Tamara B. v. Pete F., 80 N.Y.2d 959 (1992)

Labor Law § 241(6), which concerns safety precautions at construction, excavation, and demolition sites, applies not only to building construction but also to other types of projects like highway repaving.

Summary

This case addresses the scope of Labor Law § 241(6) and whether it applies solely to building construction. The Court of Appeals held that § 241(6) extends beyond building sites to include activities such as highway repaving. The court reasoned that the legislative history of the statute and prior case law support a broader interpretation, ensuring worker safety in various construction-related activities. This decision clarifies the applicability of § 241(6) and ensures that workers engaged in non-building construction activities receive the same safety protections.

Facts

The claimant, Tamara B., sustained injuries while working on a State highway repaving project. She brought a cause of action under Labor Law § 241(6), alleging that the State failed to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety at the worksite.

Procedural History

The Court of Claims denied the State’s motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the cause of action brought under Labor Law § 241(6). The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Court of Claims’ order.

Issue(s)

Whether the requirements of Labor Law § 241(6) are limited to building construction sites, or whether they extend to other construction, excavation, or demolition work such as highway repaving projects.

Holding

No, because the legislative history of Labor Law § 241(6) demonstrates that its scope was not intended to be limited to building construction, and prior holdings by the Court of Appeals support this broader interpretation.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals based its decision on the legislative history of Labor Law § 241(6) and prior case law. The court noted that while the introductory language of § 241 appears to limit the applicability of the subsequent subdivisions to building construction, the history of subdivision (6) shows that its scope was not intended to be so limited. Prior to a 1969 amendment, the statute applied to “[a]ll areas, buildings or structures.” The court referenced Tilkins v. City of Niagara Falls, which examined the legislative history and concluded that the amendment was not meant to narrow the scope of protection. The court also cited its prior decisions in Page v. State of New York and Celestine v. City of New York, which endorsed this reasoning. The Court specifically addressed the contrary interpretation in Matter of Dillon v. State of New York, clarifying that Dillon incorrectly relied on a case arising under an earlier, narrower version of the statute and should not be followed. The Court concluded that the claimant’s allegations fall within the purview of Labor Law § 241(6) because the statute’s protections extend to injuries sustained during a State highway repaving project.