New York Law Review

Tag: trespass

  • People v Williams, 2025 NY Slip Op 00901: Legal Sufficiency of Evidence for Burglary Conviction

    2025 NY Slip Op 00901

    A conviction for burglary requires legally sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant knowingly entered or remained unlawfully in a building with the intent to commit a crime therein.

    Summary

    In People v. Williams, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed a burglary conviction, holding that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that the defendant knowingly entered a CVS store unlawfully, given a trespass notice barring his entry, and with the intent to commit a crime therein, demonstrated by his actions and statements. The dissent argued the evidence was insufficient to prove intent to steal the Red Bulls, emphasizing the lack of overt actions suggesting intent and critiquing the reliance on a confession made during a confusing police interrogation. The case underscores the importance of direct evidence of intent and the potential for prosecutorial overreach in charging minor offenses.

    Facts

    Raymond Williams was found to have entered a CVS store, despite having previously signed a trespass notice barring him from all CVS locations. He was observed on surveillance footage walking past the store, turning back, going to the beverage cooler, taking two Red Bull energy drinks, and then walking toward the self-checkout area without attempting to pay for the drinks. The store manager confronted him, at which point he “slammed” the Red Bulls down and left. During a subsequent police interrogation, Williams made statements that were interpreted as admissions to stealing the Red Bulls, although the dissent argued these statements were ambiguous and may have referred to a different incident.

    Procedural History

    Williams was convicted of third-degree burglary. The trial court sentenced him to 3.5 to 7 years in prison as a second violent felony offender. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the New York Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, leading to this appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support the conviction for third-degree burglary, specifically regarding the elements of unlawful entry and intent to commit a crime.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the trespass notice, combined with Williams’ actions and statements, provided legally sufficient evidence for the jury to find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the standard of legal sufficiency, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution. It found that the trespass notice established that the defendant’s entry into the store was unlawful. The court determined that the surveillance footage depicting Williams’ behavior inside the store, along with his reaction when confronted, and his statements to the police constituted adequate evidence that the defendant intended to steal the Red Bull. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that innocent explanations for his conduct precluded a finding of intent. The court also noted that the defendant had failed to preserve an argument that his statements were not sufficiently corroborated.

    The dissent argued that no rational trier of fact could have concluded that Williams intended to steal, pointing out that his actions were ambiguous. The dissent also highlighted the lack of clarity in Williams’ confession to police. The dissent also referenced CPL 60.50, which says that a person cannot be convicted of an offense solely upon evidence of a confession or admission made by him without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores that, for a burglary conviction to stand, there must be legally sufficient evidence to prove the defendant intended to commit a crime inside a building. Attorneys should analyze evidence carefully to establish whether intent can be reasonably inferred from the defendant’s actions and statements. Furthermore, this case is important for understanding the evidentiary requirements for burglary convictions. The court’s decision suggests that a signed trespass notice is sufficient to prove that the defendant’s presence in the building was unlawful, and it also illustrates the importance of a clear confession in the face of surveillance footage. Attorneys defending these types of cases should focus on the ambiguity of the defendant’s actions and the potentially misleading nature of the police interrogation to cast doubt on the prosecution’s claim of intent, as highlighted by the dissent.

  • People v. Torres, 21 N.Y.3d 721 (2013): Search Incident to Arrest and Exigent Circumstances

    21 N.Y.3d 721 (2013)

    A warrantless search incident to arrest must be justified by exigent circumstances, such as officer safety, and the mere potential for a weapon in a bag is insufficient justification when the suspect is secured and the connection to a violent crime is attenuated.

    Summary

    Torres was arrested for trespass in a building where a burglary had been reported. Incident to the arrest, police searched her handbag and found a loaded gun. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision to admit the gun as evidence. The Court held that the search was not justified as incident to a lawful arrest because no exigent circumstances existed. The court reasoned that the connection to the burglary was weak, and the defendant was secured at the time of the search, negating any immediate threat to officer safety.

