New York Law Review

Tag: Teacher Tenure

  • Acting Supt. of Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. v. United Liverpool Faculty Assn., 42 N.Y.2d 509 (1977): Enforceability of Contractual Evaluation Procedures in Tenure Decisions

    Acting Supt. of Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. v. United Liverpool Faculty Assn., 42 N.Y.2d 509 (1977)

    Even though a school board has the exclusive right to deny tenure, a bargained-for right to specific procedural steps preliminary to the tenure determination is enforceable through arbitration and cannot be considered a nullity.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a probationary teacher, denied tenure for alleged professional incompetence outside the classroom, can arbitrate claims of breached contract evaluation procedures related to classroom performance. The Court of Appeals held that arbitration is permissible. While tenure decisions are not subject to negotiation, performance evaluations leading to tenure are. The school board’s fear that arbitration would undermine its tenure denial authority is not a valid reason to stay arbitration, as the bargained-for procedural steps are distinct from the tenure decision itself. The Court emphasized that the school board must adhere to the agreement it negotiated, and failure to do so is a valid grievance subject to arbitration.

    Facts

    A probationary teacher was denied tenure, allegedly due to professional incompetence in non-classroom duties. The teacher’s union sought arbitration, claiming that the school district had breached contractual evaluation procedures, particularly those related to the teacher’s classroom performance. The school district sought to stay the arbitration, arguing that the tenure decision was based on non-arbitrable reasons unrelated to classroom performance.

    Procedural History

    The lower court initially ordered arbitration. The Appellate Division reversed, staying the arbitration, reasoning that the tenure denial was based on factors independent of classroom performance. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the order to proceed with arbitration.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a probationary teacher, denied tenure for reasons of alleged professional incompetence in the performance of non-classroom duties, has a right to arbitrate alleged breaches of contract evaluation procedures specifically referable to classroom performance.

    Holding

    Yes, because even though the decision to grant tenure is not within the permissible area of negotiation, the performance of a probationary teacher preliminary to a tenure determination is arbitrable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the decision to grant tenure is not subject to arbitration, the procedures used to evaluate a teacher’s performance leading up to the tenure decision are. The Court applied the two-tier analysis from Matter of Acting Supt. of Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. (United Liverpool Faculty Assn.), finding that arbitration was authorized under the Taylor Law and that the subject matter was encompassed by the arbitration clause. The Court rejected the school board’s argument that arbitration should be stayed because it might interfere with the board’s authority to deny tenure. The Court emphasized that bargained-for procedural rights preliminary to a tenure determination cannot be considered meaningless. The court stated, “Even though the board has the right to deny tenure to a probationary teacher without an explanation, the bargained for right to procedural steps preliminary to the tenure determination cannot be considered a nullity.” The Court further noted, “The courts should not, by staying arbitration, “foreclose any remedy for alleged violations of procedural guarantees as well as substantive rights said to be afforded under the contract””. The Court held that the school board was bound by its agreement and that the failure to perform as required was a valid grievance subject to arbitration. The procedural aspects of the contract are discrete from the denial of tenure and should be treated separately.

  • Feinerman v. Board of Cooperative Educational Services, 48 N.Y.2d 491 (1979): Enforceability of Teacher’s Waiver of Tenure Rights

    48 N.Y.2d 491 (1979)

    A prospective teacher may knowingly and freely waive the right to be appointed to a three-year probationary period in a tenure-bearing position, provided the waiver is not the product of coercive influences.

    Summary

    Muriel Feinerman was hired by the Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) for successive one-year contracts to teach in an adult education program that was federally funded. Each contract stated the position was non-tenure-bearing. Feinerman signed each contract. After several years, BOCES terminated her employment due to decreased enrollment. Feinerman sued, arguing her position was legally probationary and thus tenure-bearing, entitling her to seniority rights. The New York Court of Appeals held that Feinerman knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to a probationary, tenure-track position by signing the contracts, so her termination was lawful.

    Facts

    • In February 1974, Muriel Feinerman was hired by BOCES as a business subjects teacher in an adult education program funded by the federal government.
    • Her contract, which she signed, ran until June 30, 1974, specified a per diem wage, and stated, “There is no tenure with this position.”
    • Feinerman was reappointed for the 1974-1975 and 1975-1976 school years under similar terms.
    • In September 1975, she received a letter stating her salary would be per diem and no tenure would attach, which she signed to indicate acceptance.
    • A collective bargaining agreement in effect stated, “Tenure is not applicable in annually funded Day Time Adult Occupational Education projects.”
    • In June 1976, the superintendent informed Feinerman her position would be terminated on June 30, 1976, due to decreased enrollment.

