New York Law Review

Tag: Town of Cheektowaga

  • Buffalo Crushed Stone, Inc. v. Town of Cheektowaga, 13 N.Y.3d 88 (2009): Establishing Prior Nonconforming Use for Quarrying Operations

    13 N.Y.3d 88 (2009)

    A quarrying company can establish a prior nonconforming use for its entire property, including areas held in reserve for future excavation, if it demonstrates a clear intent to use the property for quarrying purposes, even if actual excavation has not occurred on every portion of the land before the enactment of restrictive zoning ordinances.

    Summary

    Buffalo Crushed Stone (BCS) sought a declaratory judgment that zoning restrictions were void on unexcavated portions of its quarry. The Town of Cheektowaga argued its zoning ordinances were enforceable. The Court of Appeals held that BCS demonstrated a prior nonconforming use for most of its property, including areas held as mineral reserves, due to its long-standing quarrying operations and expressed intent to utilize the entire property for that purpose. However, factual issues remained regarding specific subparcels, requiring further inquiry.

    Facts

    BCS and its predecessors operated a hard-rock quarry on approximately 280 acres in Cheektowaga for 80 years. The land was acquired between 1929 and 1992 and dedicated exclusively to quarrying. The disputed subparcels were primarily mineral reserves not yet actively quarried. The Town enacted zoning ordinances in 1942 and 1969. The 1969 ordinance permitted continuation of nonconforming activities but prohibited their extension or enlargement. BCS argued it had a prior nonconforming use right for the unexcavated areas.

    Procedural History

    BCS sued for a declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court ruled that some subparcels had nonconforming use status, while others did not. The Appellate Division modified, granting the Town summary judgment on additional subparcels. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division order, finding in favor of BCS on some parcels and remanding others for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether BCS established a prior nonconforming use for subparcel 5, despite the presence of Indian Road dividing it from actively quarried areas.
    2. Whether BCS established a prior nonconforming use for subparcel 25D, considering the timing of its acquisition and the existence of quarrying permits.
    3. Whether BCS established a prior nonconforming use for thoroughfares/roadway subparcels (28A/28B, 29A/29B, 30A/30B, 31-33), given their potential abandonment as public roadways.
    4. Whether BCS established a prior nonconforming use for subparcels 17C/25C and 12B/25I, based on preparations for quarrying before the 1969 ordinance.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the relatively narrow Indian Road did not negate the company’s long-standing intent to quarry both sides of the road.
    2. Remanded for factual determination, because the court needed to determine when BCS received legal title to the land.
    3. Remanded for factual determination, because the court needed to determine whether these thoroughfares were abandoned before the 1969 zoning ordinance.
    4. Yes, because BCS made its intent to quarry clear before 1969 by preparing the land and securing quarrying permits.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v. Weise, which recognized the unique nature of quarrying: “a quarry operator will not excavate his entire parcel of land at once, but will leave areas in reserve, virtually untouched until they are actually needed.” The Court found that BCS and its predecessors acquired the property exclusively for mining. The Court stated that for subparcel 5, the narrow roadway was not a physical separation and cited evidence of BCS’s intent to mine the area. As to subparcel 25D and the thoroughfares, issues of fact remained concerning when BCS obtained rights to the land and when the roadways were abandoned. For subparcels 17C/25C and 12B/25I, the court found that the actions of clearing the land and obtaining quarrying permits demonstrated an intent to quarry them in the future. The dissenting opinion argued that Indian Road separated parcel 5, making it ineligible for nonconforming use status and that a mining permit was required for parcel 25D to be lawfully mined.

  • Buffalo Sewer Authority v. Town of Cheektowaga, 20 N.Y.2d 47 (1967): Liability for Concentrated Surface Water Discharge

    Buffalo Sewer Authority v. Town of Cheektowaga, 20 N.Y.2d 47 (1967)

    An upper landowner is liable when it artificially collects and concentrates surface waters, discharging them in quantities beyond a natural outlet’s capacity onto a lower landowner’s property.

    Summary

    The Buffalo Sewer Authority sued the Town of Cheektowaga to enjoin the town’s discharge of storm water into the city’s sewer system. The town, an upper landowner, constructed a storm drainage system that concentrated surface water and discharged it into the city’s system, causing sewage to back up into city streets and homes. The court held that the town was liable because it artificially collected and concentrated surface waters, discharging them in quantities beyond the city’s system’s capacity. The injunction was modified to require the city to make a fair offer for joint action in storm water disposal.

    Facts

    The Town of Cheektowaga’s Drainage District No. 1 was adjacent to the City of Buffalo. Historically, surface waters from the town drained into the city. In 1958, the town constructed a storm drainage system for Tudor Place, which included receiving basins and pipes. The Buffalo Sewer Authority warned the town that connecting this system to the city’s combined sanitary and storm water sewage system would create a nuisance. The town connected the Tudor Place system without permission, resulting in sewage discharge into city streets and homes due to the city’s system being overburdened.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled in favor of the Buffalo Sewer Authority, issuing an injunction against the town. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision without opinion. The Town of Cheektowaga then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an upper landowner (the Town of Cheektowaga) is liable for damages when it constructs a drainage system that artificially collects and concentrates surface waters, discharging them onto a lower landowner’s property (the City of Buffalo) in quantities exceeding the capacity of the natural outlet, thereby causing a nuisance.

    Holding

    Yes, because the town artificially collected and concentrated large quantities of surface waters and discharged them into an outlet on the city’s land that was unable to carry them off. The court modified the order to direct a mandatory injunction contingent upon a fair offer by the city for joint action in storm water disposal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the distinction between the general drainage of surface waters and the use of natural waterways for discharge. While landowners have rights to improve their property regarding surface water, they cannot use pipes or ditches to drain water onto another’s property. Quoting Kossoff v. Rathgeb-Walsh, the court reiterated that owners have equal rights to improve their properties, but cannot drain water onto another’s property using pipes or ditches.

    The court distinguished this situation from one involving a natural watercourse, stating that even if the open ditch in question were considered a natural watercourse, the town could not artificially concentrate and discharge waters into the stream in quantities beyond its natural capacity. The court cited Byrnes v. City of Cohoes and other cases supporting this principle.

    The court found the town’s actions inappropriate because they did not involve merely preventing surface water from flowing onto its land, but rather actively collecting and concentrating water and discharging it onto the city’s property. The court recognized the need for a solution due to increasing suburban populations and real estate developments. The court modified the injunction, mandating a fair offer by the city for joint action with the town regarding storm water disposal. The court highlighted that “the town is left at the mercy of the city” without such a provision.

    The court remitted the matter to the Special Term, empowering it to determine the fairness and reasonableness of any proposals submitted by the city and to issue the injunction if the town refused to cooperate in a plan submitted by the city. The court retained jurisdiction until a plan went into operation, reflecting the equitable powers of the court to grant or withhold relief based on reasonable and equitable conditions.