    Facts

    Police responded to a report of a burglary in progress on the fifth floor of a residential building. Upon entering the lobby, they saw Torres and a male companion exiting a stairwell. The building superintendent gestured towards them. When questioned, Torres gave inconsistent explanations for her presence in the building. The police arrested Torres for trespassing. While handcuffing her, they noticed a weighted handbag on her shoulder, which she held tightly. They opened the handbag and found a loaded handgun.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Torres’s motion to suppress the firearm, arguing the search was lawful as incident to arrest. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, granting the motion to suppress the evidence.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless search of Torres’s handbag was justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest, given the circumstances.

    Holding

    No, because the search was not justified by exigent circumstances. The connection between Torres and the reported burglary was tenuous, and Torres was already secured when the search occurred.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a search incident to arrest must be contemporaneous with the arrest and justified by concerns for officer safety or the preservation of evidence. Here, the Court found no such justification. While acknowledging that police need not testify explicitly about their safety concerns, the Court emphasized the need for objective reasonableness. The Court found that “nothing connected defendant or her companion to the burglary,” and that the defendant’s mere presence in a building where a burglary was reported, coupled with inconsistent explanations, was insufficient to establish probable cause to believe the defendant was armed and dangerous. The Court distinguished this case from cases where there was a clear connection between the crime for which the defendant was arrested and the potential for weapons, stating, “the facts that defendant was arrested for trespass, that several officers were on the scene, and that defendant offered no resistance weigh heavily against a finding of exigent circumstances.” A dissenting opinion argued that the superintendent’s gestures toward Torres, combined with her suspicious behavior and the heavy handbag, created a reasonable inference of danger justifying the search. The dissent emphasized that the lower courts’ factual findings should be upheld unless no reasonable inference could support the conclusion that the search was lawful, quoting, “Warrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his person unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”

  • Marinaccio v. Kieffer Enterprises, Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 501 (2013): Standard for Punitive Damages in Intentional Tort Cases

    Marinaccio v. Kieffer Enterprises, Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 501 (2013)

    Punitive damages in tort cases require more than just intentional conduct; they necessitate a showing of malice, fraud, evil motive, or a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others implying criminal indifference to civil obligations.

    Summary

    Marinaccio sued Kieffer Enterprises, Inc. (KEI) for trespass and nuisance, alleging intentional diversion of stormwater onto his property causing significant damage. The jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages against KEI. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the punitive damages award, holding that while KEI’s actions were intentional and caused considerable damage, the evidence did not demonstrate the requisite malice or wanton disregard necessary to justify punitive damages. The court emphasized that compliance with regulations and engagement of experts, even if ultimately unsuccessful, negated a finding of criminal indifference to civil obligations.

    Facts

    KEI, developing a residential subdivision, diverted water into a ditch that was mistakenly believed to be on KEI’s property but was actually on Marinaccio’s land, without his permission. The mitigation pond was insufficient, leading KEI to install drainage pipes that routed water onto Marinaccio’s property, creating a large flooded wetland. Marinaccio complained to KEI, but was ignored. The flooding caused mosquitos and frogs, which Marinaccio feared, to proliferate on his property. However, Marinaccio refused to allow the Town to clean the ditch on his property which would have alleviated the flooding.

    Procedural History

    Marinaccio sued KEI and the Town for trespass and nuisance, seeking damages. The trial court denied KEI’s motion to dismiss the punitive damages claim. The jury awarded compensatory damages against both the Town and KEI, and punitive damages against KEI. KEI appealed the punitive damages award. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision regarding punitive damages.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages against KEI for intentional diversion of stormwater onto Marinaccio’s property, constituting trespass and nuisance.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence did not demonstrate malice, fraud, evil motive, or a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others implying criminal indifference to civil obligations, which is required to justify punitive damages in tort cases.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the strict standard for awarding punitive damages, stating that it requires “spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called wilful or wanton.” While KEI’s actions resulted in damage to Marinaccio’s property, KEI complied with planning and development laws, worked with the Army Corps of Engineers, and hired experts. This, even if ultimately unsuccessful in preventing damage, demonstrated that KEI’s actions could not be considered wanton or malicious. The court acknowledged that KEI should have ensured the Town obtained an easement from Marinaccio, making them liable for trespass and nuisance. However, “something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages.” The court found that KEI’s behavior, while not ideal, did not rise to the level of moral turpitude required for punitive damages. The court distinguished between volitional acts and those demonstrating a purposeful or grossly indifferent causing of injury. Punitive damages are awarded to punish and deter behavior involving moral turpitude, and KEI’s behavior did not meet this threshold. The court quoted Prozeralik v Capital Cities Communications, 82 NY2d 466, 479 (1993) stating that “[s]omething more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages”.

