Y.3d 50 (2010)

    A property owner who did not contract for the injury-inducing work is not liable under Labor Law § 241(6) unless there is a nexus (connection) between the owner and the injured worker, established by a lease agreement, easement, work permit, or other property interest.

    Summary

    Alan Morton, an employee of a private water company, was injured while repairing a water main break beneath a state highway. He sued the State under Labor Law § 241(6), alleging the State failed to provide a safe excavation site. The Court of Appeals held that the State was not liable because the water company did not obtain a work permit from the State Department of Transportation before commencing the repairs. This absence of a permit meant that there was no nexus (legal connection) between Morton and the State, as required to establish liability under Labor Law § 241(6). The court emphasized that without a permit, Morton was essentially a trespasser on state property.

    Facts

    Alan Morton, employed by New York Water Service Corporation, was part of a crew dispatched to repair a water main break under Carman Mill Road, a state highway. The crew excavated a trench to access the water main. While Morton was working in the trench, it collapsed, injuring his leg. The water company had not obtained a work permit from the New York State Department of Transportation before starting the repair work.

    Procedural History

    Morton sued the State, alleging negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241(6). The Court of Claims dismissed the negligence claims. After a trial on the Labor Law § 241(6) claim, the Court of Claims found the State 100% liable. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the State summary judgment and dismissing the § 241(6) claim. Morton appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State, as the owner of the highway, can be held liable under Labor Law § 241(6) for injuries sustained by an employee of a private company repairing a water main beneath the highway, when the company failed to obtain a required work permit from the State Department of Transportation?

    Holding

    No, because the water company’s failure to obtain a work permit meant there was no nexus (legal connection) between the injured worker and the State, as required to impose liability on the State as a property owner under Labor Law § 241(6).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle that ownership alone is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 241(6). There must be a nexus between the owner and the worker, such as a lease agreement, easement, or other property interest. The court emphasized that in the absence of a work permit, the water company and its employee (Morton) were essentially trespassing on state property. The court distinguished this case from situations where the owner has granted some form of property interest or permission for the work to be performed. The court stated, “Here, there was no lease agreement or grant of an easement or other property interest creating a nexus between claimant and the State. Claimant was performing excavation work on the State’s premises `not by reason of any action of the [State] but by reason’ of the water company’s obligation to repair a break in its water line.” The dissent argued that the work was an emergency repair, but the majority countered that even in an emergency, a work permit was still required (though notification procedures might differ). The court also noted the importance of work permits for ensuring safety inspections, protecting the integrity of the roadway, and verifying that the permittee has sufficient liability insurance to protect the State’s interests. The court quoted Abbatiello v Lancaster Studio Assoc., stating “Any permission to work on the premises [would have been] granted upon compulsion and no relationship [would have] existed between [the State] and [the water company] or [claimant]” in the event a work permit was not needed for emergency repairs.

  • O’Connor v. G & R Packing Co., 53 N.Y.2d 278 (1981): Issue Preclusion Requires Clear Prior Determination

    O’Connor v. G & R Packing Co., 53 N.Y.2d 278 (1981)

    Issue preclusion protects a defendant not party to a prior suit from relitigation of an issue considered alternatively only when the prior determination squarely addressed and specifically decided the issue.

    Summary

    Anthony O’Connor, a minor, was injured when he climbed a freight car and touched a high-voltage wire. A prior suit against the railroads was dismissed. This case concerns whether that dismissal precludes a subsequent suit against G & R Packing, whose yard provided access to the railroad yard. The Court of Appeals held that the prior dismissal did not preclude the current action because the prior ruling did not definitively determine the issue of contributory negligence. The court emphasized the need for a clear and specific prior determination for issue preclusion to apply.

    Facts

    Anthony O’Connor, age 16, was injured on February 11, 1967, in a railroad yard after climbing a freight car ladder and touching a high-voltage wire while attempting to throw a snowball.

