New York Law Review

Tag: Town of Riverhead

  • Town of Riverhead v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, 21 N.Y.3d 183 (2013): Standing to Challenge Agency Regulations Based on Procedural Violations

    21 N.Y.3d 183 (2013)

    A party has standing to challenge agency regulations based on procedural violations if they have a concrete interest affected by the agency’s failure to follow procedure and the asserted statutory provisions are designed to protect that interest.

    Summary

    The Town of Riverhead and its Community Development Agency challenged amendments to the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) regulations regarding endangered and threatened species, alleging both procedural flaws and substantive defects. The New York Court of Appeals held that Riverhead had standing to pursue claims based on procedural violations concerning the failure to consult with the State Environmental Board, conduct public hearings, and properly analyze regulatory impacts. However, the Court found that Riverhead lacked standing to pursue substantive claims because they had not yet suffered concrete harm from the regulations’ application.

    Facts

    The Town of Riverhead owned approximately 3,000 acres of land, formerly a Grumman facility, conveyed by the U.S. Navy for economic redevelopment. This land, known as Enterprise Park at Calverton (EPCAL), was habitat for endangered or threatened species. The DEC amended its regulations regarding incidental taking permits for such species, requiring mitigation plans with a net conservation benefit. Riverhead challenged these amendments, claiming both procedural and substantive violations.

    Procedural History

    Riverhead commenced a hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding/declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding, finding a lack of ripeness and standing. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding the procedural claims were ripe but that Riverhead lacked standing due to failure to allege injury-in-fact. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Riverhead has standing to challenge the DEC regulations based on procedural violations, specifically the failure to refer the proposed amendments to the State Environmental Board, hold public hearings, and properly evaluate and analyze the potential regulatory impacts.
    2. Whether Riverhead has standing to challenge the DEC regulations based on substantive claims, such as ultra vires, impermissible regulatory taking, and arbitrary and capricious action.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Riverhead, as a governmental entity owning land subject to the amended regulations, alleged a sufficient injury-in-fact by asserting a concrete interest in the matter regulated and a concrete injury from the agency’s failure to follow procedure. The asserted statutory provisions also set forth certain procedural steps to be followed when promulgating rules or regulations and the alleged violations, including the deprivation of an opportunity to be heard, constitute injuries to petitioners within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statutes.
    2. No, because Riverhead had not yet suffered a concrete injury from the application of the substantive provisions of the regulations. Until Riverhead submits a permit application and DEC imposes the requirements of the amended regulations to their detriment, allegations that they are affected by those requirements through an encumbrance on their property or the imposition of costs are too speculative.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that standing requires both an injury-in-fact and that the asserted injury falls within the zone of interests protected by the relevant statute. In land use matters, the injury must be different from that of the public at large. The Court acknowledged that standing rules should not be overly restrictive, particularly when shielding actions from judicial review.

    Regarding the procedural claims, the Court found that Riverhead had demonstrated a concrete interest and injury. The procedural violations deprived Riverhead of an adequate airing of the issues and impacts, as well as an accurate assessment of costs. The Court emphasized that denying standing would insulate the amendments from timely procedural challenge, which is against public interest. The Court cited Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, noting that a litigant can enforce procedural rights if the procedures are designed to protect a threatened concrete interest.

    The Court further reasoned that economic injury alone does not confer standing under SEQRA. Regarding the substantive claims, the Court found they were not ripe because there had been no final agency action inflicting concrete harm. “Until petitioners submit a permit application and DEC imposes the requirements of the amended regulations to their detriment, allegations that they are affected by those requirements through an encumbrance on their property or the imposition of costs are too speculative.”

    The court distinguished the case from situations where parties are merely alleging a failure to follow SAPA requirements, clarifying that the universe of potential plaintiffs is suitably delimited to those with a direct and concrete interest.

  • Town of Riverhead v. New York State Board of Real Property Services, 5 N.Y.3d 36 (2005): Limits on a Town’s Ability to Challenge Tax Equalization Rates

    5 N.Y.3d 36 (2005)

    A town lacks the legal capacity to challenge a segment special equalization rate set by the New York State Board of Real Property Services for another municipality within the same school district, as the relevant statute (RPTL 1218) expressly limits such challenges to the municipality for which the rate was established.

    Summary

    The Town of Riverhead challenged a segment special equalization rate granted to the Town of Southampton by the New York State Board of Real Property Services, arguing it unfairly shifted the school tax burden. The New York Court of Appeals held that Riverhead lacked the legal capacity to bring the challenge. The court relied on Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) § 1218, which explicitly allows only the municipality for which the equalization rate was established to initiate such a legal action. This decision underscores the principle that governmental entities’ right to sue is limited to powers expressly granted or necessarily implied by statute.

    Facts

    The Riverhead Central School District encompasses portions of the Towns of Riverhead, Southampton, and Brookhaven. Southampton applied for a segment special equalization rate, asserting that residential properties within the Riverhead Central School District segment were assessed at a higher percentage of market value compared to other areas of Southampton. The State Office of Real Property Services (ORPS) agreed, recommending a segment special equalization rate of 3.01% for the Southampton segment within the Riverhead school district, while Southampton’s general equalization rate was 2.37%. The State Board approved the special rate, which decreased Southampton’s tax levy share by 17.9% and increased the shares for Brookhaven and Riverhead by 4.3%.

    Procedural History

    Riverhead initially filed a CPLR Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, which was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Riverhead then commenced an Article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division dismissed the proceeding, holding that Riverhead lacked capacity and standing to sue. Riverhead appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a town that is part of a school district has the legal capacity to contest the segment special equalization rate set by the State Board of Real Property Services for another municipality in the same school district, given the limitations outlined in RPTL 1218.

    Holding

    No, because RPTL 1218 specifically limits the capacity to challenge the State Board’s determination to the municipality “for which the rate or rates were established.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, emphasizing that a governmental entity’s right to sue must be derived from enabling legislation or a concrete statutory predicate. The Court focused on RPTL 1218, which authorizes judicial review of state equalization rates and explicitly allows only the “county, city, town or village for which the rate or rates were established” to commence such an action. The court interpreted “rates” to encompass segment special equalization rates, finding they are a subset of state equalization rates. The Court reasoned that because RPTL 1218 specifically limits the capacity to challenge the State Board’s determination to the municipality for which the rate was established, Riverhead lacked the legal authority to challenge Southampton’s segment special equalization rate. The court applied the statutory interpretation principle that “where a law expressly describes a particular act, thing or person to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must he drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded.” In essence, the legislature’s explicit limitation in RPTL 1218 prevented the court from inferring capacity for other municipalities to sue. Because the Court determined Riverhead lacked the capacity to sue, it did not address the issue of standing.