  • People v. Jones, 90 N.Y.2d 52 (1997): Establishing Reasonable Suspicion During a Vertical Sweep

    People v. Jones, 90 N.Y.2d 52 (1997)

    Police detention of a suspect during a vertical sweep of an apartment building requires reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.

    Summary

    During a vertical sweep of an apartment building known for drug activity, police encountered the defendant under suspicious circumstances. The Court of Appeals held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant. The court reasoned that the defendant’s presence near an open apartment door, his reaction to seeing the officer, and the context of a vertical sweep in a building known for drug activity, provided sufficient grounds to suspect the defendant of trespassing, which justified the brief detention. The court affirmed the conviction, also finding sufficient evidence for constructive possession of the drugs found in the apartment.

    Facts

    On March 29, 1996, NYPD officers conducted a vertical sweep of a four-story apartment building in Manhattan, pursuant to a trespass affidavit indicating the building was plagued by illegal drug trade. An officer encountered the defendant on the third floor near the open door of apartment 3D after hearing someone call out to an individual known for narcotics arrests. The defendant appeared surprised upon seeing the officer, then turned as if to knock on apartment 3C, but instead walked toward a staircase. The officer then observed coffee grounds and drug paraphernalia in plain view inside the open apartment 3D.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance based on constructive possession. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress money found during a search incident to arrest. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. This appeal followed after a judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant during a vertical sweep of an apartment building?

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s presence outside an open apartment door in a building known for drug activity, his suspicious behavior upon seeing the officer, and the observation of drug paraphernalia inside the apartment provided reasonable suspicion that the defendant was trespassing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the principle that police seizure of a suspect must be justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, citing People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444, 447 (1992). The court referenced People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223 (1976), noting that permissible police intrusion intensifies with escalating evidence of criminal activity. It reasoned that the purpose of the vertical sweep was to apprehend trespassers, and Penal Law § 140.05 only requires illegal entry or remaining on the premises to constitute trespassing. The court determined that the defendant’s presence near the open apartment door, his reaction to the officer, and the context of the sweep provided reasonable suspicion of trespassing, justifying the brief detention. The court also found sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the apartment, supporting the constructive possession charge, citing People v. Kennedy, 47 N.Y.2d 196, 201-202 (1979). The court emphasized that the determination of reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact, which is beyond their review if supported by the record.

  • Wing Ming Properties (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. Mott Operating Corp., 79 N.Y.2d 1021 (1992): Trespass on Air Rights and De Minimis Encroachments

    Wing Ming Properties (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. Mott Operating Corp., 79 N.Y.2d 1021 (1992)

    Encroachments on conveyed airspace are actionable as trespass, but de minimis variations and the lack of demonstrable harm can preclude injunctive or monetary relief.

    Summary

    Wing Ming Properties sued Mott Operating Corp. for trespass, alleging that new rooftop air-conditioning equipment and parapets erected by a sublessee encroached on airspace Wing Ming acquired in a 1973 conveyance. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the suit, holding that while development rights were conveyed, the new structures were excluded from Floor Area Ratio (FAR) calculations, thus not affecting those rights. Further, any physical encroachment on the conveyed airspace was considered de minimis, and Wing Ming failed to demonstrate any actual harm or diminution in property value resulting from the slight variations. Therefore, neither injunctive nor monetary relief was warranted.

    Facts

    In 1973, Mott, Kaplan, Chu, and Tam conveyed the airspace above a building at 5 Chatham Square in Manhattan to Wing Ming’s predecessor. Mott et al. retained the right to maintain an existing rooftop air-conditioning unit and room. Wing Ming’s predecessor intended to transfer unused development rights (FAR) to a contiguous building. In 1985, Kaplan subleased the property to the Bank of Central Asia (BCA), allowing BCA to use the roof for HVAC equipment and alter the facade. BCA removed the old equipment, installed new equipment, and built parapet walls extending over the rooftop.

