New York Law Review

Tag: Terry Stop

  • People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106 (1993): “Plain Touch” Doctrine and Warrantless Searches

    81 N.Y.2d 106 (1993)

    The “plain touch” doctrine, an extension of the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, is not recognized in New York; tactile impressions during a Terry frisk, absent reasonable suspicion a weapon is present, cannot justify a warrantless search.

    Summary

    Robert Diaz was observed by police officers in an area known for drug activity. After observing Diaz participating in several groups and walking away from a stopped car, officers stopped and frisked him. During the frisk, an officer felt what he believed to be vials of crack cocaine in Diaz’s pocket. The officer then reached into Diaz’s pocket, seized the vials, and arrested Diaz. The New York Court of Appeals held that the search of Diaz’s pocket was unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that because the officer knew Diaz’s pocket did not contain a weapon, the search was not justified under the Terry stop-and-frisk exception. Further, the court declined to adopt a “plain touch” exception to the warrant requirement, distinguishing it from the plain view doctrine.

    Facts

    Officers Healey and Gordon were patrolling an area known for drug activity. They observed several groups of people on the sidewalks, appearing to exchange objects. Over 20 minutes, the officers saw Diaz at the center of several of these groups. They later saw Diaz standing next to a stopped car. When the police car approached, Diaz walked away.

    The officers called Diaz over to the car. Diaz repeatedly put his hand in his pocket, despite Officer Healey’s warnings. Healey noticed a bulge in Diaz’s pocket and again told him to remove his hand. Fearing a weapon, Healey grabbed Diaz’s pocket, feeling what he thought were vials. Diaz attempted to flee. Healey reached into Diaz’s pocket and removed 18 vials of crack cocaine. Diaz was then arrested.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted Diaz’s motion to suppress the drugs, finding the stop and frisk lacked reasonable suspicion.

    The Appellate Division reversed, finding reasonable suspicion for the stop and frisk. It further held that the seizure of the drugs was permissible based on what Officer Healey felt during the pat-down.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether information allegedly obtained by an officer through a protective pat-down that reveals the suspect is unarmed justifies a subsequent warrantless search of the suspect’s pocket based on a “plain touch” exception to the warrant requirement.

    Holding

    No, because the “plain touch” doctrine is rejected as an unconstitutional extension of the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held that the search of Diaz’s pocket was not within the scope of a Terry pat-down because Officer Healey knew the pocket did not contain a weapon. Under Terry v. Ohio, a protective pat-down is limited to what is necessary to ascertain the presence of weapons. Once an officer determines that no weapon is present, the search is over.

    The Court declined to adopt a “plain touch” exception to the warrant requirement. The Court distinguished this from the plain view doctrine, which allows seizure of an object if (1) the police are lawfully in the position from which the object is viewed; (2) the police have lawful access to the object; and (3) the object’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent. The Court emphasized that the plain view doctrine addresses seizures, not searches. Because an item in plain view is already exposed, there is no further invasion of privacy in viewing it.

    The Court reasoned that the “plain touch” doctrine, however, concerns items not in plain view and thus justifies a further search, not just a seizure. “Unlike the item in plain view in which the owner has no privacy expectation, the owner of an item concealed by clothing or other covering retains a legitimate expectation that the item’s existence and characteristics will remain private.”

    The Court also expressed practical concerns about the “plain touch” exception. It noted that tactile impressions are inherently less reliable than visual observations in determining an object’s identity and criminal nature. Moreover, the Court worried that the exception could lead to officers exceeding the limited scope of a Terry search and using weapons searches as a pretext for unwarranted searches. As the court stated, “the proposed ‘plain touch’ exception could thus invite a blurring of the limits to Terry v Ohio searches and the sanctioning of warrantless searches on information obtained from an initial intrusion which, itself, amounts to an unauthorized warrantless search”.

    The dissent argued that the search was justified as incident to a lawful arrest. Because the officer had probable cause to arrest Diaz after feeling the vials, they argued that the search was valid, regardless of a “plain touch” theory.

