New York Law Review

Tag: Term of Office

  • Matter of Cohen v. Cuomo, 77 N.Y.2d 936 (1991): Disqualification from Holding Office After Felony Conviction

    Matter of Cohen v. Cuomo, 77 N.Y.2d 936 (1991)

    A public officer who is removed from office due to a felony conviction under Public Officers Law § 30 (1)(e) is barred from seeking election to the same office for the remainder of the term from which they were removed.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that a State Senator, Cohen, who was removed from office due to a federal felony conviction for making a false statement on a loan application, was ineligible to seek election to the unexpired term of the same office. The court reasoned that Public Officers Law § 30 (1)(e) considers the term of office an integral part of the office itself. Therefore, removal under this section bars the officer from seeking the same office for the duration of the term from which they were removed.

    Facts

    Appellant Cohen was a New York State Senator elected from the 32nd Senatorial District. Cohen was convicted of a federal felony for making a false statement on a loan application in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014. Upon his felony conviction, Cohen’s public office automatically became vacant as per Public Officers Law § 30 (1)(e).

    Procedural History

    Following Cohen’s removal from office, he attempted to seek election to the unexpired term of the same State Senate seat. The Appellate Division ruled that Cohen was precluded from seeking this election. Cohen appealed this ruling to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a public officer, removed from office due to a felony conviction under Public Officers Law § 30 (1)(e), is barred from seeking election to the same office for the remainder of the term from which they were removed.

    Holding

    Yes, because Public Officers Law § 30 (1)(e) considers the term of an office an integral part of the office itself, and removal under this section bars the officer from seeking the same office for the duration of the term from which they were removed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected Cohen’s argument that the precedent set in People v. Ahearn, 196 N.Y. 221 should not apply to elected officials, but only to appointed officials. The court in Ahearn stated that “the right to enjoy for a certain period the privileges and profits of a given position is an important element of [that] office.” (Id. at 230). The Court of Appeals found that this logic was applicable in Cohen’s case as well.

    The Court stated that its prior holding in Ahearn is consistent with the intent of Public Officers Law § 30 (1)(e), which states that “the term of an office should be considered an integral part of the office itself and that a removal effected by operation of that section should result in a bar to an officerholder’s seeking the same office for the duration of the ‘certain period’ or term for which the officer had been elected.” The court emphasized the ineligibility to run again for the very term that was forfeited due to the conviction. The court implied the importance of maintaining integrity in public office and preventing individuals removed for malfeasance from immediately returning to the same position. Essentially, the court focused on the idea that the penalty for the felony conviction included the loss of the ability to serve out the term for which the officer was elected. The court did not discuss potential dissenting opinions.

  • People ex rel. LeRoy v. Foley, 148 N.Y. 677 (1896): Determining Effective Date of Election Law Changes

    148 N.Y. 677 (1896)

    The election of a public officer occurs when the electoral body expresses its choice by voting, not when the result is officially declared; therefore, laws enacted after voting but before the official declaration of results do not retroactively alter the term of office for that election.

    Summary

    This case addresses a dispute over the term length of a town clerk in Watervliet, NY. The relator, LeRoy, was elected town clerk, but a new law extending the term of town clerks from one to two years was enacted between the time of voting and the official declaration of the election results. The court had to determine whether the new law applied to LeRoy’s election, thus extending his term. The court held that the election occurred when the votes were cast, prior to the law’s enactment. Therefore, the new law did not apply retroactively to extend LeRoy’s term, which remained one year.

    Facts

    The town of Watervliet held elections for town officers on April 10, 1893. On April 11, 1893, the governor signed a law amending the Town Law, extending the term of town clerks to two years. The official declaration of the election results occurred on April 16, 1893, showing that LeRoy was elected town clerk. The defendant, Foley, took possession of the office after being elected at the town meeting in April 1894. LeRoy argued that the law extending the term of town clerks to two years was in effect when he was elected and, therefore, Foley’s election was invalid.

    Procedural History

    The Attorney General brought an action in the nature of quo warranto to oust Foley from the office, arguing that LeRoy’s term was for two years due to the new statute. The lower court dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed, challenging the dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the amendment to the Town Law, extending the term of town clerks, applied retroactively to the election of LeRoy, whose votes were cast before the law’s enactment but whose election was declared afterward.

    Holding

    1. No, because the election of a public officer occurs when the electoral body expresses its choice by voting, not when the results are officially declared; therefore, the amendment extending the term of office does not apply retroactively to the relator’s election.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the election occurred on April 10, 1893, when the electors cast their votes. The amendment, signed on April 11, 1893, was deemed to be prospective in nature and did not retroactively affect the term of an officer for whom votes were cast before the amendment took effect. The court stated, “The election of a public officer must be referred to the day upon which the electoral body, in which the right of selection resides, expresses its choice by voting for candidates for the office, and not to some subsequent day when the result is declared.” The act of canvassing votes is ministerial, but the essential act of voting determines the election. Applying the amendment retroactively would effectively extend LeRoy’s term, which the court deemed an unconstitutional exercise of power akin to an appointment by the legislature. The court emphasized that while the legislature can enlarge official terms, such changes can only affect officers elected after the change takes effect. The court cited People ex rel. Lord v. Crooks, 53 N. Y. 648; People ex rel. Williamson v. McKinney, 52 N. Y. 374; People ex rel. Fowler v. Bull, 46 N. Y. 57 in support of this reasoning.