Hubbard v. City of New York, 38 N.Y.2d 337 (1975)

When serving a notice of claim against a municipality by ordinary mail under General Municipal Law § 50-e, the notice must be actually received by the municipality within 90 days of the claim arising to constitute effective service.

Summary

This case addresses whether a notice of claim against New York City, sent by ordinary mail on the 90th day after the incident but received after the 90-day deadline, constitutes effective service under General Municipal Law § 50-e. The Court of Appeals held that the notice was not timely served. The statute, at the time, required personal or registered mail service within 90 days, but a saving clause allowed other methods if the notice was “actually received” within that period and the claimant was examined. Because the notice was received on the 96th day, the saving clause did not apply, and the complaint was properly dismissed. This case underscores the importance of strict compliance with statutory deadlines for claims against municipalities.

Facts

Plaintiff’s car collided with a New York City sanitation truck on November 12, 1969. On February 10, 1970, the 90th day after the accident, plaintiff sent a notice of claim to the city by ordinary mail. The city received the notice on February 16, 1970, which was 96 days after the incident. The city examined the plaintiff on January 20, 1971, but later moved to dismiss the complaint before trial, arguing that the notice had not been served within the statutory time limit.

Procedural History

The Special Term denied the city’s motion to dismiss. The Appellate Term affirmed the denial. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether a notice of claim sent to a municipality by ordinary mail on the 90th day after the accident, but received after the 90-day statutory period, constitutes effective service under General Municipal Law § 50-e, given that the city subsequently examined the claimant.

Holding

No, because under the applicable version of General Municipal Law § 50-e, for service by ordinary mail to be effective, the notice of claim must be actually received by the municipality within the 90-day statutory period, and in this case it was not.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court emphasized that General Municipal Law § 50-e was enacted to create a uniform system for tort claims against public corporations, acting as a condition precedent to liability, and functioning like a statute of limitations to protect municipalities from fraudulent and stale claims. The court acknowledged that the “saving clause” was added to the statute to prevent harsh results, such as those in Teresta v. City of New York, where a claim was dismissed for service by ordinary mail within the statutory period. The court stated that “service of such notice be made within the period prescribed by [the] section * * * and such party against whom the claim is made shall cause the claimant * * * to be examined in regard to such claim.” The court interpreted the saving clause as requiring two conditions: (1) actual receipt within the statutory period, and (2) examination of the claimant. Here, the notice was received on the 96th day, failing the first condition. The court rejected the argument that the city’s examination of the plaintiff cured the defective service because the statutory requirements are conjunctive. The court stated that the time and manner of service is “wholly one of legislative judgment.” The court also cited to the Judicial Conference Reports noting that, at the time, even service by certified mail was complete upon receipt, implying that service by ordinary mail could not be complete before receipt. The court also emphasized the significant differences between public corporations and private tortfeasors justifying the need for strict compliance with notice of claim requirements to allow the municipality to investigate claims while the facts are still fresh.