In re Norman D., 3 N.Y.3d 152 (2004)

An insanity acquittee’s track status, as determined by the initial commitment order, governs the acquittee’s level of supervision and can be overturned only on appeal from that order, not by means of a rehearing and review.

Summary

Norman D. was designated a “track one” insanity acquittee after being found not responsible for arson due to mental disease. He sought a rehearing and review, arguing that since he was now mentally ill but not suffering from a dangerous mental disorder, his track status should be changed to track two. The Court of Appeals held that track status, determined by the initial commitment order, can only be challenged via appeal of that initial order, not through a subsequent rehearing and review. The court reasoned that the rehearing and review assesses the acquittee’s current mental state, while track status is determined closest to the time of the crime to ensure public safety based on the acquittee’s potential dangerousness at that time.

Facts

Norman D. set fire to his family’s trailer home in April 1997.

In February 1998, he pleaded not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect.

In June 1998, after an initial hearing, the court determined he suffered from a dangerous mental disorder and designated him a “track one” insanity acquittee, remanding him to a secure psychiatric facility.

In July 1998, Norman D. petitioned for a rehearing and review of his commitment order.

By April 2001, all parties agreed that Norman D. was no longer suffering from a dangerous mental disorder, but was mentally ill.

Procedural History

Following his plea, the County Court designated Norman D. as a track one acquittee after an initial hearing.

Norman D. sought a rehearing and review of this commitment order.

Supreme Court upheld the original track one designation, finding it supported by credible evidence, even though Norman D. no longer suffered from a dangerous mental disorder.

The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the rehearing and review proceeding was not the appropriate vehicle for reviewing track status.

The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether an insanity acquittee’s track status can be changed based on a rehearing and review under CPL 330.20 (16) when the acquittee is later determined to be mentally ill but no longer suffering from a dangerous mental disorder.

Holding

No, because track status is determined by the initial commitment order and can only be challenged on appeal from that order, not through a rehearing and review.

Court’s Reasoning

The court emphasized that track status designation is unique to insanity acquittees and is critical in determining the level of judicial and prosecutorial involvement in decisions regarding confinement, transfer, and release. A track one designation subjects the acquittee to ongoing court supervision and requires a court order for any transfer to a nonsecure facility, furlough, release, or discharge. Track two status places the acquittee under the Commissioner of Mental Health’s supervision, making it less restrictive.

The court outlined the two ways an acquittee can challenge orders affecting their liberty: a rehearing and review or seeking leave to appeal. The rehearing and review is a de novo evidentiary proceeding assessing the acquittee’s current mental state, ensuring that the supervision conditions are appropriate at the time of the new proceeding. An appeal, however, reviews the lower court’s determination based on the record at the time of the earlier proceeding.

The court stated that challenging the original track status is permissible only through the appeal process. The court reasoned that the track status is fixed at the initial commitment hearing, closest in time to the crime, to best protect the public welfare and the acquittee’s safety. As the court noted, an acquittee “may seek permission to appeal [his or her track status] to an intermediate court, which has the power to modify the acquittee’s track status if the evidence presented at the initial commitment hearing does not support a finding of dangerousness. However, the rehearing and review proceeding…is not designed as a substitute for appellate review of the initial commitment order.” (309 AD2d at 149-150).