New York Law Review

Tag: Terrorism

  • People v. Morales, 20 N.Y.3d 240 (2012): Defining ‘Intent to Intimidate or Coerce a Civilian Population’ in Terrorism Statutes

    People v. Morales, 20 N.Y.3d 240 (2012)

    New York’s terrorism statute, Penal Law Article 490, was not intended to elevate gang-on-gang violence to the level of terrorism, requiring a showing that the defendant’s actions were designed to intimidate or coerce a broad civilian population, not merely rival gang members.

    Summary

    Edgar Morales, a member of the “St. James Boys” gang, was convicted of terrorism for a shooting during a gang fight that resulted in the death of a child and the paralysis of another individual. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the terrorism convictions, holding that the intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, as required by the terrorism statute, was not met. The court reasoned that the statute was aimed at acts with a broader terroristic purpose and not simply gang-related violence. Additionally, the court ordered a new trial on the underlying offenses due to prejudicial spillover from the terrorism charges.

    Facts

    Defendant Edgar Morales, a member of the St. James Boys (SJB) gang, attended a christening party. SJB members identified Miguel, who they believed belonged to a rival gang, and planned to assault him. Morales obtained a revolver and agreed to shoot Miguel if necessary. A fight ensued, and Morales fired five shots, paralyzing Miguel and fatally wounding a 10-year-old girl. Morales and other SJB members fled the scene, disposing of the gun and shell casings.

    Procedural History

    Morales was indicted on 70 counts, including crimes of terrorism and conspiracy. The Supreme Court denied Morales’s motion challenging the sufficiency of evidence for the terrorism charges. The jury convicted Morales of three terrorism charges and second-degree conspiracy. The Appellate Division modified, reducing the terrorism convictions to the underlying offenses and the conspiracy conviction to a lesser charge. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the phrase “intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population” in Penal Law § 490.25 encompasses gang-related violence targeted at rival gang members or a subset of the general population.

    2. Whether the introduction of evidence related to the terrorism charges unduly prejudiced the jury’s ability to fairly adjudicate guilt or innocence on the underlying offenses.

    Holding

    1. No, because the New York legislature did not intend to elevate gang-on-gang violence to the status of terrorism.

    2. Yes, because the volume of proof regarding unrelated assaults, murders, and other offenses created a reasonable possibility that the jury’s findings were prejudicially influenced.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the terrorism statute was enacted to address acts with a broader terroristic purpose, citing examples like the September 11th attacks and other high-profile terrorist incidents. The Court found that applying the terrorism statute to gang-on-gang violence would trivialize the concept of terrorism. "The concept of terrorism has a unique meaning and its implications risk being trivialized if the terminology is applied loosely in situations that do not match our collective understanding of what constitutes a terrorist act."

    The court considered the legislative history, noting that the definitional provisions of Penal Law Article 490 were drawn from the federal definition of “international terrorism”. The court stated that federal antiterrorism statutes were designed to criminalize acts such as “the detonation of bombs in a metropolitan area” or “the deliberate assassination of persons to strike fear into others to deter them from exercising their rights”—conduct that is not akin to the serious offenses charged in this case.

    Regarding the cross-appeal, the court determined that the introduction of evidence related to numerous alleged criminal acts committed by SJB members over three years, which would have been inadmissible without the terrorism charge, prejudiced the jury. The Court stated that "[w]ithout the aura of terrorism looming over the case, the activities of defendant’s associates in other contexts would have been largely, if not entirely, inadmissible." This spillover effect required reversal and a new trial on the underlying offenses.

  • Nash v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 22 N.Y.3d 437 (2013): Governmental Immunity and Landlord Liability for Terrorist Acts

    Nash v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 22 N.Y.3d 437 (2013)

    When a government entity acts in a proprietary capacity, such as a landlord, it is subject to the same tort law principles as a private landlord, but retains governmental immunity for discretionary decisions regarding the provision of police protection.

    Summary

    This case concerns the Port Authority’s liability for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Plaintiffs argued the Port Authority was negligent in failing to provide adequate security in the underground parking garage. The court held that the Port Authority’s decisions regarding security measures in the parking garage were governmental functions involving resource allocation and policy decisions related to public safety, thus shielded by governmental immunity. The dissent argued the Port Authority was acting as a commercial landlord and should be held to the same standard of care as a private landlord, particularly regarding basic security measures in the garage.

    Facts

    The Port Authority owned and operated the World Trade Center (WTC), which included a public parking garage. Prior to the 1993 bombing, the Port Authority received multiple security assessments warning of the WTC’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks, specifically highlighting the risk posed by the public parking garage. Recommendations included eliminating public parking, increasing surveillance, and inspecting vehicles. The Port Authority declined to implement these measures due to concerns about cost, inconvenience to tenants, and potential revenue loss. In 1993, terrorists detonated a bomb in a van parked in the public parking garage, resulting in deaths and injuries.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs sued the Port Authority, alleging negligence in failing to maintain the garage in a reasonably safe condition. The Supreme Court denied the Port Authority’s motion for summary judgment, finding triable issues of fact regarding the Port Authority’s proprietary functions. The Appellate Division affirmed. A jury found the Port Authority negligent. The Appellate Division affirmed the jury verdict. The Port Authority appealed to the Court of Appeals after a judgment was entered for one of the plaintiffs after a damages trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Port Authority’s decisions regarding security measures in the WTC parking garage are protected by governmental immunity, shielding it from liability for negligence.

    Holding

    No, because the Port Authority’s decisions regarding security at the World Trade Center involved discretionary governmental functions related to resource allocation and public safety, therefore are protected by governmental immunity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that governmental entities are immune from liability for discretionary decisions related to governmental functions. The Port Authority’s security decisions for the WTC involved complex resource allocation and policy judgments about how best to protect the public, thus constituting governmental functions. The Court distinguished these decisions from routine maintenance or simple security measures typically undertaken by private landlords. The court stated “the challenged omissions all implicate the exercise of discretion with respect to security measures and the deployment of limited police resources.” The dissent argued that the Port Authority, as a landlord, had a duty to take reasonable steps to minimize foreseeable dangers to its tenants and visitors. The dissent emphasized that the Port Authority was warned about the specific risk of a vehicle bombing in the garage and failed to take basic security measures commonly employed by private landlords. The dissent argued that “the acts and omissions for which the Port Authority was found liable fall on the proprietary end of the spectrum,” and should not be protected by governmental immunity.