New York Law Review

Tag: Timely Hearing

  • People ex rel. Brown v. NYS Div. of Parole, 70 N.Y.2d 391 (1987): Parole Revocation Hearings and Statutory Time Limits

    People ex rel. Brown v. New York State Div. of Parole, 70 N.Y.2d 391 (1987)

    A parolee’s court appearance does not automatically excuse the Division of Parole’s failure to hold a timely revocation hearing unless the parolee deliberately manipulates the system; the Division must still demonstrate reasonable diligence within the statutory 90-day period.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases address whether the Division of Parole’s failure to hold final revocation hearings within 90 days of a probable cause determination can be excused when a parolee or their attorney is unavailable. In Brown, the parolee had a conflicting court appearance, while in Citro, the parolee’s attorney failed to appear. The court held that in Brown, the Division failed to meet its burden of showing that the parolee was not subject to its practical control, thus the delay was not excused. In Citro, the court found a portion of the delay was attributable to the parolee’s counsel’s failure to properly request an adjournment, but the remaining delay was the Division’s fault for failing to schedule the hearing on the next available date.

    Facts

    Brown: Robert Brown was paroled in April 1985, arrested in November 1985 for new crimes, and a parole violation warrant was issued. A final hearing was scheduled for February 4, 1986, then rescheduled to February 13 at the Division’s request. After another adjournment, Brown informed the Administrative Law Judge of a conflicting court appearance on February 25. The hearing was scheduled for February 24, but Brown was taken to his arraignment instead, without prior notice. The hearing was held on March 17, 1986, 108 days after the probable cause determination.

    Citro: Albert Citro was paroled in May 1983 and later charged with a parole violation. A final hearing was scheduled for August 13, 1985, but Citro was transferred facilities, leading to a rescheduled hearing on September 25, 1985 (86 days after the probable cause determination). Citro’s counsel didn’t appear on September 25, and the hearing was adjourned to October 9, 1985. Counsel claimed she notified the parole officer of the conflict but didn’t file a formal adjournment request.

    Procedural History

    Brown: The Supreme Court dismissed Brown’s habeas corpus petition challenging the timeliness of the hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Citro: The Special Term granted Citro’s habeas corpus petition and restored him to parole. The Appellate Division affirmed on different grounds, finding part of the delay chargeable to the parolee and part to the Division. The Court of Appeals granted the respondent leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. In Brown: Whether the Division of Parole should be excused for failing to afford the parolee a revocation hearing within the 90-day period because he was not subject to its “convenience and practical control” due to a conflicting court appearance.

    2. In Citro: Whether the adjournment of the revocation hearing from September 25, 1985, to October 9, 1985, should be chargeable to the Division of Parole, rendering the October 9, 1985, hearing untimely.

    Holding

    1. In Brown: No, because the parolee was within a facility amenable to the Division’s jurisdiction, and the Division failed to prove that the parolee’s nonappearance was attributable to any of the statutory exceptions or that the parolee was otherwise not subject to the practical control of the Division during the 90-day period.

    2. In Citro: Yes, in part. The delay from September 25 to October 2 was chargeable to the parolee, but the delay from October 2 to October 9 was chargeable to the Division, because the Division bypassed an earlier available hearing date without justification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Brown: The court reasoned that a parolee is subject to the Division’s control when in the custody of a correctional facility over which the Parole Board has jurisdiction. The Division had the responsibility to coordinate the hearing within the 90-day period. While parolees cannot abuse the system, Brown’s court appearance was not a deliberate manipulation. The court stated, “Executive Law § 259-i (3) (f) (i) reflects a legislative judgment that 90 days is sufficient time to overcome unexpected contingencies, such as court appearances, so long as the parolee is subject during that time to the Division’s practical control. The Division is not entitled to an extension based simply on a showing of its lack of fault.”

    Citro: The court held that the initial delay was due to counsel’s failure to comply with regulations for requesting an adjournment. However, the Division could not bypass an earlier available hearing date (October 2) without justification. Since the notice of the rescheduled hearing wasn’t mailed until October 2, counsel had no opportunity to obtain a shorter adjournment. The court stated that the Division cannot bypass an earlier available date at which a parolee’s counsel is willing and ready to proceed without establishing any justification for doing so.