    Procedural History

    Wing Ming, as successor in interest, sued for trespass. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the new rooftop air-conditioning equipment and parapets erected by BCA constituted a trespass on Wing Ming’s conveyed rooftop airspace, entitling Wing Ming to injunctive or monetary relief.

    Holding

    No, because the new rooftop structures did not affect Wing Ming’s development rights (FAR), and any physical encroachment was de minimis with no demonstrable harm. Therefore, neither injunctive nor monetary relief is warranted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower courts that no trespass occurred that warranted relief. The new structures were excluded from FAR calculations under New York City Zoning Resolution § 12-10, meaning Wing Ming’s development rights were unaffected. More importantly, the court found that any physical intrusion into the conveyed airspace was minimal. The court stated, “The variations between the air-conditioning unit and room existing at the time of the 1973 conveyance and the replacement unit and ducts subsequently erected by BCA, and the extent to which the newly constructed parapets rise above the elevation plane of the conveyed airspace, are de minimis at best.” The court emphasized that Wing Ming had not demonstrated that these slight variations negatively impacted its property value. This lack of demonstrated harm was crucial to the decision. Even if a technical trespass occurred, the principle of de minimis non curat lex (the law does not concern itself with trifles) applied, precluding the need for injunctive or monetary relief. The court implicitly acknowledged the conveyance of the airspace property right, but focused on the lack of substantial interference and provable damages. The court emphasized a practical approach, requiring demonstrable harm to justify legal intervention in property disputes.

  • People v. Blim, 63 N.Y.2d 718 (1984): Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses When Evidence Supports It

    People v. Blim, 63 N.Y.2d 718 (1984)

    A court must instruct the jury on a lesser included offense if a reasonable view of the evidence would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of burglary. At trial, the court denied the defense’s request to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering a new trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the jury should have been instructed on the lesser-included offense because, based on the defendant’s intoxication, a reasonable jury could have concluded that he committed trespass but lacked the specific intent required for burglary. The court emphasized that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant when determining whether to give a lesser included offense instruction.

    Facts

    Shortly after midnight on December 18, 1979, police arrested the defendant as he fled from an auto supply store. He was charged with third-degree burglary. The defendant testified that he had been drinking heavily in the 12 hours leading up to his arrest and did not remember being at the store. Other witnesses corroborated the defendant’s intoxicated state on the evening of his arrest and immediately thereafter.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defense’s request to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of third-degree criminal trespass. The jury convicted the defendant of burglary. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, stating the reversal was based on the law, even though the order mentioned the facts. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass in the third degree, given the evidence presented at trial regarding the defendant’s intoxication.

    Holding

    Yes, because a reasonable jury could have concluded that the defendant committed the act of trespass but, due to intoxication, lacked the specific intent required for a burglary conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that trespass in the third degree is a lesser-included offense of burglary in the third degree, citing People v. Henderson, 41 N.Y.2d 233, 235. The court stated the rule: “the trespass count should have been charged if, under any reasonable view of the evidence, a jury could find that defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater (see CPL 300.50, subds 1, 2; see, also, People v. Scarborough, 49 NY2d 364; People v. Johnson, 45 NY2d 546).” The court emphasized that when determining whether a reasonable view of the evidence exists, it must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, citing People v. Shuman, 37 N.Y.2d 302. The Court reasoned that the jury could have found that the defendant knowingly entered or remained unlawfully in the building (committing trespass) but also concluded that he was too intoxicated to form the specific intent to commit a crime within the building, which is a prerequisite for burglary. Therefore, it was error to refuse the lesser-included offense instruction. The court implied that the Appellate Division correctly identified the error of law, despite also alluding to facts in their decision, and affirmed their decision to order a new trial.

  • O’Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353 (1981): Res Judicata and Notice of Claim Requirements in Property Disputes

    O’Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353 (1981)

    A property owner cannot bring a second lawsuit for trespass based on the same conduct alleged in a prior unsuccessful action for de facto appropriation; moreover, a timely and sufficient notice of claim is a prerequisite to bringing a tort claim against a municipality.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs, property owners in Syracuse, initially sued the city for de facto appropriation, alleging the city’s actions interfered with their property rights. After losing that suit, they filed a new complaint alleging trespass based on the same conduct. The New York Court of Appeals held that res judicata barred the trespass claim to the extent it relied on the same facts as the prior appropriation claim. The court further held that general allegations of trespass occurring after the first lawsuit were barred due to the plaintiffs’ failure to file a timely and sufficient notice of claim as required by New York law. The court emphasized the importance of preventing repetitive litigation based on the same factual nucleus and ensuring municipalities have adequate notice to investigate claims.

