New York Law Review

Tag: tenancy in common

  • Butler v. Rafferty, 100 N.Y.2d 265 (2003): Liability of a Tenant-in-Common for Injuries on the Property

    Butler v. Rafferty, 100 N.Y.2d 265 (2003)

    A tenant-in-common who surrenders possession and control of a portion of the property to another tenant-in-common is not liable for injuries occurring in that portion of the property.

    Summary

    Plaintiff was injured when she fell from a bunk bed in a room occupied by one of the co-tenants (Maureen) of a property co-owned by the defendant, Rafferty. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether Rafferty, as a tenant-in-common, could be held liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. The Court held that because Rafferty had surrendered possession and control over the portion of the property where the injury occurred to the other tenant-in-common, he could not be held liable. The agreement between the tenants, along with their conduct, effectively created separate living spaces, relieving Rafferty of liability for injuries within the other tenant’s exclusive domain.

    Facts

    Rafferty bought a property in 1980. He shared the residence with his sister, Maureen, and her son between 1983 and 1986, and again starting in 1988. Rafferty and Maureen entered into a written agreement where Maureen would pay the mortgage and insurance for seven years, after which they would become co-owners. They agreed to share maintenance expenses, and major improvements required mutual consent. The agreement also stipulated that they would live separately on the premises without interference and Rafferty would deed the property to himself and Maureen as co-tenants. Rafferty lived in a loft in the barn while Maureen and her son occupied the residence. In 1991, Maureen married Keller and they built an addition to the residence with its own separate living spaces. Maureen, Keller, and her son lived exclusively in the addition. Keller built a bunk bed in the son’s room, which was affixed to the wall. Rafferty had no involvement in building, installing, or paying for the bunk bed. In 1995, the plaintiff was injured when she fell from the top bunk of the bed in the son’s room.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued Maureen, Keller, and Rafferty. Rafferty moved for summary judgment, arguing he had no control over the accident area, no role in the bunk bed, and the plaintiff’s negligence caused the fall. The Supreme Court granted Rafferty’s motion, finding he had no control or notice of the dangerous condition. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the agreement created separate apartments, making Rafferty an out-of-possession landlord. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, as a co-owner (tenant-in-common) of the property, Rafferty can be held liable for the plaintiff’s injuries when the injury occurred in a portion of the premises that he did not possess or control.

    Holding

    No, because Rafferty surrendered possession and control of the portion of the property where the injury occurred.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court recognized that cotenants typically have the right to use and enjoy the entire property, which translates into a duty to maintain it safely. The Court stated, “because the common-law doctrine of tenancy-in-common presumptively gives each cotenant full possession of the entire premises, a defective condition causing injury to a third party results in joint and several liability as to each cotenant.” However, cotenants may contract otherwise, agreeing that one of them shall have exclusive possession of a portion of the property. “When cotenants enter into such an agreement and are faithful to its terms, liability for personal injuries will fall only on the tenant who exercises possession and control over the area in question.” The Court emphasized that “control is the test which measures generally the responsibility in tort of the owner of real property.” Here, Rafferty and Maureen agreed to live separately, free from interference. Rafferty did not supervise Maureen’s living area, and the entrance between their living spaces was blocked. Maureen and her family solely occupied the new addition. The contract provision for shared maintenance expenses did not establish that Rafferty had permission to enter Maureen’s premises or that he exercised control over her portion of the property. Because Rafferty showed that he did not possess or control the portion of the property where the plaintiff was injured, he could not be held liable. The Court clarified that it was not characterizing Rafferty as an “out-of-possession landlord,” because Rafferty and Maureen were co-owners. However, “the critical feature of the analysis is the same, namely, whether defendant exercised possession and control over Maureen’s portion of the property.”

  • Jemzura v. Jemzura, 36 N.Y.2d 496 (1975): Foreclosure of Mortgage on Inherited Property

    Jemzura v. Jemzura, 36 N.Y.2d 496 (1975)

    When property is inherited subject to a mortgage, the distributee is not personally liable for the mortgage debt beyond the value of the inherited property; the mortgage holder must first foreclose on the property, and a deficiency judgment can only be pursued against the estate and then the distributees to the extent of their inheritance.

    Summary

    Raymond Jemzura sought to foreclose a mortgage on a farm he partially owned as a tenant in common with his siblings after inheriting it from their father. The mortgage had been executed by the father in favor of another sibling, who then assigned it to Raymond. The trial court found an implied agreement where Raymond’s exclusive possession of the farm compensated for his waiver of interest on the mortgage. The Court of Appeals held that while the mortgage was valid, the judgment improperly imposed personal liability on the siblings. The court clarified that distributees inheriting mortgaged property are not personally liable beyond the value of the property and outlined the proper procedure for foreclosure and deficiency judgments.

    Facts

    John Jemzura executed a $10,000 mortgage on his farm in favor of his son, George Jemzura. George assigned the mortgage to another son, Raymond Jemzura. John Jemzura died intestate, leaving the farm to his children, Raymond, Gorton, Griffin, and George, as tenants in common. Raymond lived on the farm, using it for personal gardening and collecting resources. Raymond paid the property taxes beginning in 1964 but never requested contribution from his siblings. Gorton deeded her interest to Griffin. George defaulted.

    Procedural History

    Raymond Jemzura sued to foreclose on the mortgage. The trial court held the mortgage valid and enforceable, deducting payments and Raymond’s share as a co-tenant, setting the balance at $6,600, and awarding a judgment against all defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. Defendant Griffin appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a distributee who inherits property subject to a mortgage is personally liable for the mortgage debt beyond the value of the inherited property.

    Holding

    No, because EPTL 3-3.6 and its predecessors make the mortgaged premises the primary source for payment of the mortgage debt, and a distributee’s liability is limited to the value of the inherited property after foreclosure proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on EPTL 3-3.6, which re-enacts section 20 of the Decedent Estate Law, which in turn embraced the general content of section 250 of the Real Property Law. These statutes dictate that mortgaged property inherited by a distributee is the primary source for mortgage debt payment. “The effect of EPTL 3-3.6, as well as that of said precursor sections, upon real property subject to a mortgage executed by an ancestor or testator and which descends to a distributee or passes to a testamentary beneficiary, is to make the mortgaged premises, as between the distributee or testamentary beneficiary and in the absence of a different testamentary direction, the primary source for payment of the mortgage debt.” The court emphasized that the mortgagee must first foreclose on the property. Only if a deficiency remains after the foreclosure sale can the mortgagee pursue a deficiency judgment against the deceased mortgagor’s estate. If the estate lacks sufficient assets, the distributees can be held liable, but only to the extent of the value of the property they received. The court found no merger of Raymond’s interests as mortgagee and tenant in common, so the mortgage remained valid. The court also upheld the finding of an implied agreement where Raymond’s exclusive possession compensated for waiving interest. However, the judgment was modified to remove the personal liability imposed on the defendants and to reflect the correct amount due on the mortgage, emphasizing the proper foreclosure procedure.