New York Law Review

Tag: Tie Vote

  • Tall Trees Construction Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 97 N.Y.2d 86 (2001): Effect of Repeated Tie Votes on Variance Applications

    Tall Trees Construction Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 97 N.Y.2d 86 (2001)

    When a quorum of a zoning board of appeals is present and participates in a vote on a variance application, a vote of less than a majority of the board in favor of the application is deemed a denial of the variance.

    Summary

    Tall Trees Construction Corporation sought area variances from the Town of Huntington Zoning Board of Appeals to subdivide a property. After the Board repeatedly issued “no action” decisions due to tie votes, Tall Trees initiated Article 78 proceedings. The New York Court of Appeals held that repeated tie votes by a zoning board on a variance application, where a quorum is present and voting, effectively constitute a denial of the application. The Court further found that the denial in this specific case was arbitrary and capricious, given the evidence presented and the Board’s prior approvals of similar applications.

    Facts

    Tall Trees Construction Corporation applied to the Town of Huntington Zoning Board of Appeals for area variances to divide a 1.94-acre parcel into two lots and construct a home on each. Lawrence Lamanna, the vice-chair of the Board, owned property abutting the parcel in question, and therefore, abstained from voting. The initial vote resulted in two members voting to deny, two voting to grant, and two absent, leading to a “no action” determination. The Board reiterated the same “no-action” determination after being compelled to vote again by court order.

    Procedural History

    1. Tall Trees initially commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding after the first “no action” decision, seeking to annul the Board’s decision and compel the granting of the variances. The Supreme Court remitted the matter back to the Board.

    2. Following the Board’s second “no action” decision, Tall Trees commenced a second CPLR Article 78 proceeding. Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the Board’s second decision, and granted the variances.

    3. The Appellate Division reversed, remitting the matter to the Board for a new hearing, concluding that the Board’s vote was not a denial.

    4. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether repeated tie votes by a Zoning Board of Appeals on an application for area variances, where a quorum is present and participates in the voting, constitutes a denial of the application.

    Holding

    Yes, because General Construction Law § 41 allows valid action by a body as long as there is participation by a majority, and Town Law § 267-a(4) requires a concurring majority to “reverse” a determination or to “grant” a variance, but does not specify the same requirement for a denial. Therefore, failure to achieve a concurring majority to grant the variance results in a denial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a harmonious reading of General Construction Law § 41 and Town Law § 267-a(4) indicates that while a majority of the board must participate to exercise authority, a concurring majority is not required to deny a variance application. Town Law § 267-a(4) explicitly requires a concurring majority to “reverse” a determination or to “grant” a variance. The absence of such a requirement for denial implies that if a concurring vote does not exist to grant the application, it is necessarily denied.

    The Court explicitly rejected the prior holding in Matter of Walt Whitman Game Room v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, which had concluded that a tie vote constitutes non-action. The Court found that Walt Whitman‘s reliance on Matter of Squicciarini v Planning Bd. was misplaced, as Squicciarini involved a situation where a majority of the board did not participate in the vote, violating General Construction Law § 41.

    The Court also addressed the specific facts of the case, finding the Board’s denial of the variance to be arbitrary and capricious. Citing Matter of Sasso v Osgood, the Court reiterated the balancing test required when deciding on area variances, weighing the benefit to the applicant against the detriment to the community. The Court emphasized that the Board provided no factual findings to support its denial, and that the record contained unrefuted evidence that the variances would have minimal adverse impact on the neighborhood. Quoting Knight v Amelkin, the court stated, “ ‘[a] decision of an administrative agency which neither adheres to its own prior precedent nor indicates its reasons for reaching a different result on essentially the same facts is arbitrary and capricious.’ ” Given that similar applications had been approved in the past, the denial in this case was deemed arbitrary and capricious.

    The court found that the Board’s repeated tie votes, in effect, blocked the applicant’s right to judicial review and would leave the petitioner’s application in “zoning purgatory.” The Court held that the benefit of granting the variance was significant, the detriment to the community minimal, and that the Board had acted arbitrarily.

  • Tall Trees Construction Corp. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 97 N.Y.2d 86 (2001): Effect of Tie Votes on Variance Applications

    97 N.Y.2d 86 (2001)

    When a quorum of a Zoning Board of Appeals is present and participates in a vote on a variance application, a tie vote that fails to garner a majority to grant the application is deemed a denial.

    Summary

    Tall Trees Construction Corp. applied for area variances to subdivide a property. The Zoning Board of Appeals repeatedly deadlocked on the application. Tall Trees then initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding arguing the tie vote should be considered a denial. The New York Court of Appeals held that a tie vote by a zoning board, where a quorum is present and participates in the vote, is effectively a denial of the variance application. The Court also determined that the denial was arbitrary and capricious because the benefit to the applicant was significant while any detriment to the community was minimal, and similar applications had been approved in the past.

    Facts

    Tall Trees Construction Corp. sought area variances from the Town of Huntington Zoning Board of Appeals to divide a 1.94-acre parcel into two lots and construct a home on each. Lawrence Lamanna, the vice-chair of the Board, owned property abutting the parcel. The Board initially issued a “NO ACTION” decision after a vote of 2-2, with two members absent and Lamanna abstaining. After a court order to reconsider, the Board again issued a “NON-ACTION” determination based on the same vote.