    Procedural History

    • Feinerman filed an Article 78 proceeding seeking reinstatement.
    • Special Term dismissed the petition, finding she consented to a temporary, non-tenure position.
    • The Appellate Division modified the judgment, awarding her 60 days’ back pay, but denied reinstatement, reasoning she could have been terminated anyway during the probationary period.
    • Both Feinerman and BOCES appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prospective teacher may waive the right to be appointed to a three-year probationary period in a tenure-bearing position.

    Holding

    Yes, because such waivers are valid if they are knowingly and freely made, and not the product of coercive influences.

    Court’s Reasoning

    • The Education Law (§ 3014, subd 1) requires teachers to be appointed for a probationary period of up to three years.
    • The court distinguished cases preventing the subversion of tenure statutes through “temporary” designations or delayed appointments, noting Feinerman expressly agreed to limited, non-tenure-bearing terms.
    • The court relied on Matter of Baer v Nyquist, stating it implicitly recognized that public policy doesn’t absolutely bar a teacher from waiving the right to a probationary period. The court emphasized that a waiver must be knowing and voluntary.
    • The court cited Matter of Abramovich v Board of Educ., which allowed a tenured teacher to waive statutory protections, reasoning that if a tenured teacher can waive rights, a probationary teacher’s waiver of a mere expectancy of tenure is even more acceptable.
    • The court emphasized that 3014 of the Education Law doesn’t bar teachers from waiving the three-year probationary period.
    • The court noted Feinerman willingly signed contracts stating, “There is no tenure with this position,” and didn’t allege coercion.
    • The court stated, “Only when it is clearly demonstrated that a teacher voluntarily, knowingly and openly waived the right to be appointed to a three-year probationary term in a tenure-bearing position and there is no evidence of coercion or duress should the public policy considerations embodied in the tenure statutes be said to yield to the terms of the employment agreement between the parties.”
    • Dissent: Judge Wachtler argued that teachers should not be required to waive tenure rights and that such waivers in original employment contracts are against public policy.

  • Abramovich v. Board of Education, 46 N.Y.2d 450 (1978): Waiver of Statutory Rights in Settlement Agreements

    Abramovich v. Board of Education, 46 N.Y.2d 450 (1978)

    A tenured teacher may waive their rights under Education Law § 3020-a, which provides specific procedural protections in disciplinary proceedings, as part of a voluntary settlement agreement, provided the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and without duress.

    Summary

    David Abramovich, a tenured teacher, challenged a settlement agreement in a disciplinary proceeding where he waived his rights under Education Law § 3020-a. The Court of Appeals held that a tenured teacher can waive these statutory protections through a voluntary settlement. Abramovich faced 49 charges of insubordination and incompetence. To avoid potential dismissal, he entered a settlement where he took a leave of absence, was reassigned to a new school, and was subject to a four-month evaluation period, after which the principal’s decision on his retention would be unappealable. After an unfavorable evaluation, Abramovich was dismissed and sued, claiming the waiver violated public policy. The Court of Appeals upheld the waiver, finding it was knowing, voluntary, and served as consideration for the dismissal of the charges against him.

    Facts

    David Abramovich, a tenured elementary school teacher, faced 49 charges of insubordination, incompetency, and neglect of duties in May 1975.

    A hearing commenced under Education Law § 3020-a, during which Abramovich was represented by counsel, a union field representative, and the president of his teachers’ association.

    On the third day of the hearing, Abramovich and the Board of Education, with their representatives, entered into a settlement stipulation.

    The stipulation provided that Abramovich would continue as a teacher, avoiding potential dismissal, but would be subject to dismissal if his work was unsatisfactory after a designated period.

    The Board agreed to withdraw all charges with prejudice, and Abramovich agreed to take an unpaid leave of absence until the fall 1976 term, when he would be re-employed at a different school with a new principal.

    The Board agreed to provide Abramovich with a written list of deficiencies and the new principal would supply written performance standards.

