New York Law Review

Tag: Teacher Suspension

  • Derle v. North Bellmore Union Free School District, 77 N.Y.2d 483 (1991): Teacher Compensation During Adjourned Disciplinary Hearings

    Derle v. North Bellmore Union Free School District, 77 N.Y.2d 483 (1991)

    A school district lacks the statutory authority to withhold a teacher’s salary during an adjournment of a disciplinary hearing under Education Law § 3020-a, even if the teacher requested the adjournment pending the resolution of related criminal charges, unless the teacher acted obstructively or in bad faith.

    Summary

    Gilbert Derle, a tenured teacher, faced misconduct charges from the North Bellmore School District. He requested an adjournment of his disciplinary hearing pending the resolution of related criminal charges, which was initially granted. The District then ceased paying his salary. The court held that the District lacked the authority to withhold Derle’s salary during the adjournment period, relying on the precedent set in Matter of Jerry v. Board of Educ., absent evidence of obstructionist conduct or bad faith by Derle. This case clarifies the scope of a school district’s power regarding teacher compensation during disciplinary proceedings under Education Law § 3020-a.

    Facts

    Gilbert Derle was a tenured teacher in the North Bellmore School District for over 30 years.

    In November 1984, the Board of Education charged Derle with misconduct, prompting Derle to request a hearing under Education Law § 3020-a.

    In February 1985, Derle was arrested and charged with sexual abuse and endangering the welfare of a child, stemming from the same allegations underlying the school district’s charges.

    On March 6, 1985, Derle requested an adjournment of the § 3020-a hearing until the criminal charges were resolved, arguing that proceeding would compromise his defense and privilege against self-incrimination.

    The hearing panel granted the adjournment on April 12, 1985.

    The District ceased Derle’s salary payments on March 22, 1985.

    On August 11, 1985, the panel reversed itself and ordered the hearing reopened.

    Derle resigned, effective December 15, 1985, as part of a settlement agreement.

    Procedural History

    Derle initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking reinstatement of his salary and benefits retroactive to March 21, 1985.

    The Supreme Court, Nassau County, dismissed the petition.

    The Appellate Division modified the judgment, remanding the matter for a new determination regarding salary and benefits between August 11, 1985, and December 15, 1985.

    The Court of Appeals dismissed Derle’s appeal for lack of finality.

    The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed Derle’s application for salary and benefits for the August-December period.

    The Appellate Division reversed, awarding Derle salary and benefits for the four-month period.

    Derle appealed to the Court of Appeals, bringing up for review the denial of salary and benefits for the period of March 21-August 11, 1985.

    The District cross-appealed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the School District was authorized to withhold Derle’s salary during the period of adjournment of the § 3020-a hearing, from March 21, 1985, to August 11, 1985, when the adjournment was requested by Derle pending resolution of parallel criminal charges.

    Holding

    No, because Education Law § 3020-a, as interpreted in Matter of Jerry v. Board of Educ., does not grant school districts the authority to withhold a teacher’s pay during a period of suspension or adjournment, absent obstructionist conduct or bad faith on the part of the teacher in requesting the adjournment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on its prior holding in Matter of Jerry v. Board of Educ., which established that compensation is a substantive right that cannot be taken away from a teacher absent explicit statutory authorization. The Court noted that the Legislature had not amended Education Law § 3020-a to authorize withholding pay during suspension since the Jerry decision.

    The Court rejected the District’s argument that Derle forfeited his salary by requesting the adjournment. The Court distinguished Matter of Belluardo v. Board of Educ., which allowed for forfeiture of salary if a teacher obstructs proceedings or obtains frivolous adjournments in bad faith. The Court found no evidence of bad faith on Derle’s part, noting that precedent at the time supported his request for adjournment and that the hearing panel had found good cause to grant it. The court quoted from the original hearing panel decision, "conceivable that what takes place in that administrative hearing could have an influence on his [Derle’s] ability to utilize all avenues of defense available to him in a criminal proceeding."

    The Court stated, "Compensation is a matter of such substantive right on the part of the teacher that we conclude that it cannot be taken away from him except pursuant to explicit statutory authorization.”

    The Court emphasized that any change to the Education Law granting school districts the authority to withhold compensation is a matter for the Legislature.

  • Adlerstein v. Board of Education, 64 N.Y.2d 90 (1984): Authority to Assign Duties to Suspended Teachers

    Adlerstein v. Board of Education, 64 N.Y.2d 90 (1984)

    A school board can assign non-teaching duties to a tenured teacher during a suspension period pending disciplinary hearings, provided the assignment is reasonably related to the teacher’s competence and training and maintains the dignity of the profession; furthermore, a school superintendent has broad authority to transfer teachers between schools absent contractual limitations or evidence of malice or bad faith.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases address the extent of a Board of Education’s authority over tenured teachers during suspension. Adlerstein, an art teacher, refused a reassignment to a different school after a disciplinary proceeding and sought reinstatement to his original position. Radoff, a social studies teacher, refused to perform tasks assigned during his suspension pending a disciplinary hearing and was subsequently dismissed. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Board could assign non-teaching duties to suspended teachers, and a superintendent has broad powers to transfer teachers between schools. The Court affirmed the denial of Adlerstein’s motion and affirmed Radoff’s dismissal.

    Facts

    Adlerstein, a senior art teacher, was suspended due to allegations of inadequate instruction and classroom management. He was reassigned to the Superintendent’s office but didn’t report. After reinstatement, he was assigned to a different school, which he refused. Radoff, a social studies teacher, was suspended and assigned tasks in the Board’s personnel office, which he refused to complete. This refusal led to a second set of charges and his eventual dismissal.

