Congregation Kollel Horav Yitzchok Isaac of Rockland, Inc. v. Town of Ramapo, 407 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1980)

A clergy residence may be exempt from property taxes under New York Real Property Tax Law § 462, even if the religious organization does not own other real property used exclusively for religious purposes.

Summary

Congregation Kollel Horav Yitzchok Isaac of Rockland, Inc., a religious corporation, sought a property tax exemption for the residence of its rabbi under New York Real Property Tax Law § 462. The Town of Ramapo denied the exemption because the congregation did not own the building where it held religious services, arguing that § 462 required the religious organization to also qualify for an exemption under § 421(1)(a) by owning property used exclusively for religious purposes. The New York Court of Appeals held that the clergy residence exemption under § 462 is independent of whether the religious organization owns separate property used for religious purposes. The court emphasized the history and purpose of the statute, which aims to support religious leaders and organizations, regardless of their financial capacity to own real property.

Facts

Congregation Kollel Horav Yitzchok Isaac of Rockland, Inc. is a religious corporation conducting daily religious services and Talmudic studies. Since 1973, the congregation has operated in leased or borrowed buildings within the Town of Ramapo. The congregation owns a single-family house used as a residence and office for its rabbi.

Procedural History

The Town of Ramapo’s tax assessor denied the congregation’s application for a real property tax exemption for the rabbi’s residence. The congregation initiated a proceeding to review the assessor’s determination. Special Term dismissed the proceeding, holding that the exemption under § 462 was conditional on the religious organization also qualifying for an exemption under § 421(1)(a) by owning property used for religious purposes. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the exemption. The Town of Ramapo appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether § 462 of the Real Property Tax Law should be interpreted to exempt a clergy residence from local property taxes when the religious organization that employs the clergy does not own other real property used exclusively for religious purposes.

Holding

Yes, because the legislative history and purpose of § 462 indicate that the clergy residence exemption is not contingent on the religious organization owning other property used for religious purposes. The phrase “In addition to” was included only to call attention to parallel provisions in the two statutes; nothing in the wording suggests any dependence of one statute on the other.

Court’s Reasoning

The court examined the history of § 462, noting the long-standing tradition of exempting church property from taxation. The court highlighted that the “In addition to” phrase, which the assessor argued created a dependency between § 462 and § 421(1)(a), did not appear in the original statute granting the clergy residence exemption. The court found that the addition of the phrase in later codifications was not intended to create a substantive change in the law. The court reasoned that the statute aims to support religious organizations, regardless of their financial ability to own property. “By no means do the statutory annals recited above suggest any legislative purpose to distinguish between a clergyman’s residence owned by a religious institution which leases its house of worship and one owned by a group with sufficient resources to purchase its sanctuary outright.” The court also rejected the argument that § 462 should be construed in accordance with the historical definition of “parsonage” requiring the residence to be appurtenant to an estate on which a church stands because the statute refers to “property * * * used by * * * officiating clergymen * * * for residential purposes”. Judge Jasen dissented, advocating for reversal based on the dissenting opinion at the Appellate Division, but the majority affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.