    Anthony accessed the railroad yard through the adjacent yard of G & R Packing Co.

    Anthony and his father initially sued the railroads operating the yard.

    Procedural History

    The initial action against the railroads was dismissed at the end of the plaintiffs’ case.

    The Trial Judge in the first case ruled that Anthony, as a trespasser, was owed only a duty to refrain from willful or wanton injury, and that he had violated Penal and Railroad Law provisions.

    The Trial Judge stated the infant plaintiff deliberately exposed himself to a known danger.

    No appeal was taken from the dismissal of the action against the railroads.

    In the present action, Anthony and his father sued G & R Packing Co.

    G & R Packing moved to dismiss, arguing the prior action was grounded on both absence of duty and contributory negligence.

    Special Term granted the motion, but the Appellate Division reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the dismissal of the prior action against the railroads, based on the plaintiff’s status as a trespasser and a finding of no breach of duty, precludes the current action against G & R Packing Co. based on the issue of contributory negligence.

    Holding

    No, because the prior ruling against the railroads did not constitute a clear and specific determination on the issue of contributory negligence; therefore, issue preclusion does not apply to the suit against G & R Packing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from Malloy v Trombley, where a specific finding of contributory negligence was given preclusive effect. Here, the Trial Judge’s ruling in the railroad case was based on Anthony’s status as a trespasser and the railroads’ lack of duty to him.

    The court noted the absence of explicit findings of fact regarding contributory negligence in the prior case and the lack of consideration of factors relevant to a minor’s negligence, such as “age, experience, intelligence, and degree of development”.

    The court emphasized that the essence of the prior ruling was that no breach of duty by the railroads had been proved, rather than a definitive finding of contributory negligence on Anthony’s part.

    The court cited Mayer v Temple Props., noting a jury should consider “the well-known propensities of children to climb about and play.”

    The court also noted that contributory negligence “is a jury question in all but the clearest cases” (MacDowall v Koehring Basic Constr. Equip.).

    The court held that the trial transcript from the action against the railroads, which was appended to the attorney’s affidavit, presented a jury question on the issue of contributory negligence.

    Because the prior holding was less than explicit, it should not be given preclusive effect.

  • Carrico v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 41 N.Y.2d 328 (1977): Defining the Duty of Care Owed to Trespassers and Licensees on Railroad Property

    Carrico v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 41 N.Y.2d 328 (1977)

    Railroad companies owe a duty to refrain from willful or reckless injury to trespassers or licensees on their property, and are not liable for injuries resulting from open and obvious conditions when the injured party is aware of the risks.

    Summary

    Christine Carrico, while walking on an abandoned train platform owned by Penn Central, slipped on ice and was severely injured by a passing train. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s judgment in favor of Carrico, holding that Penn Central did not breach any duty owed to her. The Court reasoned that Carrico was either a trespasser or a licensee, and in either case, Penn Central’s duty was limited to refraining from willful or reckless harm. The Court emphasized that the icy condition was open and obvious, and Carrico was aware of the risk. This case clarifies the limited duty of care owed by railroads to individuals on their property without invitation and highlights the importance of the obviousness of a dangerous condition.

    Facts

    The infant plaintiff, Christine Carrico, and a companion were walking on an abandoned passenger platform owned by Penn Central. The platform had not been used as a passenger station since 1959. The platform was approximately 20 feet wide and 200 feet long, and partly covered by a canopy. While not open to the public, there was testimony that members of the public used it as a shortcut. Carrico slipped on snow and ice near the edge of the platform and fell under the wheels of a passing train, resulting in the loss of both legs below the knee. The train was moving slowly, with its headlight on and bell ringing.

    Procedural History

    The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, with two justices dissenting. The defendant, Penn Central, appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The plaintiffs cross-appealed on the grounds that the damages awarded were inadequate, but this cross-appeal was dismissed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Penn Central breached a duty of care owed to Carrico that proximately caused her injuries, considering her status as either a trespasser or a licensee on the abandoned train platform.