  • People ex rel. Benedetti v. Warden, 61 N.Y.2d 920 (1984): Effect of Parolee’s Waiver on Hearing Obligations

    People ex rel. Benedetti v. Warden, 61 N.Y.2d 920 (1984)

    When a parolee knowingly and intelligently waives their right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing and the right to be present at the final hearing, the parole board is required to proceed with the final hearing in the parolee’s absence within the statutorily prescribed time period.

    Summary

    Benedetti, while on parole in New York, absconded to Mississippi and was imprisoned there. A parole violation warrant was lodged against him. He waived his right to a preliminary hearing and to be present at the final hearing, requesting the hearing be conducted in his absence. The parole board tried to secure his return from Mississippi, but failed. After Benedetti was paroled in Mississippi and returned to New York, Special Term annulled the parole violation warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Benedetti waived his rights, the parole board should have proceeded with the hearing in his absence within the statutory time frame. Failure to do so required dismissal of the warrant, regardless of whether Benedetti was within the board’s convenience and practical control.

    Facts

    Benedetti was on parole in New York State.
    He absconded to Mississippi, where he was convicted of a crime and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.
    On January 15, 1982, a parole violation warrant was lodged against Benedetti by the respondent.
    By letter dated February 1, 1982, Benedetti waived his right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing and his right to be present at the final hearing, requesting the hearing be conducted in his absence.
    The parole board corresponded with Mississippi officials for four months to try to secure Benedetti’s return for a hearing.
    Mississippi officials required an executive agreement between the Governors of New York and Mississippi, with New York paying for Benedetti’s transport and return to Mississippi.
    No further action was taken until May 1983, when Benedetti was paroled in Mississippi and returned to New York.

    Procedural History

    Benedetti applied on June 2, 1982, to have the parole violation warrant annulled and vacated.
    Special Term granted the application.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, citing People ex rel. Gonzales v Dalsheim, holding that the respondent had not shown that Benedetti was not within its convenience and practical control.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on different grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the parole board was required to proceed with a final parole revocation hearing in the absence of the parolee after the parolee knowingly and intelligently waived their right to be present at the hearing.

    Holding

    Yes, because Benedetti waived his rights to a preliminary hearing and to be present at the final hearing, and there was nothing to indicate that the waiver was not made knowingly and intelligently, the parole board was required to proceed with the hearing in Benedetti’s absence within the statutorily prescribed time period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that Benedetti’s waiver of his rights to a preliminary hearing and to be present at the final hearing was effective because there was no indication that it was not made knowingly and intelligently. Therefore, the parole board was obligated to proceed with the final hearing in Benedetti’s absence.
    The court emphasized that the parole board’s failure to conduct the hearing within the time period prescribed by Executive Law § 259-i required the parole violation warrant to be dismissed, citing People ex rel. Gonzales v Dalsheim. The court stated, “Inasmuch as there is nothing in the record to indicate that such waiver was not made knowingly and intelligently, the waiver was effective and there was nothing to prevent respondent from proceeding in petitioner’s absence. Indeed, it was required to proceed.”
    The court reasoned that because the hearing could have and should have been held in Benedetti’s absence, it was unnecessary to determine whether and when Benedetti came within the respondent’s convenience and practical control.

  • People ex rel. Wilson v. Dalsheim, 61 N.Y.2d 690 (1984): Parole Revocation Hearings and Interstate Detainers

    61 N.Y.2d 690 (1984)

    When a parolee is incarcerated in another state, the burden rests on New York parole authorities to demonstrate that they were unable to conduct timely parole revocation hearings because the parolee was not subject to their convenience and practical control, regardless of whether the Interstate Compact for parole supervision was formally invoked.

    Summary

    Wilson, a New York parolee, was incarcerated in Connecticut for a robbery conviction. New York issued a parole violation warrant but delayed the revocation hearing until after Wilson completed his Connecticut sentence. Wilson argued he was denied a timely hearing. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s dismissal, holding that the parole authorities had the burden to prove Wilson was not under their practical control, irrespective of formal Interstate Compact supervision. The case was remitted to determine if Wilson was subject to New York’s control while in Connecticut custody.

    Facts

    In 1976, Wilson was sentenced in New York for criminal sale of a controlled substance and paroled in 1977.
    In 1979, he was arrested and convicted of robbery in Connecticut, receiving a prison sentence.
    New York issued a parole violation warrant in July 1979 and sent it to Connecticut authorities.
    The New York parole board declared Wilson delinquent in October 1979, requesting his return upon release from Connecticut custody.
    No parole revocation hearings were held until after Wilson’s Connecticut parole in March 1982.