    Facts

    The O’Briens owned property in Syracuse subject to urban rehabilitation. In 1973, they sued the city, alleging various actions constituted a de facto appropriation of their property. These actions by the city formed the basis of their claim that the city had effectively taken their property without formally condemning it. The initial lawsuit was dismissed after a non-jury trial, a decision affirmed by the Appellate Division. In 1978, the O’Briens filed a new complaint, restating the previous allegations and adding that the city took the property via tax deed in 1977. This new complaint also included general claims of trespass from 1967 to 1978, alleging unlawful intrusions and property damage.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially denied the city’s motion to dismiss the trespass complaint, finding res judicata inapplicable because the elements of proof differed between de facto appropriation and trespass. The court also determined the action was timely based on the 1977 tax deed. However, the Appellate Division reversed, holding the entire action was barred by res judicata. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the doctrine of res judicata bars a subsequent action for trespass when a prior action for de facto appropriation, based on the same conduct, was unsuccessful?

    2. Whether general allegations of trespass against a municipality are barred by failure to serve a timely and sufficient notice of claim as required by New York General Municipal Law?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because under the transactional analysis approach to res judicata, all claims arising from the same transaction or series of transactions are barred once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, even if based on different legal theories.

    2. Yes, because a notice of claim must provide sufficient information to enable the municipality to investigate the claim, and the plaintiffs’ notice failed to specify the time, place, and manner of the alleged trespassory acts beyond those already litigated in the first suit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the transactional analysis approach to res judicata, stating, “[O]nce a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy.” The court found that the conduct underlying the 1973 de facto appropriation suit was the same conduct forming the basis of the trespass claim. The court characterized de facto appropriation as “an aggravated form of trespass,” where the key distinction lies in the egregiousness of the trespass. The court explicitly overruled Smith v. Kirkpatrick (305 NY 66) to the extent it suggested otherwise.

    Regarding the notice of claim, the court emphasized that General Municipal Law § 50-e requires a notice to state “the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claims arose.” The court found the notice of claim insufficient because it only referenced the acts underlying the 1973 proceeding, failing to provide the city with adequate information to investigate the new trespass allegations. Therefore, the failure to provide proper notice also barred the second action. The court noted the importance of proper notice: “The test of the notice’s sufficiency is whether it includes information sufficient to enable the city to investigate the claim”.

  • People v. Bush, 39 N.Y.2d 529 (1976): Picketing on Private Property and Federal Labor Law Preemption

    People v. Bush, 39 N.Y.2d 529 (1976)

    Picketing on private property is not automatically protected by the First Amendment and may be subject to state criminal trespass laws, and state court jurisdiction is not necessarily preempted by federal labor law if the picketing involves trespassing conduct.

    Summary

    Union members picketed in front of stores selling their employer’s products, inside the cart corrals on private property. They were arrested for criminal trespass after refusing to move to a nearby parking lot. The New York Court of Appeals held that the picketing was not protected by the First Amendment or federal labor law because the union members were trespassing and interfering with customer access. The court affirmed the convictions, finding that the state’s interest in preventing trespass outweighed the union’s right to picket on private property, especially when reasonable alternative locations were offered.

    Facts

    Defendants, employees of Lorenz Schneider Co., Inc. (Wise Potato Chips distributor) and members of the Independent Routeman’s Association, engaged in a labor dispute with Schneider. The defendants picketed several stores that sold Wise products obtained from Schneider. The picketing took place in the cart corrals, areas directly in front of store entrances fenced off by steel railings. Pickets carried signs urging customers not to buy Wise products and chanted loudly. Store managers requested the pickets move to the parking lot driveway; police offered a barricaded area nearby. The pickets refused, claiming a right to picket on private property, leading to their arrest for criminal trespass.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of criminal trespass in a lower court and received unconditional discharges. The Appellate Term upheld the convictions. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether picketing by union members in front of a store selling their employer’s products is protected under the First Amendment when it takes place on private property.
    2. Whether the jurisdiction of state courts over conduct constituting a violation of the state’s criminal trespass statute is preempted by federal labor law.