    Procedural History

    Adlerstein filed an Article 78 proceeding seeking reinstatement and back pay. Special Term initially denied the petition, then granted it in part, awarding back pay. The Appellate Division reversed. Adlerstein appealed. Radoff also filed an Article 78 proceeding challenging his dismissal. The Appellate Division confirmed the Board’s determination. Radoff appealed by permission of the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a Board of Education may require a suspended teacher to perform non-teaching assignments during the suspension period pending disciplinary proceedings.
    2. Whether a school superintendent has the authority to transfer a teacher to a different school after reinstatement following a disciplinary proceeding.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statutory language authorizing suspension pending a hearing does not preclude assigning other duties, and such assignments serve public interests. Also because, the non-teaching assignment bears a reasonable relationship to the suspended teacher’s competence and training and is consistent with the dignity of the profession.
    2. Yes, because the superintendent has broad authority to transfer teachers between schools absent contractual limitations or evidence of malice or bad faith.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that suspension pending a hearing is not a form of censure or discipline but a measure to protect students and the public interest. The Court emphasized that the purpose of tenure is to ensure job security for competent teachers, which isn’t frustrated by temporary non-teaching assignments related to their expertise. Citing Education Law § 2566(6), the Court upheld the superintendent’s broad power to transfer teachers, absent contractual conflicts or evidence of bad faith. The court distinguished Bailey v McDougall, noting it addressed transfers as disciplinary actions under a different section of the Education Law. The court stated that nonteaching assignments which bear a reasonable relationship to the suspended teacher’s competence and training and is consistent with the dignity of the profession is permissible because “the rationale of Matter of Jerry was not his or her release from all service but the protection of a suspended teacher from impoverishment during the period of suspension”. Regarding the transfer, the court noted, “[T]he subdivision does not specify that he must be returned to the same position in the same building from which he was suspended, but only that he be restored to his position as an art teacher, subject, as he was before suspension, to transfer by the superintendent to any other school within the district.”

  • Jerry v. Board of Education, 35 N.Y.2d 534 (1974): Teacher Suspensions and Withholding Pay

    Jerry v. Board of Education, 35 N.Y.2d 534 (1974)

    New York Education Law Section 3020-a, as drafted in 1974, does not authorize the suspension of a tenured teacher without pay pending disciplinary proceedings.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a Board of Education has the authority to suspend a tenured teacher without pay while disciplinary proceedings are pending under Section 3020-a of the New York Education Law. The Court of Appeals held that the statute, as then written, did not grant such authority. While acknowledging the necessity of suspension power for school administration, the court emphasized that the right to compensation is a substantive right and requires explicit statutory authorization for its deprivation. The court rejected the argument that a clause mentioning restoration of pay after acquittal implied the power to withhold pay during suspension, asserting that such power requires explicit statutory language.

    Facts

    In Jerry, a physical education teacher was suspended without pay due to allegations of using excessive physical force and inappropriate language toward students, violating prior directives. In Goldin, a guidance counselor was suspended without pay based on charges of sleeping with an 18-year-old female student and subsequently denying the allegations. Both teachers challenged the suspensions without pay, arguing the lack of statutory authority and raising constitutional concerns.

    Procedural History

    In Jerry, the Supreme Court dismissed the teacher’s petition, but the Appellate Division modified the decision, ordering back pay and a hearing. In Goldin, the Supreme Court upheld the suspension without pay pending resolution of one charge, but the Appellate Division modified by striking an injunction and limiting the withholding of pay to 30 days. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Section 3020-a of the Education Law authorizes a Board of Education to suspend a tenured teacher without pay pending the determination of disciplinary proceedings.

    Holding

    No, because Section 3020-a, as worded in 1974, does not explicitly grant the authority to withhold pay during a teacher’s suspension. The power to suspend does not automatically imply the power to withhold pay, which is a substantive right requiring clear statutory authorization.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while the power to suspend is essential for school administration, the right to compensation is a substantive right that cannot be taken away without explicit statutory authorization. The Court found no such explicit authorization in Section 3020-a. The Court dismissed the argument that the phrase “[i]f the employee is acquitted he shall be restored to his position with full pay for any period of suspension” implies legislative intent to allow withholding of pay during suspension. The Court stated, “had there been such an intention the easy and normal manner of its expression would have been to include an explicit, appropriate provision therefor in subdivision 2.”

    The dissenting judges argued that subdivisions 2 and 4 of Section 3020-a, read together, imply that the statute sanctions discretionary pre-hearing suspension without pay. They also contended that basic fairness requires that a payless suspension not be unlimited and that the courts are competent to remedy this deficiency by applying the traditional rule of reasonableness. The dissent cited analogous provisions of the Education Law where payless suspensions have long been accepted in administrative practice and in the courts.

    The majority stated there was no constitutional impediment to a statutory grant of explicit authority to withhold pay pending Section 3020-a proceedings, but left it to the legislature to grant such authority if it chose to do so. The court also held that the boards were entitled to credit against the teacher’s entitlement to back salary all earnings which the teachers may have had from other employment during their periods of suspension, citing Matter of Lezette v. Board of Educ.

    Regarding the Goldin case, the court addressed the teacher’s contention that constitutional protection of his right to privacy precluded the use of the first charge as a predicate for disciplinary proceedings. The court rejected this contention, stating, “We cannot accept the proposition that the Constitution confers an absolute right of privacy. We conclude that such right must give way in these circumstances to a recognition of the legitimate interests of the school.”