    The Board would provide instruction in specialty teaching areas and opportunities to observe other teachers.

    After a four-month term starting in September 1976, the new principal would evaluate Abramovich’s performance, and that decision would be unappealable.

    In December 1976, the principal’s evaluation was unfavorable, and Abramovich was dismissed.

    Procedural History

    Abramovich initiated an Article 78 proceeding challenging the settlement as violating public policy. Special Term agreed with Abramovich.

    The Appellate Division reversed the Special Term’s decision.

    Abramovich appealed to the Court of Appeals pursuant to CPLR 5601(a)(ii).

    Issue(s)

    Whether a tenured teacher can waive their rights to the protections afforded by Education Law § 3020-a as part of a settlement agreement in a disciplinary proceeding.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a waiver is freely, knowingly, and openly arrived at, without taint of coercion or duress, the public policy underpinnings of section 3020-a are not undermined.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the importance of Education Law § 3020-a in protecting tenured teachers from arbitrary dismissal and ensuring procedural due process.

    However, the court found that the statute does not expressly prohibit a teacher from waiving its benefits. To the contrary, the court noted the statute allows waiver of a hearing through “unexcused failure” to request one within 10 days of receiving charges.

    The court emphasized the competing public policy favoring the nonjudicial resolution of legal claims, allowing parties to stipulate away statutory and even constitutional rights. Citing Matter of New York, L. & W. R. R. Co., 98 N.Y. 447, 453. Compromises and settlements are favored in law.

    The court drew analogies to plea bargaining, litigation settlements, and arbitration agreements, where fundamental rights are often waived in exchange for certain benefits.

    The court emphasized that the settlement was reached after extensive discussion and negotiation among all parties, including Abramovich, his counsel, and union representatives. The court noted that the hearing officer made a record of Abramovich’s understanding of the rights he was waiving.

    The court overruled Matter of Boyd v Collins, 11 NY2d 228, to the extent that it prohibited any waiver of rights under Section 3020-a. The court held that the facts demonstrated a voluntary relinquishment of known rights.

  • Ward v. Nyquist, 43 N.Y.2d 57 (1977): Teacher Re-employment Rights and Certification Requirements

    Ward v. Nyquist, 43 N.Y.2d 57 (1977)

    A tenured teacher whose position is abolished is only entitled to re-employment in a “corresponding or similar position” for which they are legally qualified through proper certification; tenure in a general subject area does not override specific certification requirements for particular teaching positions.

    Summary

    Miriam Ward, a tenured Latin teacher, was laid off due to position abolishment. She applied for an English teaching position, arguing her general secondary tenure entitled her to preference, despite lacking English certification. The school board denied her application and hired new English teachers. Ward appealed to the Commissioner of Education, who upheld the board’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that re-employment rights under Education Law § 2510(3) only extend to positions for which the teacher is certified; general tenure doesn’t negate the need for specific subject certification.

    Facts

    Miriam Ward was a tenured Latin teacher in the Harrison Central School District for the 1970-1971 school year. She held secondary-level tenure but was only certified in Latin. In May 1971, the school board abolished one Latin position due to budget cuts. Because Ward had less seniority than the remaining Latin teacher, her employment was terminated. Ward then applied for an English teaching position within the district, claiming her general secondary tenure gave her preference. She was not certified to teach English. The board denied her application and subsequently hired new English teachers.

    Procedural History

    Ward appealed the board’s decision to the Commissioner of Education under Education Law § 310, arguing her tenure entitled her to the English position. The Commissioner upheld the board’s denial, citing her lack of English certification. Ward then initiated an Article 78 proceeding challenging the Commissioner’s determination. Supreme Court upheld the Commissioner’s decision, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a tenured teacher whose position is abolished is entitled to preferential re-employment in a different subject area (here, English) within their general tenure (secondary education), even if they lack specific certification for that subject area.