  • People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d 224 (1989): Limits on Vehicle Searches During Terry Stops Under the New York Constitution

    People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d 224 (1989)

    Under Article I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution, a police officer’s authority to intrude upon the personal effects inside a suspect’s vehicle during a Terry stop is limited to what is strictly necessary to protect the officer’s safety; a generalized concern that the suspect might later re-enter the vehicle and access a weapon is insufficient justification for a search.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the search of a bag inside a car during a Terry stop violated the New York State Constitution. Police, acting on an anonymous tip, stopped and frisked Torres, who matched the tip’s description of a man carrying a gun. After the frisk revealed no immediate threat, an officer searched a bag in the car, finding a gun. The Court distinguished this case from federal precedent, holding that the search exceeded what was necessary to ensure the officers’ safety, as Torres and his companion were already removed from the vehicle and frisked. The Court emphasized that the officers’ actions must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the stop in the first place, and that the officers had eliminated any immediate threat to their safety before searching the bag.

    Facts

    An anonymous caller informed the police that “Poppo,” wanted for homicide, was at a barber shop on 116th Street and Third Avenue, described as a large Hispanic male wearing a white sweater, driving a black Eldorado, and carrying a gun in a shoulder bag. Detectives arrived at the location and observed Torres, matching the description, leaving the barber shop with another man and entering a black Eldorado. Torres was wearing a white sweater and carrying a green nylon shoulder bag. The detectives, with guns drawn, ordered the men out of the car and frisked them.

    Procedural History

    Torres was charged with third-degree criminal possession of a weapon after the trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, suppressed the evidence, and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under Article I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution, the police were justified in searching a bag inside the passenger compartment of a vehicle during a Terry stop, after the occupants had been removed and frisked, based solely on a concern that the occupants might later re-enter the vehicle and gain access to a weapon.

    Holding

    No, because the search of the bag was not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the initial stop and frisk, and because the officers had already taken steps to ensure their safety by removing and frisking the occupants. The New York Constitution provides greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution in this context.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while the initial stop and frisk may have been justified by reasonable suspicion, the subsequent search of the bag in the car was not. The Court distinguished Michigan v. Long, which allowed such searches under the Fourth Amendment, asserting that the New York Constitution provides greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court emphasized that a search during a Terry stop must be “reasonably related in scope and intensity to the circumstances which rendered their initiation permissible” (quoting People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 215). Once the suspects were removed from the car and frisked, any immediate threat to the officers’ safety was eliminated. The Court found that the theoretical possibility of the suspects returning to the car and retrieving a weapon was insufficient to justify the intrusion of searching the bag. The Court stated, “The rule we fashion asks only that, once the officers have taken steps to secure their own physical safety, they limit their intrusion to the inquiry permitted by CPL 140.50.” The court also distinguished New York v. Belton, noting that the search in that case was incident to a lawful arrest, which was not the situation here.

  • People v. Allen, 73 N.Y.2d 378 (1989): Handcuffing During a Terry Stop

    People v. Allen, 73 N.Y.2d 378 (1989)

    The use of handcuffs does not automatically convert a Terry stop into a full-blown arrest if the circumstances reasonably warrant such measures to ensure the safety of the officers and the public.

    Summary

    Defendant Allen was apprehended by plain-clothes police officers responding to a radio report of an armed robbery. Allen and three other black males were seen running from the direction of the crime. The officers, identifying themselves, approached the group, who then scattered. Allen led an officer into a dark alley, where he was eventually handcuffed. Before any questioning, Allen spontaneously admitted his involvement in the robbery and moved to suppress this statement. The New York Court of Appeals held that handcuffing Allen in the alley did not automatically constitute an arrest, as the officers’ actions were reasonable to ensure their safety given the circumstances. Therefore, the statement was admissible.

    Facts

    Three plain-clothes police officers received a radio report of an armed robbery in progress involving four black males with multiple guns. Moments later, near the crime scene, they observed Allen and three other black males running away. The officers identified themselves and approached the group, who scattered and fled. Allen led one officer into a dark alley. The officer, concerned for his safety, called for backup. Allen was apprehended while attempting to scale a wall in the alley, then handcuffed and moved to a brighter area for a search and questioning. Allen spontaneously admitted his complicity in the robbery immediately after being handcuffed, but before any questioning occurred.

