People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 409 (1985)

A gender-based statutory rape law is constitutional if it serves important governmental objectives and is substantially related to achieving those objectives; preventing teenage pregnancy is such an objective.

Summary

The defendant pleaded guilty to rape in the third degree but challenged the constitutionality of the statutory rape laws, arguing they unlawfully discriminate against males. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the statute, finding that the prevention of teenage pregnancy is a legitimate state interest justifying the gender-based classification. The Court rejected the argument that the law was unconstitutional simply because only males could be convicted as principal actors, finding that the statute was substantially related to the important governmental objective of preventing teenage pregnancy and its associated consequences.

Facts

The defendant was indicted on multiple counts, including rape. He pleaded guilty to two counts of rape in the third degree. New York Penal Law § 130.25(2) states a male is guilty of rape in the third degree when, being twenty-one years old or more, he engages in sexual intercourse with a female less than seventeen years old. Prior to his plea, the defendant reserved his right to appeal the constitutionality of the statute, arguing it was gender-based and violated equal protection because it only penalized males.

Procedural History

The defendant pleaded guilty in the trial court but reserved his right to appeal the constitutionality of the statute. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether a statutory rape law that only punishes males for engaging in sexual intercourse with underage females violates the equal protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions.

Holding

No, because the prevention of teenage pregnancy is an important governmental objective, and the statute is substantially related to achieving that objective.

Court’s Reasoning

The court acknowledged the gender-based classification inherent in the statutory rape law, noting that only males can be convicted as principal actors. The court applied the intermediate scrutiny standard applicable to gender-based classifications, requiring the statute to serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to achieving those objectives. The court rejected the state’s argument that the law was justified by preventing psychological injury to young females, finding this rooted in outdated stereotypes. However, the court found the prevention of early pregnancy a sufficient justification, stating that “the unique vulnerability of young women in this area requires no empirical support, and a statute tailored to discourage sexual contact between fertile, underaged females and older men certainly can be viewed as one substantially related to the ‘important governmental objective’ of preventing the deleterious economic social and psychological consequences of premature parenthood.” The court addressed the underinclusiveness of the statute (not penalizing young females for sexual contact with teenage boys), justifying it as a societal decision not to penalize those not yet capable of mature judgment. The court explicitly rejected requiring legislative history to support the justifications for the law, stating that “it is certainly illogical to require the production of legislative history documenting the underlying purpose for enactment or retention of a statute where, perhaps due to the statute’s immutably sound basis, no such legislative history exists.” The court concluded that where the legislation is supported by plausible and constitutionally sufficient justifications, the challenge to that legislation must be rejected.