    Holding

    No, because Education Law § 2510(3) provides re-employment rights only for “corresponding or similar positions,” and lacking the required certification means the position is not considered “similar” despite the teacher’s general tenure area.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the interplay between Education Law § 2510(2) and § 2510(3). Subdivision 2 governs the dismissal process when a position is abolished, dictating that the teacher with the least seniority *within the tenure of the position abolished* must be terminated. Subdivision 3 addresses re-employment rights, granting preference for vacancies in “corresponding or similar positions.” The court emphasized that while subdivision 2 considers the *tenure area* for dismissal purposes, subdivision 3 limits re-employment rights to *similar positions*. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Lynch v. Nyquist, which held that lack of certification could not be used to circumvent seniority-based dismissal under subdivision 2. Here, the issue was not improper dismissal, but rather the scope of re-employment rights. The court reasoned that certification is a crucial statutory requirement; a Latin teacher lacking English certification cannot claim entitlement to an English position, as the absence of certification negates any claim of the position being “similar.” The court cited Matter of Meliti v. Nyquist to highlight the significance of certification requirements. The court deferred to the Commissioner’s interpretation, noting that the construction given statutes by the responsible agency should be respected. The court stated, “When seeking reemployment rights the threshold question must be one of certification to teach in the position sought. Absent such certification, re-employment rights cannot attach.” The court explicitly limited its holding to subdivision 3 re-employment rights and did not address any potential issues related to the propriety of Ward’s initial dismissal under subdivision 2, as that issue was not properly raised in the appeal.

  • Bell v. Board of Education of Vestal Central School District, 42 N.Y.2d 848 (1977): Tenure Rights in Abolished Positions

    Bell v. Board of Education of Vestal Central School District, 42 N.Y.2d 848 (1977)

    When a teaching position is abolished, a teacher’s rights are determined by seniority within their specific tenure area, not by overall district seniority.

    Summary

    This case addresses the tenure rights of a teacher whose position was abolished due to budget cuts. The New York Court of Appeals held that the teacher’s rights were governed by his seniority within the specific tenure area of driver education, not by his overall seniority in the school district. The court emphasized that the school district had consistently recognized driver education as a separate tenure area. The teacher, having moved into that area later in his career, was the least senior driver education teacher, and therefore, his termination was proper under the relevant provisions of the Education Law.

    Facts

    The petitioner was initially employed as a Latin teacher in the Vestal Central School District. He later became a driver education teacher. Due to budget cuts, the school district abolished a driver education position. The petitioner was terminated because he was the least senior driver education teacher in the district. The school district had maintained a “Senior High Tenure Area List” since 1946, which included driver education as a special tenure area since at least 1961.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Education upheld the termination. The Appellate Division reversed the Board’s determination. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Board of Education’s original determination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the petitioner’s rights upon the termination of his position were determined by his seniority within the driver education tenure area, or by his overall seniority within the school district?

    Holding

    Yes, because the petitioner’s rights were determined by his seniority within the driver education tenure area, as the school district properly designated it as a separate tenure area, and the petitioner was the least senior teacher in that area.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the petitioner’s rights were governed by subdivisions 2 and 3 of section 2510 of the Education Law, which pertain to the termination of teachers when a position is abolished. These provisions prioritize seniority within the specific tenure area. The court emphasized that sections 3012 and 3020-a of the Education Law, which provide for hearings in certain teacher disciplinary matters, were not applicable in this case, as the termination was due to the abolishment of a position, not misconduct. The court found significant that the school district had consistently treated driver education as a distinct tenure area. They cited Steele v. Board of Educ., noting that the petitioner was “sufficiently alerted to the fact” that by moving to driver education, he was entering an independent tenure area where his previous experience would not be relevant for determining seniority. The court stated, “when a teacher’s services are terminated pursuant to subdivision 2 of section 2510, there is no requirement that a hearing be held.” The court’s decision underscores the importance of tenure areas in determining a teacher’s rights during staff reductions and affirms the school district’s authority to define reasonable tenure areas.

  • James v. Board of Education, 42 N.Y.2d 357 (1977): Interpreting “Review” in Teacher Tenure Decisions

    James v. Board of Education of Central Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Orangetown and Clarkstown, 42 N.Y.2d 357 (1977)

    When interpreting statutes, courts must give effect to the plain meaning of the words used by the legislature, and should not interpret a statute in a way that renders its provisions meaningless or ineffective.

    Summary

    This case concerns the interpretation of Section 3031 of New York’s Education Law, which grants boards of education the power to “review” superintendent recommendations regarding teacher tenure. Probationary teachers James and another teacher were denied tenure. The Superintendent advised the Board that they could not grant tenure unless he recommended it. The teachers argued that the Board had the power to overrule the superintendent’s recommendation. The Court of Appeals held that the statute empowers the board to review recommendations but does not authorize them to override the superintendent’s decision. The dissent argued that “review” must mean something more than a mere recommendation, lest the statute become meaningless.