    Procedural History

    Allen moved to suppress his statements, arguing that he was arrested without probable cause when handcuffed. The Supreme Court denied the motion, and Allen was convicted of two counts of robbery in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the handcuffing did not constitute an arrest. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the handcuffing of a suspect during a Terry stop, based on reasonable suspicion, automatically escalates the encounter into a full-blown arrest requiring probable cause.

    Holding

    No, because, under the circumstances presented, the police officers were entitled to handcuff defendant to effect his nonarrest detention in order to ensure their own safety while they removed him to a more suitable location to pat him down for weapons.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the application of handcuffs does not automatically transform a Terry stop into a full arrest. The critical inquiry is whether the officers’ actions were reasonable under the circumstances. The court emphasized that police officers in rapidly developing and dangerous situations must be permitted to take reasonable measures to assure their safety. The court stated, “Where, as here, police officers find themselves in a rapidly developing and dangerous situation presenting an imminent threat to their well-being, they must be permitted to take reasonable measures to assure their safety and they should not be expected ‘to await the glint of steel’ before doing so.” In this case, the court considered factors such as the poor lighting in the alley and the officers’ reasonable belief that Allen might be armed. The court found that handcuffing Allen was a justified, limited measure to prevent him from accessing a concealed weapon while being moved to a safer location.

  • People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234 (1986): Permissibility of Detaining and Transporting Suspects for Identification

    People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234 (1986)

    When police have reasonable suspicion to stop an individual, they may detain and transport the suspect a short distance to a crime scene for prompt identification by eyewitnesses if the detention is brief, the crime scene is nearby, and there are no less intrusive means available.

    Summary

    Police officers stopped two men suspected of robbery based on a radio report describing the perpetrators and their car. The men gave a suspicious explanation for their whereabouts. The officers transported the men, without handcuffs, to the robbery scene less than a minute away, where they were identified by victims. The New York Court of Appeals held that the brief detention and transportation to the crime scene for immediate identification did not constitute an unlawful arrest because the police action was a reasonable and minimally intrusive means of investigation under the circumstances to quickly confirm or dispel their suspicion. The Court emphasized the short duration of the detention, proximity of the crime scene, and the presence of eyewitnesses.

    Facts

    Around 4:00 a.m., police officers heard a radio report of a robbery involving two black men, about 5’5″ tall, in a green Pontiac with black trim. Minutes later, near the crime scene, they saw two black men in a grey and black Buick sedan appearing to be the described height. The men claimed to be coming from work at American Brass, which the officer knew was far away in the opposite direction. The officers told the men they matched the description and were being taken to the factory for identification, and would be released if not identified.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery. He challenged the stop, detention, transportation, showup identification, and vehicle search. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, limiting the issue to the legality of the stop, detention, and transportation.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in the absence of probable cause, it is permissible for the police, having made a lawful stop based on reasonable suspicion, to detain the suspect and transport him to the crime scene for possible identification.

    Holding

    Yes, because the detention and transportation were a permissible incident of a lawful stop under the specific circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court determined the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion based on the radio report description, the suspects’ proximity to the crime scene, and their suspicious explanation. The Court clarified that the police action did not constitute an arrest because the defendant was not handcuffed, there was no show of force, he was allowed to park his car, the detention was brief, and he was informed of its limited purpose. The Court then reasoned that the transportation to the crime scene was a reasonable and minimally intrusive means of investigation to quickly confirm or dispel the suspicion. Key factors supporting the reasonableness of the detention were that a crime had actually been committed; the detention was less than 10 minutes; the crime scene was very close; eyewitnesses were present; and there were no significantly less intrusive means available. The Court emphasized the importance of on-the-scene identifications, stating, “A speedy on-the-scene viewing thus was of value both to law enforcement authorities and to defendant, and was appropriate here.” The Court rejected using a “totality of the circumstances” test, and instead emphasized that the findings of reasonable suspicion and reasonable detention must rest on articulable facts, credible objective evidence, and the rational inferences that flow therefrom.