New York Law Review

Tag: Time, Place, and Manner Restriction

  • People v. Barton, 10 N.Y.3d 73 (2008): Constitutionality of Restrictions on Soliciting from Motorists

    10 N.Y.3d 73 (2008)

    A municipal ordinance prohibiting roadside solicitation from vehicle occupants is constitutional if it is content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leaves open ample alternative communication channels.

    Summary

    The City of Rochester enacted a law prohibiting solicitation from vehicle occupants on roadways. Defendant Barton was ticketed for violating this ordinance. He argued the law was overbroad, violating free speech protections. The City Court agreed, but the County Court reversed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the County Court’s decision, holding that the ordinance was a valid time, place, and manner restriction on speech. The Court found the ordinance content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve the significant government interest of traffic safety, and that it left open alternative means of communication.

    Facts

    Michael Barton was ticketed for violating Rochester City Code § 44-4(H), which prohibits soliciting from occupants of motor vehicles on a street or public place. The ordinance defines “solicit” as spoken, written, or gestured requests for money or anything of value. The City Council enacted the ordinance to protect people from harassment, maintain safe public spaces, ensure the free flow of traffic, and promote tourism and business, addressing increased panhandling and citizen complaints.

    Procedural History

    Barton moved to dismiss the charges in City Court, arguing the ordinance was overbroad and violated free speech rights. The City Court agreed and dismissed the charges. The County Court reversed, upholding the ordinance’s constitutionality. Barton appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Rochester City Code § 44-4(H), prohibiting solicitation from vehicle occupants, is an unconstitutionally overbroad restriction on free speech.

    Holding

    No, because the ordinance is a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction on speech that is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and leaves open ample alternative channels for communication.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the ordinance as a time, place, and manner restriction on speech. The court assumed, without deciding, that panhandling is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment. The court stated that even if Barton’s conduct was not protected, he could still challenge the law as overbroad on behalf of others whose protected expression might be chilled. The court found the law content-neutral because it was justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, promoting traffic safety by preventing driver distraction. The court emphasized the City Council’s intent to promote the free and safe flow of traffic, and the ban applied regardless of the solicitor’s message. The court stated that the ordinance was narrowly tailored, designed to address the specific problem of individuals seeking handouts from drivers, creating a hazard and slowing traffic. "[T]he requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation… So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest . . . the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government’s interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative." Finally, the Court noted that the ordinance left open ample alternative channels of communication, as it did not prohibit requests for things other than handouts or non-aggressive solicitation directed at pedestrians.

  • People v. Colon, 71 N.Y.2d 410 (1988): Locking Courtroom Doors During Jury Instructions and Public Trial Rights

    People v. Colon, 71 N.Y.2d 410 (1988)

    Locking courtroom doors during jury instructions to prevent disruption, while allowing those already present to remain, does not violate a defendant’s right to a public trial.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court’s practice of locking courtroom doors during jury instructions, preventing late entry and early exit, violated the defendant’s right to a public trial. The court held that this practice, intended to prevent disruption and ensure jury concentration, did not constitute a closure of the proceedings because it did not explicitly exclude anyone already present. The court distinguished this limited restriction from complete closures requiring specific findings and less restrictive alternatives, finding the trial judge’s action a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on access to the trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale and possession of cocaine. Before the jury charge, defense counsel objected to the trial judge’s practice of locking the courtroom doors during instructions. The judge explained this was to prevent distractions to the jury caused by spectators entering or leaving. The doors would remain locked for the duration of the charge. The defense argued this violated the defendant’s right to a public trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without addressing the courtroom closure issue. After the First Department ruled similarly in People v. Venters, the defendant moved for reargument, which was denied. Leave to appeal was granted by a Judge of the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether locking the courtroom doors during the Trial Judge’s charge to the jury — thereby precluding access to those who arrive after commencement of the charge, and prohibiting those who have elected to stay from leaving during its delivery — violates defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial.

    Holding

    No, because the practice is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction designed to prevent disruption and does not constitute a true closure of the courtroom.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the importance of the right to a public trial, tracing its roots to the abolition of the Star Chamber and emphasizing its role in ensuring fairness and public confidence in the judicial process. However, the court noted that this right is not absolute and must be balanced against other interests, such as ensuring a fair trial and protecting witnesses. The Court distinguished the act of locking the doors from a complete closure, which explicitly excludes members of the public. Instead, the Court characterized this action as a reasonable “time, place, and manner” restriction on access to the trial, analogous to restrictions on street use. The Court emphasized the importance of the jury charge, stating: “The charge to the jury is a solemn and comparatively complex phase of the trial requiring precision and concentration on the part of both the jury and the Trial Judge… It is during the charge that the jury is instructed on the law applicable to the case, the time they must master often difficult and interrelated principles”. The court reasoned that the need to maintain order and prevent disruption during this critical phase justified the limited restriction on access. The court also upheld the trial court’s decision to deny a challenge for cause regarding a prospective juror with relatives on the police force, finding no inherent bias.