    Facts

    Two probationary teachers, James and another teacher, were informed by the superintendent of schools that they would not be recommended for tenure and their services would be terminated. Pursuant to Section 3031 of the Education Law, the teachers requested and received written statements detailing the reasons for the superintendent’s recommendations. They then filed written responses with the district clerk. At the board of education meeting, the superintendent advised the board that they could not grant tenure unless he recommended it.

    Procedural History

    The teachers challenged the board’s determination in court. Special Term ruled in favor of the teachers, annulling the board’s determination and remitting the matter for review. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the petition, reasoning that the board lacked the power to override negative tenure recommendations. The dissenting justices at the Appellate Division supported the Special Term’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Section 3031 of the Education Law grants boards of education the power to override a superintendent’s recommendation not to grant tenure to a probationary teacher, or whether it merely grants the power to review and recommend reconsideration.

    Holding

    No, because the statute does not explicitly grant boards the power to override the superintendent’s recommendation, and prior law reserved the tenure decision to the superintendent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that Section 3031 must be interpreted in light of existing law. Prior to the enactment of Section 3031, boards of education could not override negative tenure recommendations made by the superintendent. The court noted the second paragraph of Section 3031 explicitly states that it should not be construed as modifying existing law. Therefore, the court reasoned that the legislature did not intend to grant boards the power to override the superintendent’s decision. The court interpreted the word “review” in the first paragraph as giving boards the power to remand individual cases for reconsideration, but not the power to grant tenure against the superintendent’s recommendation. The dissenting opinion argued that this interpretation renders the procedural rights granted by the statute meaningless, as the board becomes an “entirely impotent tribunal.” The dissent argued the word “review” should be given its ordinary meaning: “To re-examine judicially.”

  • Baer v. Nyquist, 34 N.Y.2d 291 (1974): Limits on Local School District Authority to Define Tenure Areas

    Baer v. Nyquist, 34 N.Y.2d 291 (1974)

    Local school districts cannot unilaterally define teaching tenure areas without defined standards or regulations established prospectively by the Board of Regents or the Legislature.

    Summary

    Thomas Baer, a junior high school teacher, sought recognition of his tenure after the Massapequa School District discharged him. Baer initially taught general science but later switched to social studies with the principal’s warning that this created a new probationary period. The school district had informally organized its staff by subject matter departments. The Commissioner of Education upheld the school district’s decision, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that local school districts cannot arbitrarily define tenure areas without prospective regulations or standards established by the Board of Regents or the Legislature. The court emphasized the need for uniformity and protection for teachers under the tenure statutes.

    Facts

    Thomas Baer was hired to teach general science in the Massapequa School District on September 1, 1967.

    In May 1968, Baer requested a change to teaching social studies, which was granted, and he began in the 1968-1969 school year.

    The school principal orally warned Baer that the change made him subject to a new three-year probationary period.

    The school district informally organized its teaching staff by subject matter departments (English, social studies, science, etc.).

    In March 1971, Baer was notified of his discharge, effective June 30, 1971.

    Baer argued that he had already served his probationary period from September 1967 to June 1970 and was thus entitled to tenure.

    Procedural History

    Baer appealed his discharge to the Commissioner of Education.

    The Commissioner dismissed Baer’s appeal, ruling that the school district had the power to create tenure areas that suited its needs.

    Baer then initiated an Article 78 proceeding, which was successful at Special Term and the Appellate Division.

    The Commissioner of Education appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether local school districts may limit teaching tenure areas at their discretion, without defined standards, subject only to retrospective approval by the Commissioner of Education.

    Holding

    No, because radical restructuring of tenure areas should not be free of controlling regulations or express standards propounded by the Board of Regents or enacted by the Legislature, and should be prospective in effect.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that allowing random experimentation with tenure areas by local school districts, subject only to ad hoc approval by the Commissioner, would thwart the legislative purpose of attracting qualified teachers and providing job protection.

    The court distinguished its prior holding in Matter of Becker v. Board of Educ., noting that the court in Becker affirmed the Commissioner’s determination due to a long-standing administrative construction of “horizontal” grade-level tenure areas. The court noted that in Baer’s case the Commissioner was now recognizing “vertical tenure areas in the traditional curricula.”