    Holding

    No, because Penn Central did not breach any duty owed to Carrico, whether she was considered a trespasser or a licensee. The railroad was only obligated to refrain from willful, wanton, or intentional harm, and the evidence failed to establish any such breach.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Section 83 of the Railroad Law prohibits unauthorized individuals from walking along railroad tracks, and Section 9-103 of the General Obligations Law limits the duty of care owed by landowners to those using their property for recreational activities. Reading these statutes together, the court concluded that Carrico’s presence on the platform was either a trespass or, at best, that of a licensee. As a trespasser, Penn Central only owed her the duty not to cause willful, wanton, or intentional harm. As a licensee, Penn Central owed her a duty of reasonable care. However, the court found no evidence that Penn Central breached this duty. The condition of the platform (snow and ice) was open and evident, and Carrico, familiar with the platform, voluntarily chose to walk near the edge with knowledge of the risks. The court emphasized that “Whoever walks upon, or along, the tracks of a railroad, except when necessary to cross the same upon some street, highway, or public place, violates the law and is like a trespasser, and the company’s servants are under no other obligation than to refrain from willfully, or recklessly, injuring him.” The court found no evidence that the engineer or any of Penn Central’s employees acted in a wanton or reckless manner. The platform itself was structurally sound, and the danger arose from the snow, not from any affirmative act of Penn Central. The accident was not within the foreseeable anticipation of the defendant. Judges Gabrielli and Wachtler dissented, voting to affirm the Appellate Division’s judgment.

  • Mayer v. City of New York, 9 N.Y.2d 294 (1961): Duty of Care Owed to Trespassers and Inherently Dangerous Conditions

    Mayer v. City of New York, 9 N.Y.2d 294 (1961)

    The standard of care owed to trespassers is to refrain from willful, wanton, or intentional acts, or their equivalents; the determination of whether a condition is inherently dangerous is a question of fact for the jury, unless a statute or ordinance dictates otherwise.

    Summary

    This case addresses the duty of care owed to trespassers and whether the storage of flammable liquid constituted an inherently dangerous condition. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s judgment, holding that it was a question of fact for the jury to determine whether the City of New York created or maintained an inherently hazardous situation by storing accessible, highly flammable material in a darkened, vacated recess adjacent to a former public playground area. The court also noted the importance of determining whether the children were, in fact, trespassers.

    Facts

    Infant plaintiffs were injured by a fire in a recess adjacent to a former public playground area owned by the City of New York. The area contained highly flammable material, some of which had spilled on the floor. The trial court charged the jury that the inflammable liquid was inherently dangerous as a matter of law.

    Procedural History

    The trial court rendered a judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in charging the jury that the inflammable liquid was inherently dangerous as a matter of law.
    2. Whether the infants were actually trespassers.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because in the absence of a statute or ordinance, it is a question of fact for the jury to determine whether the storage of accessible, highly inflammable material constitutes an inherently hazardous situation.
    2. The court suggested that consideration should be given at the new trial to the question of whether the infants were actually trespassers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the proper standard of care owed to trespassers is refraining from willful, wanton, or intentional acts, or their equivalents. The court emphasized that determining whether an inherently dangerous situation existed is a question of fact for the jury, considering all relevant circumstances, including the continued storage of accessible, highly inflammable material, some of which had spilled on the floor, within a darkened vacated recess adjacent to a former public playground area.

    The Court cited Mayer v. Temple Props., stating that the consequences of maintaining an inherently hazardous situation may well have been anticipated. The Court distinguished situations where a statute or ordinance defines a substance as inherently dangerous, making it a question of law. In this case, absent such a provision, the determination belonged to the jury.

    The court also raised the point of whether the infants were actually trespassers, citing Collentine v. City of New York, indicating that their status could impact the duty of care owed to them. The Court reasoned that even if no exception was taken at trial, the issue should be considered during the new trial, as it would determine the level of duty the City owed to the children.