    Procedural History

    Tall Trees initially commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding, and the Supreme Court remitted the matter to the Board for another vote. When the Board again deadlocked, Tall Trees initiated a contempt proceeding. The Supreme Court then granted the petition, annulled the Board’s second decision, and granted the variances. The Appellate Division reversed, remitting the matter for further proceedings, including a new hearing. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a tie vote by a Zoning Board of Appeals, where a quorum is present and participates in the vote, constitutes a denial of a variance application.

    Holding

    Yes, because although Town Law § 267-a(4) requires a concurring majority vote to grant a variance, it does not require the same majority vote concurrence for a denial. If no concurring vote of the majority exists to grant an application after participation and voting by a majority of the board, the application is denied.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that General Construction Law § 41 allows valid action by a body as long as there is participation by a majority of the whole number. Town Law § 267-a(4) mandates a concurring majority vote to reverse a determination or grant a variance, but conspicuously omits this requirement for denial. The Court harmonized these provisions by concluding that if a majority participates and votes, the absence of a majority vote to grant the application results in its denial. The Court rejected the prior holding in Matter of Walt Whitman Game Room v Zoning Bd. of Appeals that a tie vote is equivalent to nonaction because the Walt Whitman decision incorrectly relied on Matter of Squicciarini v Planning Bd. where there was no majority participation. The Court stated, “[w]e find it curious that this particular Zoning Board of Appeals has a history of `nonaction’ tie votes which, in effect, block an applicant’s right to judicial review.” The court found that the denial of the variance was arbitrary and capricious because the unrefuted evidence presented by Tall Trees demonstrated that the benefit of granting the variances was great, any detriment to the community was minimal, and nearly identical variance applications had been approved in the past. The Court cited the principle that “`[a] decision of an administrative agency which neither adheres to its own prior precedent nor indicates its reasons for reaching a different result on essentially the same facts is arbitrary and capricious.’”

  • Matter of Meyer v. Board of Trustees, 54 N.Y.2d 335 (1981): Standard of Review for Accidental Disability Benefits Determinations

    Matter of Meyer v. Board of Trustees, 54 N.Y.2d 335 (1981)

    When a board of trustees denies accidental disability benefits due to a tie vote, a court can only overturn that decision if the retiree is entitled to the greater benefits as a matter of law, meaning the disability was undeniably the result of a service-related accident.

    Summary

    Meyer, a police officer, sought accidental disability retirement benefits due to a 1971 car accident. The medical board initially denied his request, then later recommended ordinary disability, and finally accidental disability. The Board of Trustees rejected the final recommendation, citing Meyer’s medical history and the opinion of the chief surgeon, who believed Meyer’s condition was due to arthritis, not the accident. The court held that because the Board’s denial of accidental disability benefits resulted from a tie vote, the denial can only be overturned if the claimant is entitled to accidental disability as a matter of law, which was not the case here.

    Facts

    • Meyer, a NYC police officer since 1963, was in a car accident in 1971 and treated for contusions.
    • He returned to full duty after 11 days.
    • In 1979, he applied for accidental disability retirement related to the 1971 accident.
    • The Police Medical Board initially denied the request, citing degenerative changes due to “wear and tear.”
    • The Medical Board later recommended ordinary disability retirement, then accidental disability benefits.
    • The Board of Trustees rejected the accidental disability recommendation.
    • The Chief Surgeon believed Meyer’s condition was from arthritis, not the accident, noting Meyer’s short sick leave and subsequent years of full duty.

    Procedural History

    • Meyer commenced an Article 78 proceeding after the Board of Trustees denied accidental disability benefits.
    • Special Term vacated the Board’s determination and ordered accidental disability retirement benefits.
    • The Appellate Division reversed, reinstated the Board’s determination, finding it was not arbitrary.
    • The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    • Whether the Board of Trustees acted properly in denying Meyer accidental disability retirement benefits and granting him only an ordinary disability pension.
    • When the Board of Trustees denies accidental disability benefits because of a tie vote, what is the standard for judicial review of that decision?

    Holding

    • No, the Board of Trustees acted properly.
    • The denial of accidental disability benefits can be set aside only if the courts conclude that the retiree is entitled to the greater benefits as a matter of law; otherwise, the decision of the board must stand.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the Medical Board’s determination of disability is binding on the Board of Trustees, the Board of Trustees determines whether the disability resulted from a service-related accident. Ordinarily, the Board’s decision on the cause of disability is upheld unless unsupported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary and capricious.

    However, because the Board’s decision resulted from a tie vote, a different standard of review applies, as established in Matter of City of New York v. Schoeck. The court stated that the denial of accidental disability benefits due to a tie vote can be overturned only if the retiree is entitled to the greater benefits as a matter of law. “Unless it can be determined as a matter of law on the record that the disability was the natural and proximate result of a service-related accident, the decision of the board of trustees denying accidental disability benefits as a consequence of a tie vote must stand.”

    Based on the record, the court could not conclude that Meyer was entitled to accidental disability benefits as a matter of law. The Chief Surgeon’s opinion and Meyer’s medical history provided credible evidence supporting the Board’s decision. Therefore, the Board of Trustees’ denial was upheld. The key factor is whether the causal connection between the accident and disability is so clear that reasonable minds could not differ.