New York Law Review

Tag: temporary restraining order

  • Parkin v. Cornell Records, Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 573 (1984): Establishing Claims for Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process

    Parkin v. Cornell Records, Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 573 (1984)

    To successfully plead malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must present facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of probable cause resulting from a court’s initial issuance of temporary restraining orders; to successfully plead abuse of process, a plaintiff must allege misuse of process to achieve an end outside its proper scope.

    Summary

    Parkin sued Cornell Records, alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process related to prior temporary restraining orders. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the complaint, finding that Parkin failed to adequately plead either cause of action. Specifically, Parkin did not present sufficient facts to overcome the presumption of probable cause arising from the issuance of the temporary restraining orders, nor did Parkin demonstrate any misuse of process to achieve an improper end. The court also held that denying Parkin the opportunity to replead was not an abuse of discretion, as the record indicated Parkin could not state a valid claim.

    Facts

    Cornell Records obtained temporary restraining orders against Parkin. Parkin subsequently sued Cornell Records, alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process based on the issuance of these orders.

    Procedural History

    The lower court dismissed Parkin’s complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal and denied Parkin the right to replead. Parkin appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Parkin adequately pleaded a cause of action for malicious prosecution by presenting facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of probable cause arising from the issuance of temporary restraining orders.

    2. Whether Parkin adequately pleaded a cause of action for abuse of process by alleging misuse of process to achieve an end outside its proper scope.

    3. Whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion by denying Parkin the right to replead.

    Holding

    1. No, because Parkin failed to specifically plead facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of probable cause for the prior temporary restraining orders, which arose as a result of the fact that those temporary restraining orders were necessarily passed upon initially by the issuing court.

    2. No, because Parkin failed to allege any actual misuse of the process to obtain an end outside its proper scope.

    3. No, because the record, viewed as a whole, indicates that Parkin cannot plead a sound cause of action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that Parkin’s malicious prosecution claim was deficient because Parkin did not provide sufficient facts to overcome the presumption of probable cause that arose when the court initially issued the temporary restraining orders. The court cited Burt v. Smith, stating that the initial issuance of a temporary restraining order by a court establishes a presumption of probable cause that must be rebutted with specific factual allegations. The court emphasized that a mere allegation of malice is insufficient; the plaintiff must demonstrate a lack of reasonable grounds for the initial orders.

    Regarding the abuse of process claim, the court found that Parkin failed to allege any misuse of the legal process to achieve an objective outside the process’s legitimate purpose. Quoting Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Assn., the court reiterated that an abuse of process claim requires demonstrating that the process was used to gain an advantage that was not a legitimate objective of the lawsuit. A mere allegation that the lawsuit was initiated with malicious intent is not sufficient; there must be an overt act indicating misuse of the process itself.

    Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in denying Parkin the opportunity to replead. Citing ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, the court noted that leave to replead should be denied when it is clear that the plaintiff cannot state a viable cause of action. The court determined that, based on the entire record, Parkin could not assert a valid claim for either malicious prosecution or abuse of process.

  • First National Stores, Inc. v. Yellowstone Shopping Center, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 630 (1968): Tenant’s Failure to Obtain Restraining Order Before Lease Termination

    First National Stores, Inc. v. Yellowstone Shopping Center, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 630 (1968)

    A tenant’s failure to obtain a temporary restraining order before a landlord terminates a lease according to its terms precludes a court from reviving the lease, absent fraud, mutual mistake, or another acceptable basis for reformation.

    Summary

    First National Stores (tenant) leased a supermarket building from Yellowstone Shopping Center (landlord). A fire department order required the landlord to install a sprinkler system, leading to a dispute over who was responsible under the lease. The landlord sent a 10-day notice of default to the tenant, who then sued for a declaratory judgment but failed to obtain a temporary restraining order before the default period expired and the landlord terminated the lease. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the tenant failed to act before the lease was terminated, the court could not revive the lease absent a basis for reformation, emphasizing the importance of upholding contractual obligations.

    Facts

    First National Stores leased a supermarket from Yellowstone Shopping Center.
    The NYC Fire Department ordered the landlord to install a sprinkler system in the cellar.
    The landlord and tenant disagreed over who was responsible for the cost under the lease.
    The landlord sent the tenant a 10-day notice of default on February 24, 1967, received on February 27, 1967.
    The tenant started an action for a declaratory judgment on February 28, 1967, but the order to show cause did not contain a stay.
    On March 10, 1967, after the 10-day default period, the landlord sent a notice terminating the lease.

    Procedural History

    The tenant commenced an action for a declaratory judgment in the Supreme Court, Queens County.
    The Supreme Court declined jurisdiction.
    On appeal, the landlord stipulated that the Appellate Division could determine the controversy as a matter of law.
    The Appellate Division held that the tenant was obligated to install the sprinkler system but preserved the lease contingent on the tenant’s performance.
    The landlord appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division could revive a lease that had been terminated according to its terms when the tenant failed to obtain a temporary restraining order before the landlord sent the notice of termination.

    Holding

    No, because the lease had been terminated in strict accordance with its terms, and the tenant did not obtain a temporary restraining order until after the landlord acted. Absent fraud, mutual mistake, or another acceptable basis of reformation, courts cannot rewrite contracts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that declaratory relief can be both legal and equitable, but equitable relief requires a basis for granting it. The lease had been terminated according to its terms before the tenant obtained a restraining order. The temporary restraining order preserved the status quo only as of the date it was issued.

    The court reasoned that to revive the lease, the Appellate Division would have to read in a clause allowing the tenant an additional 20 days to cure the default. “This the court was powerless to do absent a showing of fraud, mutual mistake or other acceptable basis of reformation.”

    The court cited Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 4-5, stating: “Stability of contract obligations must not be undermined by judicial sympathy.”

    The court concluded that upholding the Appellate Division’s order would render lease termination clauses meaningless. As the court noted, “Should we hold that the termination of this lease is harsh and inequitable, then the same conclusion can be reached in every instance where a landlord exercises his contractual rights, and, in that event, the right of termination or any other right specified in a lease would be rendered meaningless and ineffectual”.

    The dissenting judges voted to affirm based on the opinion of the Appellate Division, which had sought to preserve the lease due to the tenant’s good faith in bringing the declaratory judgment action.