    Holding

    1. No, because the right to picket on private property is not absolute and can be restricted when it interferes with property rights and access to businesses.
    2. No, because the state has a legitimate interest in enforcing its criminal trespass laws, which is not necessarily preempted by federal labor law, especially when the picketing involves conduct beyond protected speech.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the Supreme Court had previously addressed picketing on private property in cases like Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, subsequent decisions, particularly Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., clarified that private property rights generally supersede First Amendment rights unless the property functions as a complete substitute for a traditional public forum, like a company town as in Marsh v. Alabama. Here, the court emphasized that the pickets were asked to move due to their trespassing conduct, not because of their message. The court cited established precedent affirming states’ power to regulate the conduct aspects of picketing, even on public property, citing Cox v. New Hampshire. Therefore, this power extends a fortiori to private property.

    Regarding preemption, the court distinguished San Diego Unions v. Garmon, noting that Garmon and its progeny primarily addressed state attempts to regulate the economic aspects of labor disputes or internal union activities, not trespass. The court cited Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, implying that a state court ruling focused solely on trespassing conduct would not be preempted. The court emphasized that unions cannot unilaterally decide to invade private property. The court noted the NLRB could potentially grant access to private property for picketing under certain circumstances, citing N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., which balances employee rights with private property rights. The court emphasized that the union should have ascertained their rights through the NLRB before trespassing, as in Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., where the union peacefully departed and sought an NLRB order. The court concluded that the union’s actions conflicted with the state’s police powers because they failed to determine their rights in advance and insisted on picketing on private property after being asked to move. The court found the requests by store managers and police to be reasonable, and that there was no attempt to ban picketing altogether.

  • Bronxville Palmer, Ltd. v. State of New York, 18 N.Y.2d 560 (1966): Res Judicata and Derivative Liability in Trespass Claims

    18 N.Y.2d 560 (1966)

    A judgment in favor of a contractor in a trespass action, based on the contractor acting under the state’s direction, can bar a subsequent claim against the state for the same trespass under the doctrine of res judicata, provided the prior judgment actually determined the contractor committed no actionable wrong.

    Summary

    Bronxville Palmer sued the State of New York for trespass, alleging damage to their property during the construction of a parkway. A prior lawsuit against the contractors for the same trespass had resulted in a judgment for the contractors. The Court of Appeals held that the prior judgment in favor of the contractors barred the claim against the State under the doctrine of res judicata. The court reasoned that the State’s liability was derivative of the contractors’ actions; if the contractors were found not liable for trespass, the State could not be held liable for the same acts. The critical factor was whether the prior judgment actually determined the contractors committed no actionable trespass.

    Facts

    Claimant owned an apartment building in Yonkers.
    During the Sprain Brook Parkway construction, piles were allegedly driven onto the claimant’s land, causing damage to the building.
    Claimant previously sued the general and special contractors for the same trespass and damages in Supreme Court.
    The Supreme Court action resulted in a judgment dismissing the complaint on the merits.

    Procedural History

    Bronxville Palmer filed claims against the State of New York in the Court of Claims.
    The State moved to dismiss the claims based on the prior judgment in favor of the contractors, arguing res judicata.
    The Appellate Division dismissed the claims, holding that the prior judgment was res judicata.
    Bronxville Palmer appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a judgment in favor of contractors in a prior trespass action, based on the same physical acts, bars a subsequent claim against the State for the same trespass under the doctrine of res judicata.