    Procedural History

    Wilson commenced an Article 78 proceeding in September 1981, arguing denial of a timely parole revocation hearing.
    Special Term dismissed the petition, finding Wilson not subject to New York parole authorities’ control because Connecticut had not accepted him for parole supervision under the Interstate Compact.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, distinguishing People ex rel. Gonzales v. Dalsheim, 52 N.Y.2d 9 (1980).
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Supreme Court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York parole authorities have a duty to provide a timely parole revocation hearing to a parolee incarcerated in another state, even if that state has not formally accepted supervision of the parolee under the Interstate Compact.
    Whether the burden rests on the parole authorities to demonstrate that a timely hearing was not possible because the parolee was not subject to their convenience and practical control.

    Holding

    Yes, because the burden rests upon the parole authorities in every instance in which timely hearings have not been held to demonstrate that they were unable to do so because the parolee was not subject to their convenience and practical control, irrespective of formal acceptance under the Interstate Compact.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on its prior holding in People ex rel. Gonzales v. Dalsheim, emphasizing that the parole authorities bear the burden of proving they could not conduct timely hearings because the parolee was not under their control. The court stated that “the burden rests upon the parole authorities in every instance in which timely hearings have not been held to demonstrate that they were unable to do so because the parolee was not subject to their convenience and practical control. A presumption alone cannot satisfy that burden.” The court rejected the argument that formal acceptance of supervision under the Interstate Compact was a prerequisite for triggering the duty to provide a timely hearing. The critical factor is whether the parolee was, in reality, subject to the convenience and practical control of New York parole authorities. Because no final judgement had been issued against the petitioner before Gonzales was handed down, Gonzales thus controls. The case was remitted to determine whether, despite the lack of formal Interstate Compact supervision, Wilson was nonetheless subject to New York’s control while incarcerated in Connecticut. This decision ensures that parolees are not denied their right to a timely hearing simply because of their incarceration in another state, placing the onus on parole authorities to actively demonstrate their inability to act promptly.

  • Matter of Saladeen v. Smith, 46 N.Y.2d 883 (1979): Timely Parole Revocation Hearings

    Matter of Saladeen v. Smith, 46 N.Y.2d 883 (1979)

    A parole eligibility hearing does not substitute for a timely final parole revocation hearing, and failure to hold such a hearing requires dismissal of parole violation charges.

    Summary

    Saladeen commenced an Article 78 proceeding to vacate parole violation charges. Although the violations allegedly occurred in 1973, no final revocation hearing was held by 1977 when the proceeding began. An eligibility hearing on a new conviction occurred in 1977, over four years after the alleged parole violations. The Court of Appeals held that the parole eligibility hearing did not render the failure to hold a final revocation hearing academic, as the eligibility hearing’s nature and scope differed significantly from a revocation hearing, and the failure to hold a timely revocation hearing mandated the dismissal of the parole violation charges.

    Facts

    The petitioner, Saladeen, was accused of parole violations in 1973.

    As of 1977, no final parole revocation hearing had been conducted regarding the 1973 alleged violations.

    In 1977, a parole eligibility hearing was conducted concerning a new conviction, more than four years after the initial alleged parole violations.

    Procedural History

    Saladeen initiated an Article 78 proceeding to vacate the parole violation charges.

    The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a parole eligibility hearing conducted on a new conviction can serve as a substitute for a final parole revocation hearing regarding earlier alleged parole violations.

    Holding

    No, because the parole eligibility hearing’s nature and scope are different, it cannot serve as a substitute for a final revocation hearing, and the failure to hold a timely revocation hearing requires dismissal of the parole violation charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the appeal was not moot because the parole violation charges could affect the petitioner’s maximum parole expiration date, even after release from prison. The court emphasized the distinct nature and scope of a parole eligibility hearing compared to a final revocation hearing. The Court stated, “Due to its different nature and scope, the eligibility hearing could not serve as a substitute for the final revocation hearing.” A timely final revocation hearing is crucial for addressing alleged parole violations. The Court relied on precedent, citing Matter of Piersma v Henderson, 44 NY2d 982 and People ex rel. Walsh v Vincent, 40 NY2d 1049, to support the holding that the failure to hold a timely revocation hearing necessitates the dismissal of the parole violation charges. The court also disapproved of any interpretation of People ex rel. Schmidt v La Vallee (39 NY2d 886) suggesting otherwise.