18 N.Y.3d 436, 963 N.E.2d 1235, 940 N.Y.S.2d 534 (2012)
When determining eligibility for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act, the ten-year look-back period for exclusion offenses is measured from the date of the resentencing application, not the date of the underlying drug crime.
Summary
Defendant Sosa applied for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 (DLRA-3). The prosecution argued he was ineligible because of a prior violent felony conviction within the preceding ten years, which constitutes an exclusion offense under CPL 440.46(5)(a). The Court of Appeals addressed whether the ten-year look-back period should be calculated from the date of the drug crime for which resentencing is sought, or from the date of the resentencing application. The Court held the look-back period runs from the date of the resentencing application. This interpretation aligns with the remedial purpose of the DLRA-3 and the plain language of the statute.
Facts
On November 27, 1995, Sosa was convicted of third-degree criminal possession of a weapon, a violent felony.
On August 24, 2002, Sosa committed drug-related offenses.
On March 26, 2003, Sosa was convicted of third and fourth-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance and sentenced as a second felony offender.
On October 7, 2009, Sosa applied for resentencing under DLRA-3.
Procedural History
The resentencing court found Sosa eligible for resentencing, measuring the ten-year look-back from the date of the resentence application. Sosa was resentenced to a seven-year prison term.
The Appellate Division affirmed the resentencing court’s decision.
The Court of Appeals granted the People leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the phrase “within the preceding ten years” in CPL 440.46(5)(a), for determining exclusion offenses under the Drug Law Reform Act, refers to the ten years preceding the commission of the drug offense for which resentencing is sought, or the ten years preceding the resentencing application.
Holding
No, because the statute’s plain language indicates that the ten-year look-back period extends from the date of the resentence application, not the date of the underlying drug crime.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plain language of CPL 440.46(5)(a) dictates that the ten-year look-back period should be measured from the present, i.e., the date of the resentencing application. The Court found no textual basis for the People’s argument that the look-back period should extend from the commission of the drug offense for which resentencing is sought.
The Court rejected the People’s argument that time spent incarcerated should not be included in the look-back period, citing the legislature’s intent that a defendant’s incarceration can be probative of their capacity for a responsible life at liberty. CPL 440.46(3) requires resentencing courts to consider a defendant’s “institutional record of confinement” and prison disciplinary history.
The court noted that while public safety is a concern, there are also significant costs associated with the extended incarceration of low-level drug offenders. It is within the legislature’s power to determine that a temporally distant violent felony should not automatically exclude an otherwise eligible defendant from resentencing.
The Court emphasized that the statute allows for judicial discretion to determine whether resentencing is consistent with the dictates of substantial justice, even if an applicant meets the basic eligibility criteria.
The dissenting opinion argued that “within the preceding ten years” refers to the 10 years preceding the drug felony for which resentencing is sought, and that the majority’s interpretation encourages gamesmanship. The dissent also argued that the 2009 DLRA was remedial only for those who have never committed a second violent felony offense, or whose violent felony offenses were sufficiently remote in time from the drug offense.