People ex rel. Knowles v. Smith, 54 N.Y.2d 259 (1981)

In parole revocation hearings, notice to the parolee’s attorney of record constitutes sufficient notice to the parolee, satisfying due process requirements, provided such notice is timely and allows the parolee to request detailed reports and prepare an application for relief.

Summary

Knowles, a parolee, was re-arrested and charged with unlawful imprisonment, leading to a parole violation warrant. Following a final revocation hearing, his parole was revoked. Knowles argued that the notification of the parole revocation decision was untimely and improperly served only on his attorney, not him personally, thus violating his due process rights. The New York Court of Appeals held that notice to the attorney of record constitutes sufficient notice to the parolee, satisfying due process, as long as it is timely and allows the parolee to seek further information and prepare a response. The court emphasized the practical aspects of administering parole regulations and the importance of balancing individual rights with administrative efficiency.

Facts

Knowles was initially sentenced to prison for robbery and sexual abuse, later paroled, and then re-incarcerated for violating parole conditions. He was paroled again but arrested shortly after for unlawful imprisonment. A parole violation warrant was issued. He requested an adjournment of his final revocation hearing until the criminal charges were resolved, eventually pleading guilty to attempted assault. After requesting his final revocation hearing, it was held on September 20, 1979. Forty-one days later, his attorney received a letter stating Knowles’ parole was revoked. Knowles claimed he did not receive the “Finding of Fact and Recommended Disposition” with his copy of the letter.

Procedural History

Knowles filed a pro se writ of habeas corpus challenging the parole revocation. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ, finding the delay was not excessive. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether the notification of a parole revocation decision solely to the parolee’s attorney, 41 days after the hearing, satisfies the due process requirement of timely and sufficient notice to the parolee.

Holding

Yes, because notice to the attorney of record constitutes sufficient notice to the parolee, satisfying due process, as long as it is timely and allows the parolee to seek further information and prepare a response.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that parolees have a constitutionally protected liberty interest. It emphasized that while promptness and accountability are required in parole revocation proceedings, the notification of the revocation hearing decision must be “as soon as practicable,” as stated in 9 NYCRR 8005.20(f). The court stated that the term “practicable” underscores the need to consider the realities of everyday administration. The court reasoned that “it is notification, not personal notification, that is a requirement of due process.” Absent legislation to the contrary, notice to the attorney serves as notice to the client. The court noted that Executive Law § 259-i(3)(f)(xi) requires the written statement to “be made available” to the alleged violator and counsel, which was satisfied by transmitting it to counsel. The court also pointed out that Knowles did not prove the original notice to his attorney lacked the enclosure, nor did he inquire with his attorney about it. The court found that reading the regulation as a preferred norm for giving notice was consistent with the statute and due process. The court reasoned that Knowles had timely notice of the revocation hearing outcome through his attorney, which enabled him to request a detailed report and prepare an application for relief, thus not unduly curtailing his rights. The court emphasized that each case must be judged on its facts to determine if notification was sent as soon as practicable, considering factors such as complexity, delay, validity of explanations, and practical necessity.