People v. Newton, 8 N.Y.3d 460 (2007)

Intoxication is not a defense to a crime when the crime does not require a specific mental state (mens rea), such as intent, because intoxication can only negate the formation of a specific intent.

Summary

Defendant was convicted of third-degree sodomy. At trial, the judge declined to instruct the jury that intoxication could be considered as a defense to the charge of third-degree sodomy, because that crime does not require a specific mental state. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because third-degree sodomy only requires that a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would have understood the victim’s words and acts as an expression of a lack of consent, the defendant’s actual subjective understanding is irrelevant, and thus evidence of intoxication is also irrelevant.

Facts

The defendant was accused of engaging in oral sex with a 19-year-old male. The victim allegedly did not resist or verbally communicate a lack of consent. The defendant claimed he perceived the act to be consensual. The defendant had been drinking beer for several hours before the incident.

Procedural History

The defendant was indicted on charges of sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and sodomy in the third degree. At trial, the court instructed the jury on intoxication only with respect to the first-degree sodomy charge. The jury acquitted the defendant of first-degree sodomy but convicted him of third-degree sodomy. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed as well.

Issue(s)

Whether evidence of intoxication is relevant to the crime of third-degree sodomy when the crime requires an objective assessment of whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would have understood the victim’s words and acts as an expression of a lack of consent?

Holding

No, because a defendant’s subjective mental state is not an element of the crime of third-degree sodomy, evidence of intoxication at the time of the sexual act is irrelevant.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that Penal Law § 130.40 (3) requires the defendant to have engaged in the sexual act “with another person without such person’s consent where such lack of consent [was] by reason of some factor other than incapacity to consent.” The statute defines “lack of consent” as “circumstances under which, at the time of the [sexual act], the victim clearly expressed that he or she did not consent to engage in such act, and a reasonable person in the actor’s situation would have understood such person’s words and acts as an expression of lack of consent to such act under all the circumstances” (Penal Law § 130.05 [2] [d]).

The court emphasized the objective element of the statute: “Although the ‘reasonable person’ must stand in the shoes of the actor, if such a person would understand that the victim was expressing a lack of consent, then it does not matter that the accused thought otherwise.”

The court reasoned that allowing evidence of intoxication would essentially require the prosecution to prove the defendant’s subjective understanding, which is not an element of the crime. The court stated, “Otherwise, it would not be enough for a victim simply to say ‘No.’ Every prosecution would devolve into a dispute over whether the particular defendant might have misapprehended whether ‘No’ really meant ‘No’ for one reason or another.”

Because the crime does not require a specific mental state that could be negated by intoxication, the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on intoxication with respect to the charge of third-degree sodomy.