New York Law Review

Tag: Traffic Signs

  • Nowlin v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 81 (1993): Municipal Liability for Negligent Placement of Traffic Signs

    Nowlin v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 81 (1993)

    A municipality can be held liable for injuries resulting from its negligent placement or maintenance of traffic control devices, even on a state-owned highway within the municipality’s jurisdiction, if the municipality undertook the duty to place such signs.

    Summary

    The case concerns a car accident on the Henry Hudson Parkway in New York City. The plaintiff, a passenger, was severely injured when the driver failed to negotiate a curve and crashed. The plaintiff sued both the driver and the City of New York, alleging that the City negligently placed warning signs. The city argued that sign placement was solely the state’s responsibility. The Court of Appeals held that the City could be liable because it had assumed responsibility for sign placement and did so negligently, creating a dangerous condition. The court affirmed the judgment against the City, finding that the City’s negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Facts

    In August 1983, Andre Robertson, driving on the Henry Hudson Parkway in New York City, crashed his car into highway barriers while negotiating a curve, injuring his passenger, the plaintiff. The Parkway has a “reverse-S” curve that, at night, appears to be a continuous straightaway due to the placement of light posts. The City’s plan called for a “reverse” warning sign and a speed limit sign to be placed 300 feet before the curve. However, in 1978, City employees mistakenly placed these signs at the beginning of the curve. The City was aware that this curve was a hazardous location with a history of accidents.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued Robertson and the City, alleging negligence. The trial court found both defendants liable, apportioning 67% of the liability to the City and 33% to Robertson. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a new trial on damages unless the plaintiff stipulated to a reduced award. The plaintiff stipulated, and an amended judgment was entered. The City appealed the decision arguing it lacked responsibility for signage.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City of New York can be held liable for negligent placement of warning signs on the Henry Hudson Parkway, a state-owned arterial highway within the City’s jurisdiction, when the City undertook the duty to place such signs.

    Holding

    Yes, because the City undertook the duty to plan and place the signs, and its negligent placement created a dangerous condition that proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Henry Hudson Parkway is a State arterial highway, which usually involves shared responsibility between the State and the locality, Article XII-B of the Highway Law does not relieve the City of its obligation to maintain the highway within its jurisdiction safely. The court cited Highway Law § 349-b, emphasizing the intent to preserve the powers and rights of cities in the modernization and construction of arterial highways. The court stated that the City planned where new signs should be placed and then placed those signs. Because the City undertook this duty, it had to perform it non-negligently. The court quoted Moch Co. v Rensselaer Water Co., 247 NY 160, 167, stating the “hand once set to a task may not always be withdrawn with impunity though liability would fail if it had never been applied at all”.

    The court distinguished Thompson v City of New York, 78 NY2d 682, where the City was found not liable because the plaintiff failed to show the City made a safe situation dangerous. Here, the court explained, the road condition was hazardous from the outset, and the City undertook to make it safe but failed to do so. The court rejected the City’s argument that Robertson’s speeding was the sole cause of the accident, reaffirming that proximate cause is a jury question. It upheld the jury’s finding that the negligence of both the City and Robertson contributed to the accident.

  • Doremus v. Incorporated Village of Lynbrook, 18 N.Y.2d 362 (1966): Scope of Prior Written Notice Requirement for Village Liability

    Doremus v. Incorporated Village of Lynbrook, 18 N.Y.2d 362 (1966)

    A village’s statutory requirement of prior written notice for defects applies only to physical conditions of streets and sidewalks, not to malfunctioning traffic signs.

    Summary

    Plaintiff Doremus sued the Village of Lynbrook for negligence after a car accident allegedly caused by a malfunctioning stop sign. The Village moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff failed to allege prior written notice of the defect as required by Section 341-a of the Village Law. The lower courts granted the motion, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prior written notice requirement applied only to physical defects in streets and sidewalks, not to malfunctioning traffic signs. The Court reasoned that the statute should be narrowly construed as it is in derogation of common law.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Doremus was injured in a car accident at an intersection in the Village of Lynbrook. The plaintiff alleged the accident was caused by the Village’s negligence in failing to maintain a working stop sign at the intersection. The complaint stated: “That the negligence of the defendant, The Incorporated Village of Lynbrook, consisted of failing to keep in good working order and failing to repair a stop sign on the southeast corner of Walnut Street and Earle Avenue in the aforesaid Incorporated Village of Lynbrook.” The plaintiff did not allege that the Village had received prior written notice of the defective stop sign.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the Village’s motion to dismiss the complaint based on the plaintiff’s failure to allege prior written notice as required by Section 341-a of the Village Law. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, with two justices dissenting. The plaintiff then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Section 341-a of the Village Law, requiring prior written notice of defective conditions, applies to a claim of negligence based on a malfunctioning or missing traffic sign.

    Holding

    No, because Section 341-a applies only to physical defects in the surface of streets, highways, bridges, culverts, sidewalks, or crosswalks, and does not extend to claims based on a failure to maintain traffic signs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Section 341-a should be read strictly and applies only to physical defects in the surface of streets and sidewalks. The court emphasized that the statute is “in derogation of the common law” and its scope should not be extended beyond its plain meaning. The court stated that the statute’s language “seems to refer to actual physical defects in the surface of a street, highway, bridge, culvert, sidewalk or crosswalk and the reference to snow and ice seems to confirm this.” The court also noted that when the statute was adopted in 1927, stop signs were not as prevalent, suggesting the legislature did not intend for the statute to cover malfunctioning traffic signs.

    The court distinguished the case from Canepa v. State of New York, 306 N.Y. 272, which held that the State could be liable for negligence in failing to provide adequate warning signs, because that case did not involve Section 341-a. The court concluded that the purpose of Section 341-a was to exempt villages from liability for “holes and breaks of a kind which do not immediately come to the attention of the village officers unless they are given actual notice thereof.”