    The court emphasized that the Commissioner’s administrative discretion, although broad under Section 310 of the Education Law, does not allow decisions that contravene statutes or constitutional provisions.

    The court warned that vertical tenure areas could become an instrument of retrenchment, enabling school boards to subvert the purpose of the tenure statutes by shifting probationary teachers or manipulating tenure areas during fiscal crises.

    The court noted the danger of “inadequate notice to the probationary teachers, and the retrospective validation of new schemes by the commissioner.”

    The court noted that the lack of formal resolution adopting the vertical tenure areas by the Massapequa Board of Education militated against a finding of waiver by Baer.

    The court acknowledged that Baer’s position was arguably weak because he requested the change of subject and acknowledged being on initial probation in the new assignment, but it emphasized that tenure statutes are intended to protect teachers, not to be a trap.

    The Court concluded that there must be standards to guide the Commissioner’s discretion, provided by regulation or statute.

    The Court emphasized that “Prospective rule-making is intrinsically less dangerous than the ad hoc adjudication proposed by the commissioner”.

    The Court emphasized that under Education Law Section 2510(2), fiscal retrenchment could be implemented by changing “social studies” to “civics” which “would not only undermine the rights of teachers working toward tenure, but also of those who have secured tenure.”

  • Matter of Green v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 18 N.Y.2d 136 (1966): Limits on Conditional Permanent Teacher Appointments

    Matter of Green v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 18 N.Y.2d 136 (1966)

    A teacher who has completed a satisfactory probationary period and received a permanent appointment cannot be removed without a hearing and charges of incompetency, even if additional qualifications attached to the permanent appointment have not been fulfilled.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a teacher with a permanent appointment can be removed without a hearing for failing to meet conditions attached to that appointment after successfully completing a probationary period. The New York Court of Appeals held that once a teacher receives a permanent appointment following a satisfactory probationary period, they cannot be removed without cause and a hearing, even if they haven’t fulfilled all preconditions attached to the permanent appointment. The court reasoned that allowing such conditions to persist beyond the probationary period would undermine the protections of the tenure law.

    Facts

    The Board of Examiners announced an examination for social studies teachers requiring a baccalaureate degree and 30 graduate semester hours. The announcement allowed applicants until February 15, 1964, to complete 28 of the 30 graduate hours. The petitioner had a baccalaureate degree and passed the exam. She received a license subject to meeting the preparation requirements by February 15, 1964. After a three-year satisfactory probationary period, the Board of Education made her appointment permanent, contingent on certification of satisfactory service during probation and subject to any conditions of the license. The petitioner had not completed all the required semester hours by 1964 and was notified that her teaching license would be terminated, leading to her removal without a hearing or charges.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner initiated an Article 78 proceeding to prevent her removal without a hearing and charges. The Special Term initially denied the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the relief sought while allowing the respondents to initiate further proceedings consistent with the decision. The Board of Education appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a teacher with a permanent appointment, following satisfactory completion of a probationary period, can be removed without a hearing and specific charges for failing to meet conditions attached to the permanent appointment relating to educational qualifications.

    Holding

    No, because the Education Law prohibits the extension of a teacher’s probationary period beyond three years, and after a permanent appointment is made, a teacher “shall not be removable except for cause.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that allowing conditions to be attached to permanent appointments that extend beyond the probationary period would undermine the protections of the tenure law. The statute explicitly states that a permanently appointed teacher “shall not be removable” except for specific grounds. The court emphasized that the time to assess teaching qualifications is during the probationary term, not after the appointment becomes permanent. The court cited People ex rel. Murphy v. Maxwell, 177 N.Y. 494, which held that statutory provisions for removal on charges of misconduct or incompetency are exclusive, preventing the Board of Education from imposing additional conditions, such as termination upon marriage. The court also referenced Matter of Boyd v. Collins, 11 N.Y.2d 228, clarifying that a board of education cannot bypass the tenure statute. According to the court, the failure to meet preconditions could be a valid ground for removal on charges and after a hearing if it adversely affected her competency to teach, but it cannot be the basis for summary dismissal. The court reasoned that the hearing afforded to the teacher was “for cause” and was addressed to good behavior and efficient and competent service.