    Holding

    Yes, because the State’s liability is derivative of the contractors’ actions, and a prior adjudication that the contractors committed no actionable wrong inures to the benefit of the State, provided the prior judgment actually determined the contractors committed no actionable trespass.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of res judicata, which prevents a party from relitigating issues that have already been decided in a prior action. The court emphasized that the State’s liability for trespass was derivative of the contractors’ actions. If the contractors were found not liable for trespass, the State could not be held liable for the same acts.
    The court noted that the burden of establishing res judicata is on the party asserting it (here, the State). The State met this burden by demonstrating that the prior judgment determined the contractors were not responsible for trespass.
    However, the court acknowledged an exception: if the prior judgment was based on a finding that the contractors acted under compulsion by the State, or that the State was solely responsible, then res judicata would not apply. The claimant argued that the jury in the Supreme Court action was instructed to decide “who was to blame, the contractors or the State”.
    But the Court found that the claimant failed to demonstrate that the prior adjudication was based on a theory different from the trespass claim. Extracts from the jury charge did not show that the jury was instructed to find for the contractors if they acted under the State’s compulsion. The court relied on the pleadings and the judgment itself, which indicated that the issue of trespass was decided against the claimant.
    Judge Keating’s concurrence emphasized that trespass is an intentional tort, and the contractors’ motive or justification is irrelevant. The only issue is whether the contractors went on the claimant’s land. If the jury was improperly instructed, the claimant’s remedy was to appeal the prior judgment.
    Judge Van Voorhis dissented, arguing that the prior judgment excluded the issue of the State’s liability. The jury could have found the contractors not liable even if there was a trespass, if they acted under the State’s direction. Therefore, the prior judgment did not decide that there was no trespass by the State, and res judicata should not apply. He emphasized that “the essence of res judicata is that the controlling issue, whether of fact or of law, has been decided between the parties by a competent tribunal.”

  • 509 Sixth Avenue Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority, 15 N.Y.2d 48 (1964): Statute of Limitations for Underground Trespass

    509 Sixth Avenue Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority, 15 N.Y.2d 48 (1964)

    An unlawful encroachment, even if underground, constitutes a continuing trespass that gives rise to successive causes of action until title or an easement is acquired by operation of law.

    Summary

    509 Sixth Avenue Corp. sued the City of New York and the New York City Transit Authority for trespass after discovering an underground subway encroachment while excavating its property. The defendants moved to dismiss based on the three-year statute of limitations for injury to property. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts, holding that the encroachment was a continuing trespass, not a permanent one. Therefore, each day the encroachment continued created a new cause of action, and the statute of limitations had not run on the claim. The court distinguished a permanent structure from a permanent trespass, emphasizing that New York law treats unlawful encroachments as continuous trespasses. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

    Facts

    Plaintiff owned premises at 509/511 Avenue of the Americas and 103/105 West 13th Street in Manhattan. While excavating for a 16-story apartment building in March 1960, the plaintiff discovered an underground encroachment by the Sixth Avenue Subway, completed in 1939, at a depth of approximately ten feet. The plaintiff claimed damages because it had to redesign its substructure and foundations, lost basement space, and incurred increased construction costs due to the encroachment.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the City of New York and the New York City Transit Authority. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the three-year statute of limitations for injuries to real property barred the action. Special Term granted the defendants’ motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the three-year statute of limitations for injury to property applies to an underground trespass, such that the cause of action accrued when the trespass was initially committed, or whether it constitutes a continuing trespass giving rise to successive causes of action.

    Holding

    Yes, the encroachment constitutes a continuing trespass because New York law characterizes unlawful encroachments as continuous trespasses giving rise to successive causes of action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that under New York law, an unlawful encroachment is considered a continuing trespass, giving rise to successive causes of action. The court distinguished its prior holding in Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., explaining that while a cause of action typically accrues upon the violation of a legal right, regardless of actual pecuniary damage, this principle does not apply to continuing trespasses. The court rejected the argument that the lack of knowledge of the trespass prevented the cause of action from accruing in 1939, stating, “Except in cases of fraud where the statute expressly provides otherwise, the statutory period of limitations begins to run from the time when liability for wrong has arisen even though the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of the wrong or injury.” However, even if the trespass were considered constructive fraud, the action would still be timely under the ten-year statute of limitations for fraud actions. The court emphasized that New York law differed from the California rule, which treats permanent structures as creating permanent trespasses, giving rise to a single cause of action. The Court stated, “From the above, the New York rule is readily perceived: an encroaching structure is a continuing trespass which gives rise to successive causes of action, except where barred by acquisition of title or an easement by operation of law.” Since the case was before the court on a motion to dismiss, the possibility of acquiring title by adverse possession was not considered. The court specifically noted that it was not addressing other grounds urged for dismissal, including whether the complaint stated a cause of action against the Transit Authority.